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Abstract 
Small farms disappeared at a disproportionately high rate in interwar England, 
when compared to large farms.  Unnoticed until now, this was coincidental 
with the dominance of farming and its political agenda by a hegemonic bloc of 
large-scale farmers and landowners and their supporters; this lobby neglected 
to demonstrate that it was small farm failure that they were utilising to 
represent interwar failure across the entire industry.  Such continued 
dominance after the Second World War resulted in the historiography seeing 
shrinkage of the arable acreages found commonly on large farms as 
demonstrative of depression in interwar agriculture.  Statistics show that large 
farms were actually better able to withstand agricultural depression.  Large-
scale farmers in all areas of England decreased their arable acreages 
voluntarily, moving into dairy production; indeed, historians have, recently, 
seen dairy farming expansion as showing interwar agricultural success.  
However, the increased competition and falling milk prices brought failure to 
the small farms traditionally involved in dairying.  Simultaneous creation of 
Government subsidised smallholdings maintained artificially high numbers of 
small farms, further increasing competition amongst them and masking their 
falling numbers. The large farm lobby has attributed interwar agricultural 
depression to Governments’ lack of financial support; however, it used the 
social capital attached to ownership of substantial land and capital to influence 
agricultural policy to favour large-scale farming.  The resulting price 
guarantees for milk and wheat benefited large farms even as disappearance of 
small farms quickened in pace.  Large-scale farmers also profited from the 
employment of paid labour and from economies of scale, neither of which 
were available to small farmers.  The agricultural hegemonic bloc also 
attributed agriculture’s problems, volubly and continually, to workers and 
minimum wage regulation whilst small farmers’ requirements went unheeded, 
leading to small farm disappearance.  These problems of powerlessness 
amongst small businesses persist to this day. 
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Introduction 
 
The study of the agriculture and of rural England between the two World Wars 
to date has suffered from a failure to recognise the importance of scale in 
farming, as represented by farm size, upon the prosperity, survival and failure 
of farmers.  A tendency exists to rely on comparisons of major types of 
farming in order to determine the economic state of agriculture at the time 
and then to make judgements on the social conditions that reflect these 
determinations.  Contrasting opinions on the overall state of interwar 
agriculture have resulted; earlier studies ascribed failure to the industry whilst 
later ones judged it a success, depending upon which of arable or dairy 
farming had been given greater prominence in the studies undertaken.  
Evidence that has not before been used to determine interwar conditions will 
be examined in an attempt to reveal the basis for the existence of these 
contrasts; trends in numbers of farms of contrasting scale, as revealed by the 
Agricultural Statistics collected by the Ministry of Agriculture for the interwar 
period, will be used as the indicator of success and failure.  
 Arable farming has been understood as in decline as a result of its 
shrinking acreage between 1919 and 1939 whilst dairy farming is noted for its 
expansion. Arable farming tended, although not exclusively, of course, to be 
undertaken on large farms in the south and east of England whilst dairy 
farming was traditionally seen as a small farm process carried out in the 
pastoral north and west.  The expectation would be that small farms would 
have prospered and their numbers would have been, if not expanded, then 
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maintained, especially in counties of dairying renown, whilst large farm 
numbers would decline, notably in the south and east.   
 Problems in arable farming stemming from long-term falls in 
international grain prices1 have become an accepted part of the story of 
interwar agriculture and, so, an obvious conclusion would be that any evidence 
found of falling farm numbers demonstrated the operation of simple market 
mechanisms which made English arable farmers less competitive. This thesis 
will explore the possibility that the decline of arable farming caused a move by 
large-scale arable farmers into dairying in the 1920s which created problems 
of competition in the markets for milk which small farms were unable to 
withstand.  The influence upon the fortunes of small-scale farmers of the 
introduction of the Milk Marketing Board in 1933 as a means by which 
Government could guarantee milk prices, ostensibly, to all dairy farmers, will 
also come under scrutiny; the expectation would be that fluctuations in farm 
numbers might be smoothed as the result of an enforced equilibrium of prices 
and production.  The contrasting fortunes of the agricultural industry could 
then be seen simply as the result, initially, of correctly functioning international 
markets which were then distorted by a National Government that was 
artificially maintaining inefficient producers.  The same could be said for the 
introduction of State subsidised smallholdings, especially during the 1920s, 
and of the Wheat Act, introduced in 1932 to guarantee prices for wheat 
farmers, and these measures will be examined.   
                                        
1 Malenbaum, W., The World Wheat Economy, 1885-1939 (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1953), p.177. 
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Issues of social class will be explored towards the end of this thesis and 
the part they played in the development of English rural society between the 
two World Wars will be assessed.  The history of interwar rural England has 
been considerably shaped by the rural class structure between the Wars.  The 
dominant class of large-scale, employing farmers and landowners reacted to 
those developments in the international economy which were forcing structural 
change on an increasingly uncompetitive English agriculture by demanding 
Government support.  The response, however, was the development of 
policies of support for agriculture that may have ignored or even militated 
against the needs of small-scale, petit bourgeois, farmers and enabled a 
consolidation of larger scale farmers and landowners to take place within the 
dominant class during the interwar years.  Larger scale farmers and members 
of the aristocracy and gentry thus formed the heart of the rural bourgeoisie,2 a 
class defined by its ownership of accumulated labour in the form of capital3 
and, extensively, as land. 
This is not a study of social class in the form of an anatomy of the 
cultural practices and consumption behaviour that are often perceived to be 
the signifiers of social class.  This is a study of the economic behaviour that is 
intrinsic to the possession of capital of differing scales, insofar as economic 
fortunes derive from that capital, which allows for the reproduction of the 
particular behaviour that acts, in sociological studies, as the signifier of 
                                        
2 Fforde, M., Conservatism and Collectivism, 1886-1914 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1990), p.167. 
3 Bourdieu, P., ‘The Forms of Capital’, in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology 
of Education, ed. by Richardson, J.G. (New York: Greenwood 1986), pp.241-58, (p.241).  
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positions in the class structure.4  Newby et al. state that, ‘Land is also capital’5  
and are forthright in recognising its economic and social significance in the 
countryside with this significance being central to this study.  Farms of over 50 
acres in extent required the presence of paid labour between the Wars. The 
representative voices of agriculture, the NFU and CLA, were dominated by 
arable farmers and landowners who accumulated capital through the payment 
of labour on their farms.  The possession of capital allows for the operation of 
influence in policy making through the operation of social capital.   The extent 
to which they created a rhetoric of their betrayal by Government based upon 
the implementation by Governments of compulsory minimum wage rates in 
agriculture will be explored.  The influence of the rhetoric combined with the 
operation of social capital of this rural grouping upon Government legislation 
that favoured employing farmers will be investigated.   
A clear clash of interests exists between the ownership of agricultural 
businesses cultivating sufficient land to allow capital to be accumulated from 
labour power and from the working class that supplies it.  The structural 
conflict between capital and labour has, where it has been examined at all, 
tended to occlude the possible existence of any adverse influence of the 
extensive ownership of economic and social capital by large-scale farmers and 
landowners upon the survival chances of small farm businesses.  Small–scale 
farmers had no direct interest in the employment of labour and, logically, only 
                                        
4 Bourdieu, P., Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (London: Routledge, 
2008; 1st published 1979), pp.55-6. 
5 ‘Land is also capital, a highly secure, long-term investment and a sound collateral.’ Newby, 
H., Bell, C., Rose, D. and Saunders, P., Property, Paternalism and Power: Class and Control in 
Rural England (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd, 1978), p.39. 
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an antagonistic relationship with large farmers with whom they were in 
competition in the marketplace, whether this was for the sale of commodities 
or a share of State agricultural support.  Very little evidence appears to exist of 
any wide recognition of the structural conflict between large and small 
farmers.  The existence of an antagonism between small-scale farmers and 
labour is taken for granted in the behaviour of the dominant class in the 
interwar years; it is further implied by an almost complete absence of an 
alternative rhetoric promoting small farm requirements, although the militancy 
of some small-scale milk farmers is recognised, below.  The effects of this 
apparent acquiescence by small farmers to their leadership by a social class 
inimical to their interests will be demonstrated, although the causes will 
remain to be explored.  
The study of agriculture in interwar England is fraught with difficulty 
because the conclusions made in the writing to date are often partial, 
contradictory or, even, self-contradicting.  Chapter One of this thesis will 
explore the contradictory basis of the debate by introducing evidence that 
stressed the existence of depression in farming but also evidence of rising 
farm incomes.  The necessity for additional evidence and a novel approach will 
be demonstrated.  
The introduction of data on trends in farmer and farm numbers in 
Chapter Two may overcome some of the difficulty in determining between 
agricultural success and failure by demonstrating any human cost of the 
economic conditions in agriculture between the Wars.  Given the oft-heard 
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expressions by agriculture’s proponents and supporters of the emotional 
attachment of farmers to farming and its land, any significant disappearance 
of farms and farmers from the industry between 1919 and 1939 might be 
considered one of the reasons, beyond simplistic economic definitions, that 
agriculture was perceived to have been in a depressed state in the period.   
However, greater output occurred for the industry as a whole.  Arable 
acreages fell whilst dairy output increased.  The conclusion appears simple; 
fortunes in interwar agriculture were mixed and an examination of reliable, 
frequently collected data on farm numbers should show arable farmers to be 
failing and disappearing whilst dairy farmers survived and numbers were, at 
least, maintained, if not increased.   
Closer examination of the statistical data is undertaken in Chapters 
Three and Four.  A search will be made for incidence of failure and 
disappearance of farms in dairy farming, the branch of agriculture which has 
appeared in the historiography to date to be the most successful.  Small farms, 
often found in dairy farming, will be analysed in counties most commonly 
associated with dairy farming: the West Riding of Yorkshire and Lancashire. It 
will be seen that arable acreages in the dairy areas, usually found on the 
larger farms, were declining simultaneously with the increase in dairying, 
suggesting a switch into milk production on large farms.  The statistical 
evidence provided is complemented by an examination of the situation that 
had developed in the milk industry by the early 1930s.  The conclusion 
emerges that large farms had been entering into milk production since the 
First World War and had, almost literally, flooded the market.   
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Farm disappearance is examined in even greater detail in Chapter Five.  
Small farm failure is found in further counties in the pastoral region as well as 
in the arable region where dairy farming was increasing.  The effect of 
difficulties for existing small farms may have been somewhat obscured in the 
1920s by the creation of heavily State-subsidised smallholdings in some of 
these counties.  Small farms disappearing in the areas of pastoral farming 
where average farm sizes were similar to the national average, such as Devon 
and Gloucester, but also in counties in the region associated traditionally with 
large-scale arable farming, such as Hampshire, Norfolk and West Suffolk, 
would amount to country-wide failure.  Simultaneous disappearance of arable 
acreages and dairy cattle increases in arable and pastoral counties will indicate 
the likelihood of a similar switch to dairy farming by large-scale farms.  Small 
farm numbers in Lincoln-Holland, where farms were uncharacteristically small 
on average and where smallholdings formed such a large proportion of small 
farms that they were insulated by subsidy, may not show the same patterns of 
disappearance as found in other arable counties.   
Chapter Six will show that small farms were not commonly reliant on 
arable production and so the support of Government in the form of the Milk 
Marketing Board (MMB) would be assumed to have been of great importance 
to them.  A comparison is made of the relative rates of disappearance of both 
large and small farms in the 1920s and the 1930s to assess the impact of 
Government legislation that offered financial support to farmers.  Particular 
attention will be paid to the effects of the MMB and the Wheat Act of 1932 on 
farms of contrasting size.  The results of the influence of large-scale farmers 
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and landowners, as part of a rural ‘hegemonic bloc’, in achieving the 
enactment of these Government policies, structured to work in their interests 
and against those of small farmers, will be scrutinised.  
The work presented here has a strong empirical element in its study of 
interwar rural England insofar as attempting to make judgements only on the 
basis of documented experience.  Statistics that show change over time 
represent documented experience since they are a record of a number of 
occurrences of a defined nature that related to social agents which can 
reasonably be accepted as having actually taken place and, thus, to have been 
experienced.  Agricultural statistics are used to provide a substantial empirical 
base because they are a record of a large number of common experiences 
provided in sets which were collected on an annual basis.  The importance of 
the analysis is to make sense of how these sets of documented experiences 
are related so that a trend in one can be identified and, then, be seen in its 
relation to a trend in another.  Related trends such as these become all the 
more likely to be representative of the actual events of the past when 
supported by the commentary and documentary evidence provided, here.   
The aim of this work is to establish whether or not a trend exists that 
shows that the larger the resources of land and capital attaching to a farmer 
and a farm in England between the Wars, the greater was their chance of 
survival and, potentially, success, irrespective of the type of farming they may 
have been engaged upon.  Were the opposite to be found to be true and small 
farms be seen to have enjoyed success at the expense of their larger 
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counterparts, an appropriate investigation of the causes would be necessary, 
especially in the light of long-term trends that show decreases in small farm 
numbers until, at least, the 1980s.6  The conditions for the success of small 
farms in adverse international economic circumstances would surely have 
resonance today, at a time when small business and entrepreneurship are 
being regarded as providing the impetus for economic growth and individual 
achievement.7  The search for the social and economic basis for any trend that 
may be illuminated through this examination of statistical and documentary 
evidence from interwar England begins here. Any conclusions reached may 
well be strongly supported by the evidence presented but they are, of course, 
open to question because the search for further information that might shed 
light or cast doubt upon any conclusions about the past remains the social 
responsibility of the historian. 
 
 
                                        
6 Grigg, D., ‘Farm Size in England and Wales from Early Victorian Times to the Present’, 
Agricultural History Review, 35 1, (1987), 179-89, (p.185). 
7 Frankish, J., Roberts, R., and Storey, D., ‘Enterprise: a Route out of Disadvantage and 
Deprivation?’, in Enterprise, Deprivation and Social Exclusion: the Role of Small Business in 
Addressing Social and Economic Inequalities, ed. by Southern, A. (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2011), pp.16-38, (pp.16-17). 
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Chapter 1: The Discourse of Agricultural Distress in Interwar England 
Introduction 
 
The representation of decline in the fortunes of English agriculture 
which has been predominant in the historiography of the period between the 
First and the Second World Wars originated in the interwar period itself, as will 
be shown in this chapter.  This representation is reflected, for instance, in the 
pronouncements of agricultural bodies made at the time that stressed the 
ongoing problems of agriculture.  The spokesman of the Central Landowners’ 
Association (CLA), Lord Hastings, for instance, when questioned as to when he 
regarded tithe rentcharge to have become an unsustainable burden upon 
agricultural land and, thus, upon farmers, replied that it was coincident with 
the beginning of an agricultural depression that had begun in 1923 or 1924 
and was ongoing in December 1934, while the Central Chambers of Agriculture 
(CCA) wrote in 1934 of ‘the long neglect and the consequent depreciation of 
the condition of both buildings and land’.1  Some credence must be given to 
both the contemporary and the historiographical representation of agriculture 
as in decline in England between the Wars, if only because of the weight of 
opinion that will be shown to have been behind it, but evidence has been 
presented recently that suggests that the nature and extent of it were subject 
                                        
1 Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge, Report of the Royal Commission on Tithe 
Rentcharge in England and Wales, etc. (Statement by His Majesty's Government - Minutes of 
Evidence Taken before the Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge), 1935-1936, (Cmd.5102), 
(London: Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge, 1936), p.181. 
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to some considerable exaggeration,2 as will be made clear.  However, it is 
pertinent to an exploration of the fortunes of small-scale farms and their 
operators that it appears to have been accepted that the arable areas of the 
east of England suffered particularly badly,3 these being areas characterised by 
farms of above average size,4 indicating, perhaps, that large-scale farmers 
experienced relatively greater problems than those on smaller holdings, a 
possibility that will be investigated in later chapters.  This chapter will 
demonstrate that the construction of the picture of depression was general 
and made little distinction between the fortunes of farmers of varying scales 
and, in particular, put little overall emphasis on the conditions of small-scale 
operators.  This is not to say that no appreciation of the existence of small 
farmers and smallholders existed, as future chapters will show, merely that 
any adverse conditions that they experienced were represented as being an 
aspect of a malaise affecting all of English agriculture.  
The statement from the CCA on the state of rural buildings and land 
demonstrates that concern over rural decay extended beyond the economics 
of agriculture and its personnel to encompass the landscape itself and, by 
extension, the fabric of rural society in its interweaving with a countryside 
                                        
2 Brassley, P., ‘British Farming between the Wars’, in The English Countryside between the 
Wars: Regeneration or Decline, ed. by Brassley, P., Burchardt, J., and Thompson, L. 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006a), pp.187-99. 
3 Howkins, A., ‘Death and Rebirth? English Rural Society, 1920-1940’, in The English 
Countryside between the Wars: Regeneration or Decline?, ed. by Brassley, P., Burchardt, J., 
and Thompson, L. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006), pp.10-25, (p.11); Brown, J., Agriculture 
in England: a Survey of Farming 1870–1947 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 
p.76.  
4 Howkins, A., The Death of Rural England: a Social History of the English Countryside since 
1900 (London: Routledge, 2003), p.5; Caird, J., English Agriculture in 1850-51 (London: Frank 
Cass and Company Limited, 1968; 1st published in 1851), p.ii. 
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conditioned by farming.  If Stanley Baldwin were to be believed in his 
estimation that, ‘The countryside is England and England is the countryside,’5 
the dangers of the decay of rural society which Lord Hastings and the CLA 
were making concomitant with that of agriculture would be an issue of 
national importance.  Thus, it can be seen that any study of English agriculture 
in the interwar period is destined to encounter issues of a much wider social, 
political and cultural nature than merely the economics of farming.  Farmers, 
as the predominant sector of business operators of the agricultural community 
were a key component of rural society and their importance within the 
countryside was increasing.6  The interaction of farmers with the issues of a 
wider social, political and cultural nature and the effects upon small-scale 
farmers are a concern of this thesis.   
This chapter begins by examining the way in which farmers and their 
supporters managed to create an image of their affliction by depression during 
the interwar years which became the predominant theme in the subsequent 
historiography.  The thesis will conclude by investigating both the extent to 
which the social positions and cultural practices of large-scale farmers as 
members of the dominant class were crucial in the maintenance both of their 
own competitive advantage, occurring as a result of their common interest 
with other rural and ruralist class fractions, and the disadvantage of small-
scale competitors.  This investigation begins in this chapter, however, through 
                                        
5 Mansfield, N., ‘Farmworkers, Local Identity and Conservatism, 1914-1930’, in The English 
Countryside between the Wars: Regeneration or Decline?, ed. by Brassley, P., Burchardt, J., 
and Thompson, L. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006), pp.176-86, (p.186). 
6 Woods, M., ‘Discourses of Power and Rurality: Local Politics in Somerset in the Twentieth 
Century’, Political Geography, 16 6, (1997), 453-78, (p.464). 
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the demonstration of the support that farmers received from various quarters 
during and after the interwar years.  A picture is then sketched of the 
development of the historiography of interwar English agriculture and a 
suggestion is made as to why a reappraisal of the economic performance of 
the industry has taken so long to emerge.  Some of the economic details of 
this belated challenge are then noted, the thrust of the challenge being that 
economic indicators suggest that difficulties in the industry seem to have been 
exaggerated in contemporary and historical accounts and that this has resulted 
in favourable treatment of agriculture by Governments since the 1930s.  The 
representation by contemporary agriculturalists and ruralists and, as a result, 
by historians of interwar agriculture as a unitary economic sector which pays 
little attention to differentials in the scale of farm businesses will become 
apparent.  The context will thereby begin to be established for an examination 
of the adverse consequences for small-scale farmers of some of the legislation 
that emerged as a result of the account of the existence of agricultural 
depression created during the interwar years.  This demonstrates the 
requirement for histories of the period to implement an approach that 
recognises the political and economic advantages possessed by the operators 
of large-scale businesses dependent on considerable inputs of capital and 
upon hired labour.  This chapter begins to fulfil that requirement. 
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Agriculture and Economy in Interwar Rural England: a History of 
Depression 
 
The relative neglect of the study of the English agriculture of the years 
from 1919 to 1939 might perhaps reflect the apparent mundanity of the 
subject area when contrasted with those wider issues of political diplomacy 
and international economy of the time that generally take centre stage.  There 
has been until recently a shortage of specialist histories of interwar rural 
England and its agriculture despite the attention paid by Alun Howkins in The 
Death of Rural England and Edith Whetham’s earlier contribution to The 
Agrarian History of England and Wales.7  Work on interwar English agriculture 
is usually to be found either at the tail end of work on the depression in 
farming that began in 1875 and which is considered to have continued until 
the Second World War, as is the case with the studies by Richard Perren and 
Jonathan Brown, or in the middle of work covering a much longer span of 
time, Howard Newby’s Country Life: a Social History of Rural England and 
David Grigg’s English Agriculture: a Historical Perspective serving as good 
examples of this tendency.  Howkins’ text, cited above, actually embraces the 
whole of the twentieth century and, at the other extreme, John Martin begins 
his study of British farming in 1931.8  
 It is noticeable that histories written in the 1980s and 1990s and even 
in the twenty-first century perpetuate a particular version of the history of 
                                        
7 Howkins, Death of Rural England; Whetham, E. H., The Agrarian History of England and 
Wales, Volume 8: 1914-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
8 Howkins, Death of Rural England; Perren, R., Agriculture in Depression: 1870–1940 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Grigg, D., English Agriculture: an Historical 
Perspective (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Brown, Agriculture; Newby, H., Country Life: a 
Social History of Rural England (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1987). 
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English agriculture that is present in the earlier work of Sir Keith Murray, of 
Peter Self and Herbert J. Storing and of Edith Whetham, that describes a 
decline in the industry that began in the 1870s and culminated at the end of 
the depressed interwar years.9  This version of agricultural decline has, until 
recently, dominated the history of agriculture and, hence, of the countryside.10  
Newby, despite acceding to the reinterpretation of the period from 1870 to 
1939 as one of the structural change in agriculture later elucidated by Joan 
Thirsk,11 offered the following in 1987: 
From 1875 until 1939, with only a brief respite during and immediately 
after the First World War, British agriculture was in a state of chronic 
depression, characterized by falling commodity prices, lower rents, 
increasing bankruptcies and an unkempt rural landscape.12  
F.M.L. Thompson wrote in 1991 that depression, as opposed to being rife 
amongst farmers before the First World War, ‘...was something that happened, 
rather, in the interwar years.’13  This image of agricultural depression is 
reflected in the very titles of some orthodox economic histories; for example, 
Perren, despite acknowledging the features of structural change recognised by 
                                        
9 Short, B., Watkins, C., and Martin, J., ‘“The Front Line of Freedom”: State-Led Agricultural 
Revolution in Britain, 1939-45’, in The Front Line of Freedom: British Farming in the Second 
World War, ed. by Short, B., Watkins, C., and Martin, J. (Exeter: British Agricultural History 
Society, 2006), pp.1-15, (p.4); Martin, J., The Development of Modern Agriculture: British 
Farming since 1931 (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.5; Whetham, Agrarian History; Self, P., and 
Storing, H.J., The State and the Farmer (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962); Murray, 
K.A.H., Agriculture: History of the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1955). 
10 Howkins, Death of Rural England, p.2. 
11 Thirsk, J., Alternative Agriculture: a History from the Black Death to the Present Day 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.147-222. 
12 Newby, Country Life, pp.104-5. 
13 Thompson, F.M.L., ‘An Anatomy of English Agriculture, 1870-1914’, in Land, Labour and 
Agriculture, 1700-1920: Essays for Gordon Mingay, ed. by Holderness, B.A, and Turner, M. 
(London: Hambledon Press, 1991), pp.211-40, (p.213). 
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Newby, titled his 1995 work which spans the period 1870 to 1940, Agriculture 
in Depression.14  Subsequent work embracing agriculture in its economic 
relations with rural society in the interwar period exists but often as a chapter 
or a theme in a wider ranging study, such as in work by Clare Griffiths or 
Jeremy Burchardt,15 and charts a course from 1918 to 1939 through 
agricultural hardship and social upheaval16 where it is not eliding the 
economics of the industry altogether.  This is especially true with regard to 
questions of the various rural class relationships that might result from the 
different scales of farm operations and the accompanying variations in the 
social relations of production of farmers.  An alternative approach exists of the 
very specialist local, almost anthropological, approach.  Alwyn Rees’ 1950 
study, for example, has the advantage of being researched in the interwar 
years and of involving the study of a parish with considerable numbers of 
small-scale farmers but the disadvantage in terms of this study of England of 
being based in a Welsh parish.17  Rees, in terms of social relations, is 
somewhat contradictory; for example, having stated that, ‘Class distinction is 
comparatively weak in Llanfinhangel’, Rees proceeds to differentiate ‘large 
farmers’, who seek to ‘emulate their social betters’, from other farmers.18  
Rees does not examine the effects of such behaviour on small-scale farmers in 
the way that this present study aspires to do and, in accordance with later 
written histories, makes no economic distinction between farmers of differing 
                                        
14 Perren, Agriculture, pp.68-70. 
15 Griffiths, Labour and the Countryside: the Politics of Rural Britain, 1918-1939 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); Burchardt, J., Paradise Lost: Rural Idyll and Social Change in 
England since 1800 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002). 
16 Howkins, Death of Rural England, pp.27-142. 
17 Rees, A.D., Life in a Welsh Countryside (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1961). 
18 Ibid., pp.142, 147. 
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scales when recounting the same tale of depression in which ‘the profits of the 
thirties were extremely meagre’.19   
It appears that the history of agriculture in the interwar period which 
was written during the second half of the twentieth century is one of serious 
and all-consuming depression.  The point is made that livestock farming was 
less hard hit, overall, than arable farming20 but scant need appears to have 
been felt to make much distinction between the fortunes of farmers of 
differing scales.  The question arises as to the nature of the evidence for this 
gloomy and overarching assessment; an answer is given in the following 
section. 
 
A Construction of Depression 
 
Little doubt can exist that the perception of historians writing after the 
Second World War of the difficulties of interwar agriculture was influenced by 
august commentators from the late 1930s who reflected a general mood in the 
need to address what they saw as existent problems in British agriculture.  
Agriculture was regarded by observers from across the political spectrum as 
having suffered serious difficulties in the interwar period, Howkins citing the 
Conservative M.P. Viscount Lymington, from the Right, and, from the Left, the 
1939 work of Lord Addison in support of this view.21  Both Brown and Cooper 
have detailed the generally affable relationship that might be expected to have 
                                        
19 Ibid., p.30. 
20 Martin, Development, pp.12-15; Perren, p.69; Brown, Agriculture, p.89. 
21 Howkins, Death of Rural England, p.12. 
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existed between farmers, as rural business owners, and the Conservative Party 
which survived a measure of strain during the 1920s and worked considerably 
in farmers’ interests in the 1930s.22  Griffiths has demonstrated that the 
Labour Party, for whom Addison had served as Minister of Agriculture during 
the Government of 1929 to 1931, was prepared neither to commit to the 
nationalization of the land as a solution to the problems it had accepted 
agriculture to be suffering nor the abandonment of the rural vote.  There was 
clearly division within the Party over the role that farmers themselves played in 
the difficulties they faced and the extent of their exaggeration of them; 
however, the party’s general shift during the 1930s towards the recognition 
that farmers needed to be embraced in an industry of service to the nation,23 
as part of what Winter refers to as the developing ‘agricultural corporatism’ 
within a nascent liberal corporate state,24 shows that Labour was undoubtedly 
accepting of the notion that the fortunes of agriculture needed addressing 
following long-term problems that were exacerbated in the interwar years.  
Addison articulated the ongoing decline of the land and its industry in his 1939 
work, A Policy for British Agriculture,25 but, despite distinguishing smallholders 
and family farmers from those of larger scale, failed to identify any structural 
                                        
22 Brown, J., ‘Agricultural Policy and the National Farmers’ Union, 1908-1939’, in Agriculture 
and Politics in England, 1815-1939, ed. by Wordie, J.R. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 
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Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989). 
23 Griffiths, Labour, pp.258-90. 
24 Winter, M., Rural Politics: Policies for Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment (London: 
Routledge, 1996), pp.19, 71-99. 
25 Right Honourable Lord Addison of Stallingborough, A Policy for British Agriculture, (London: 
Victor Gollancz Limited, 1939). 
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problems for small-scale farmers, blaming lack of marketing sense for any of 
the economic difficulties they shared with the rest of agriculture.26 
The links of Viscount Astor to the Liberals, the traditional party of 
laissez faire, make it perhaps a little surprising that he would display sympathy 
for a farming interest that made considerable claims for and received 
Government aid;27 however, having undertaken and published the results of 
studies of the industry in the 1930s, notably with B. Seebohm Rowntree, and 
despite his opposition to subsidies for wheat and sugar beet,28 his opinion, 
published in 1938, was that no previous depression in world agriculture had 
been as deep as that of the 1930s29 and the book that contained it would 
clearly have been influential.  British Agriculture: the Principles of Future Policy 
undoubtedly had an audience as the second edition makes clear, the 456 page 
first edition being widely available and having ‘had a good reception in the 
press and satisfactory sales.’30   
The term ‘depression’ was also applied to agriculture freely in the 
interwar years by agricultural economists and other experts.  The ideological 
positions of agricultural economists, in spite of some such as A.W. Ashby and 
Joseph Duncan having links with agricultural trade unionism,31 were 
                                        
26 Ibid., p.43. 
27 Lord Ernle, English Farming, Past and Present, 6th edn. (London: Heinemann, 1961; this 
edn. 1st published 1936), p.418; Orwin, C. S., A History of English Farming (London: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1949), p.91. 
28 Viscount Astor and Seebohm Rowntree, B., British Agriculture: the Principles of Future 
Policy, 2nd edn. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), p.272. 
29 Ibid., p.43. 
30 Ibid., p.vii. 
31 Whetham, E.H., Agricultural Economists in Britain 1900–1940 (Oxford: Agricultural 
Economics Institute, [1981(?)]), pp.34-5. 
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conditioned by economic orthodoxy and thus supportive of those strata of 
those members of the dominant class with interests in agriculture and rural 
society; agricultural economists were defending, effectively, their own interests 
in the countryside, as is reflected in their acceptance of the existence of 
depression.  The landowner and farmer Cecil Dampier-Whetham used the term 
‘depression’ in regard to agriculture in the first sentence of his 1927 
publication, Politics and the Land, whilst talks given to the Agricultural 
Economics Society and published in its journal included the word ‘depression’ 
in the 1929 titles by A.W. Ashby, by Ashby and J.L. Davies, by R.R. Enfield and 
by R.J. Thompson.  Enfield proceeded in 1935 to talk of the likelihood or 
otherwise of ‘recovery’ from the ‘depression’ in agriculture that he mentioned 
in the first sentence of his article of that year and which, ‘in its extent and 
severity’, he considered to be, ‘probably the most serious recorded in the 
world as a whole.’32  The historian, K.A.H. Murray, the writer of the official 
history of agriculture during the Second World War, was a member of, and 
attendee and questioning contributor at, the Agricultural Economics Society.33  
 The assumption must not be made that the expert opinion cited above 
was uncritical in its acceptance of the existence of depression in agriculture or 
                                        
32 Ashby, A.W., ‘Some Human and Social Factors in the Depression’, Journal of the 
Proceedings of the Agricultural Economics Society, 1 2, (1929), 89-99; Ashby, A.W., and 
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of its causes but there is little doubt that the involvement of its authors as part 
of the agricultural community brought them into contact with a representation 
by farmers and their supporters of the economic hardship that was claimed to 
be afflicting the industry and that they tended, unwittingly or otherwise, to 
reproduce this version.  The agricultural economists, D. Skilbeck and M. 
Messer, highlighted the role of the supporters of agriculture in creating the 
image of depression, writing in 1929, ‘the daily press has filled its readers’ 
minds with the proximity of the financial failure of the English countryside.’34  
Indeed, abundant evidence exists from within the agricultural community and 
its supporters of the creation of a perception of existing depression in the 
industry from 1921 onwards through the interwar years to which 
contemporary commentators would have been exposed.  A letter to the 
farmers’ newspaper, the Mark Lane Express, from October 1921 summed up 
the farmers’ view of their position: 
All but compulsory purchase of one’s holding; shortage of enough 
capital and stock to run it with; prices of corn and all livestock, 
abandoned to the mercies of foreign competition, tumbling down 
headlong; rates and taxes going up; and war wages and bonuses to be 
modified to a reasonable level as best you can, are enough to try the 
stoutest hearted farmer.35 
                                        
34 Skilbeck, D., and Messer, M., ‘The Incidence of Notices to Quit and Rent Reductions as an 
Indicator of Farming Conditions’, Journal of the Proceedings of the Agricultural Economics 
Society, 1 2, (1929), 52-65, (p.52). 
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 Farmers who purchased their holdings found owner-occupation often to 
be a burden.36  A significant increase in the owner-occupation of farms by 
farmers took place between 1918 and 1927 and was often the result of a 
desire amongst landowners to divest themselves of landed assets, a process 
whereby farmers in some cases were effectively forced to buy their farms if 
they wished to remain farming them in a market where demand for land was 
high, forcing up prices.37  Many farmers, partly as a result of what Ministry of 
Agriculture (MAF) documents from 1923 referred to as ‘the resultant 
competition among purchasers’ and ‘the keenness of the demand for land’,38 
found themselves with heavy mortgages, the payments of which were higher 
than had been their previous rent.39  The emotional pressure to buy was high 
for many farmers since, as was observed in the documents, ‘In many cases 
they bought in order to avoid being turned out of the homes which their 
families had occupied for generations.’40  The emotional pressure may have 
contributed further to a feeling of malaise, but, if nothing else, there were 
farmers affected financially by this condition for whom the impression of a 
miring in depression could have seemed very real.  
Howkins has concluded that agricultural depression is evident in the 
interwar years but was concentrated principally in the years from 1922 to 1925 
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and 1929 to 1932.41  Difficulties amongst farmers during the earlier period are, 
indeed, reflected in the following evidence from 1923.  The NFU Record, the 
journal published monthly by the National Farmers’ Union, was publishing 
details of a speech given in the House of Commons regarding levels of 
bankruptcy amongst farmers: it noted that ‘Lt. Col. Buckley gave a table 
showing farmers’ receiving orders and deeds of arrangements’ which had been 
increasing steadily since the end of the First World War, numbering as follows: 
30 in 1918, 33 in 1919, 44 in 1920, 285 in 1921, 404 in 1922.42  Whilst these 
numbers are low relative to the total number of farmers, they are 
demonstrably increasing and papers relating to the Agricultural Credits Bill of 
1923 suggest that farmers were also choosing to retire from farming rather 
than face bankruptcy,43 this being a familiar course of action during farming 
depression, as revealed by the agricultural economist R.J. Thompson who 
indicated its reoccurrence at the time of the depression of 1929.44  However, 
that the supporters of agriculture were anxious to highlight misfortune in the 
industry during the years that fell between the two periods of depression 
mentioned above is substantiated by the following extract from The Times, 
that media bastion of the dominant class, in 1926: 
The past 18 months have been critical for the agricultural industry, and 
the state of farming finances, it is now generally agreed, has not within 
living memory been so consistently adverse as is the case at this 
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juncture.  As a rule, in past depressions, one or more branches have 
served to relieve the situation, but there is barely the semblance of a 
bright spot this time, and reserves against low markets have diminished 
to vanishing point.  The disturbing feature in the position and outlook is 
not in any appreciable modification in the systems of farming, but in the 
exhausted state of the financial resources in and behind the industry.45 
 
The same story of difficulty and depression was being repeated by the 
summer of 1927, this time with the wholehearted support of the Daily Mail.  
The newspaper’s proprietor, Lord Rothermere, could be relied upon to back 
the causes of farmers,46 as the following excerpt from an interview with the 
baronet, Sir Cuthbert Quilter, demonstrates, simultaneously advertising the 
existent condition in which agriculturalists considered themselves to be and 
the newspaper’s own support for them: 
We are very grateful to the Daily Mail for what it is doing for the farmer 
[…] Of the 10,000 acres I own, I farm 3,000 myself, because, owing to 
the condition of the industry I cannot let the land although it is good 
land.  My five farms were all let at a loss last year.47  
The previous week had seen a similar conjunction of praise for the 
newspaper’s support for farmers and the incidence of economic troubles in 
agriculture: 
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Farmers are living on their credit.  They admit that the banks have been 
splendid in these difficult years; but the banks are reaching the limits of 
their help [...] Mr F.W. Wateridge of Barcombe, Sussex, writes: 
“Everyone, whether they be farmers or members of the whole 
community of consumers, must be indebted to you for bringing before 
the public the dire requirements of agriculture.”48 
The paper’s rural correspondent was reporting that farmers were short of 
capital, to which statements from farmers in Northumberland and Yorkshire 
gave testimony.49  Other farmers were not only failing to make profit in 1927 
but were finding it necessary to liquidate capital or fall back on their 
investments in order to run their farms: 
One of the best known and successful farmers in the Eastern Counties 
said to me: “This year I sold out £900 worth of securities.  I sold out 
another £900 to pay my way.  What about the farmers with no 
securities to sell?”50 
The chairman of the Cornwall branch of the NFU, Mr. Digory Stout, was 
indicating that recent times had been the worst that he could remember in 24 
years as an independent farmer and that he had found it ‘quite impossible in 
the last three years to balance my accounts, let alone get any interest on any 
capital.’51  Other Cornish farmers continued the account of woe to the 
agricultural correspondent complaining of the low prices they received for their 
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produce and of the high prices of the inputs that they required to run their 
farms, from the cost of repairing farm implements and the price of carpentry 
to the prices of machinery, such as binders, mowers and threshing tackle, to 
the cost of feeding stuffs which they suggested were ‘more than fifty per cent 
above pre-war prices’.52 
 Stevenson and Cook have written of the 1930s, the decade after the 
‘great slump’ that followed the Wall Street crash of 24 October 1929, as having 
been affected by the ‘popular mythology’ which has painted a picture merely 
of mass unemployment, dole queues and hunger marches.53  This has created 
a collage of desperation, the ‘Hungry Thirties’, which was continuing to have 
an influence on politics in the 1990s but which is one that it has been the 
norm for historians to repeat with ever greater emphasis since the 1960s, that 
fails to address the other two of the three Englands that J.B. Priestley 
observed in 1934, both of which were prosperous.54  One of these prosperous 
Englands was rural and traditional, ‘complete with squires, fox hunting, and 
gnarled yokels’, according to Taylor.55  This tends to suggest that even 
Howkins might be exaggerating the extent of agricultural depression in the 
latter half of the interwar years, despite limiting its occurrence to the years 
from 1929 to 1932, were it not for the mitigation of Taylor’s subsequent 
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remark that the lifestyles of the gentry were ‘sustained no doubt more from 
dividends than from agricultural rents’.56  The statement from Sir Cuthbert 
Quilter Bart., noted above, certainly supports Taylor’s suggestion that the 
rental incomes of landowners might have decreased, which is suggestive of 
problems of payment amongst their farmer tenants.  This, in conjunction with 
the apparent lack of willing farm tenants noted by Quilter that was forcing 
landowners such as himself to take farms ‘in hand’ and cultivate the land 
themselves are both tendencies suggestive of depression in the agricultural 
industry in the early 1930s.57  Written sources exist alongside Priestley’s work 
that contrast with his affirmation of rural prosperity; in combination with 
Priestly, they suggest that there may well have been both prosperity and 
decline in the countryside and, whilst the former was enjoyed by the most 
visible residents of the countryside, the latter was affecting at least some of 
those engaged in the foremost productive rural industry: agriculture. 
The existence of agricultural difficulties during the early 1930s is 
substantiated by the reporting in the ostensibly rural newspaper, the 
Lincolnshire and Boston Guardian, in its downbeat agricultural coverage of 
April 4 1931 of a recent suicide under the headline, ‘Farmer found drowned in 
River Bain’; there followed a distressing account of the tragedy which stated, 
‘There was a rope attached around the deceased’s neck and to the rope was 
tied a four stone weight.’  Complementary to such emotive reportage are the 
pleas from farmers’ organizations for Government help for their members.  By 
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mid-March of 1932, the CCA’s treasurer, V.A. Malcolmson, was reporting in a 
memorandum to MAF that ‘so deep and of such long duration has been the 
agricultural depression, especially in the Eastern counties’, that it had 
exhausted farmers’ credit and working capital and Malcolmson was suggesting 
the necessity of an emergency sum of credit of £20 million being made 
available to farmers.  A Ministry memorandum containing the minutes of a 
subsequent meeting with Malcolmson continued to say that he had consulted 
with the Westminster, National Provincial and Barclays banks and that, ‘The 
position was that between £30,000,000 and £40,000,000 had been advanced 
to farmers and this was at present irrecoverable.  Any fresh credit that could 
be found for the farmers would help the banks to recover.’58  Depression was 
still being represented as afflicting agriculture by 1935, three years after the 
period that Howkins has stated the most serious difficulties had been felt and 
it becomes apparent from the agricultural newspaper, the Farmer’s Weekly, 
that the position outlined in the memoranda had indeed materialised.  
Farmers, according to the newspaper, were in many cases using loans from 
the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, taken ‘at a comparatively high rate of 
interest’, simply to repay existing loans.  This demonstrates that it was not 
merely during the periods of the most severe economic depression for 
agriculture that farmers represented their ability to continue to operate as 
being compromised but also that the repercussions could tend to be felt for 
some time afterwards.  The Farmer’s Weekly appeared to be referring to 
ongoing depression in 1935 when it stated, ‘Economic depression in the 
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industry has operated to destroy a great deal of farming capital.’59  The 
minutes of the Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge, collected from late 
1934 into 1935 contain a series of lamentations from farmers and their 
supporters on the state of agriculture, with tithe being but one factor quoted 
as a source of problems.  Mr. A. Rackham of Norfolk summed up the farmers’ 
version of their position with the following statement: 
We are up against the cold competition of the whole world in regard to 
our farm produce.  We have no control over our outgoings, we have to 
pay a certain price for the things we buy and in addition to that here 
are the tithe owners coming along and pressing us for the tithe [...]  
We are hard up against it with our backs to the wall and we are facing 
bankruptcy unless something happens [...]  Land has depreciated to a 
great extent and the farm produce has depreciated as well, while our 
overhead charges stand at the same level.60  
The characterization of agriculture as afflicted by economic hardship 
was still current in farmers’ periodicals in 1936 when the NFU Record was 
publishing details of the Union’s deputation to the Prime Minister which was 
received at 10 Downing Street on 5 May of that year.  The visit was preceded 
by a letter signed by Cleveland Fyfe, the Union’s general secretary, which was 
published in the June 1936 edition of the publication and contained the 
following expression of despair, beginning with the request that British 
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agriculture receive preferential treatment from the Government with regards 
to foreign competition: 
In the Union’s view, the whole situation is dominated by the question as 
to whether existing trade agreements (including, of course, the Ottawa 
Agreements) will be so modified as to enable the home producer to be 
given first place in the home market [...]  The assistance under the 
Livestock Act has done no more than stave off a complete collapse of 
the industry [...] the production of milk has not been placed on a sound 
or profitable basis[...] the Milk Marketing Board have been obliged to 
impose crippling levies on the registered producers under the scheme 
[...]  Can we [...] enable the Potato Marketing Board to obviate 
disastrous price fluctuations by the maintenance of adequate regulation 
of imports and of customs duties? [...]  The plight of barley-growers is 
such that we are bound to enquire whether it is the intention of the 
Government to take prompt action to improve their situation [...] 
Registered producers under existing [Agricultural Marketing Acts] 
Schemes, however, are so dissatisfied with the inadequate control of 
competing imports that it is obvious that it would be impossible to 
expect farmers to give their support to further schemes [...]  We have 
abundant evidence of the feeling of doubt and insecurity that exists 
amongst our branches throughout the counties of England and Wales.  
Major R.H. Dorman-Smith, the Union’s president, made the following 
statement during the interview with the Prime Minister with regard to the 
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issues in the above letter that he reiterated were affecting agriculture so 
badly:  
I am anxious to avoid overstating our case.  On the other hand, we 
should be lacking in our duty to the farmers of the country and indeed 
to the Government itself if we sought in any way to minimise its 
seriousness.61 
Evidence presented above shows that farmers and their supporters 
were demonstrably willing to sustain a resolute argument that emphasised the 
existence of adverse economic conditions as a defence of their interests 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  As the extracts from the NFU Record 
suggest, farmers had a well-developed understanding of themselves as victims 
of Government policies on agriculture.  It should perhaps not be surprising 
that groups of economic producers, such as farmers, might be open to the 
accusation that they exaggerated the difficulties that they faced as a result of 
general economic conditions in order to maximise the sympathy and support 
they received from Government, but support for their representation of their 
industry as in distress came from other sources.  By 1938, support for the 
accuracy of farmers’ representation of their distressed conditions that resulted 
from Government policy was forthcoming from the unlikely source of the Land 
Worker, the monthly publication of the National Union of Agricultural Workers 
(NUAW).  The July 1938 edition carried coverage of the biennial conference of 
the NUAW and contained the following:  
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Bro. E.T. Lawrence moved a composite resolution: “This conference 
deplores the Government’s neglect to ensure proper cultivation of land 
and calls the Government’s serious attention to the drift of skilled farm 
workers from the countryside to the towns, owing to lack of suitable 
cottages and neglect of cultivation.”62 
Despite the barely veiled criticism of farmers’ behaviour with regard to the 
‘tied’ cottages that they rented to their workers and the fact that the ‘neglect 
of cultivation’ tended sometimes to be a criticism that farmworkers’ leaders 
made of farmers’ methods similar to those voiced during the meeting between 
a deputation from the Trades Union Congress (TUC) General Council and the 
Ministers for Agriculture and for Health in 1926,63 the disapproval of the 
Government’s perceived lack of support to agriculture is clear.  Whereas a 
later comment from the trade union’s president that the solution to problems 
in agriculture was that ‘the land should be nationalised’64 was clearly at 
variance with the desire of farmers,65 it might be assumed from the following 
comment from the August edition of the Land Worker that workers and 
farmers had come to some sort of unlikely agreement: 
There are millions of acres in Britain which could produce very much 
more food if farmers could afford the necessary equipment and if there 
were the men to work on the land.  The greater number of men 
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required for Arable production has meant that farmers have had to lay 
down more land to grass.66 
Such an assumption of detente might be dismissed once it is recognised that 
the article from which the extract comes was published under the title, ‘Let 
Agriculture Expand: the Farmers’ View’.  The message is clear, however, once 
again that farmers desired it to be known that they had been frustrated by 
their adverse economic circumstances and, as implied by the plea in the title, 
by some other restraining force which can only be presumed to be the 
authority of the State. 
The question of why the Land Worker was apparently giving any 
support to farmers might be asked, given its tradition of hostility to them.67  In 
reality, both articles were obviously published with one eye on the political 
events of the moment: ‘Bro.’ Lawrence had stated in the July 1938 article that, 
‘He thought the land was a country’s first line of defence’, the August ‘Farmers’ 
View’ article proceeding to state that ‘common sense should point to the 
necessity of having a vigorous agriculture in time of war’.68  The ‘time of war’ 
was the apparent inevitability in the summer of 1938 of imminent war with 
Germany during a period when the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was 
engaging in ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in an attempt to avoid conflict over Hitler’s 
designs on Czechoslovakia.69  It appears that only the threat of war and the 
deployment of the appeal to ‘common sense’ could achieve the ‘common 
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sense’ rural social unity inclusive of agricultural labourers for which farmers 
had long called, as instanced in the Journal of the Central and Associated 
Chambers of Agriculture and the Agricultural Record of June 1929.70  Calls 
from farmers for such unity, in reality, must be recognised to be an attempt to 
veil their peace-time desire for increased social control of their labour force.  
Social control would be made possible if wage bargaining could proceed 
outside of any restraints imposed by legislative bodies such as the Agricultural 
Wages Board.71  Employing farmers, especially farmers of arable land, 
expected that such control would have allowed them to make the level of 
profit that they perceived that only workers unprotected by Government 
legislation could have produced for them, as will be shown in later chapters; 
such an expectation of increased profits may have been theoretically realistic, 
as it happens, but increases would certainly have been limited by the price 
falls taking place in agriculture from 1921 onwards as a result of global over-
production.72 
 Notions of ‘common sense’, as invoked in the ‘Farmers’ View’ article, 
above, are deeply suspect and the motives of those employing them should be 
questioned rigorously, according to Pierre Bourdieu who recognises that 
‘common sense’ constitutes a ‘primary naiveté’ that conceals an ‘objective 
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truth’.73  The ‘primary naiveté’ in the above example of the ‘vigorous 
agriculture’ necessary in ‘time of war’ conceals the ‘objective truth’, implied by 
the necessity of farmers being ‘able to afford the necessary equipment’, that 
farmers were currently short of capital and, thus, of profit.  Furthermore, the 
emotive call for ‘the men to work the land’, which appears superficially to be a 
plea for employment to be provided for working class men, conceals the 
‘objective truth’, it would appear, that farmers, although they were highly 
unlikely to have derived the knowledge from Marx, were intuitively aware that 
employees constituted the source of their profit.  Marx painstakingly 
demonstrates that labour power is the original source of value and surplus 
value the source of profit74 and shows that this is demonstrably true regardless 
of the proportions in which the total profit might ultimately be distributed 
amongst those involved in production and those in the realm of circulation,75 
the latter including the ‘middlemen’ so often derided as profiteering at the 
expense of farmers.76  A shortage of ‘men to work the land’ again implies that 
agriculture, in its entirety, rather than merely farmers alone, was facing 
problems not of its own design and is suggestive of some social benefit that 
would be derived from the giving of some external aid to farmers that would 
be morally right but, at the time, was being withheld.  The short statement 
from the Land Worker of August 1938 with its references to shortages of 
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equipment and, thus, capital and the associated inability to create employment 
can, thus, be seen to be pregnant with meaning pertaining to the perception 
of the impoverishment of farmers at that moment in time, a perception that 
was merely the culmination of a message repeated regularly enough to 
become dogma.  Of such a process, Bourdieu states: 
The force of the preconstructed resides in the fact that, being inscribed 
in things and in minds, it presents itself under the cloak of the self-
evident which goes unnoticed because it is by definition taken for 
granted.77 
These articles from the Land Worker and the previously given examples 
demonstrate that the idea of a depressed agriculture was being established 
throughout the interwar years and, as suggested, was ‘preconstructed’ and 
‘self-evident’ enough to enter into the histories of the period written after the 
Second World War.   
The evidence presented here, however, shows that little significance 
was attached to the particular needs of any particular group of farmers, 
especially as differentiated by size.  Any specific problems mentioned tended 
to centre on arable farming which was undertaken to a greater extent in the 
southern and eastern areas where larger farms predominated but there is no 
mention of the varying scales of undertaking general to different branches of 
agriculture, such as cereal production.  Small-scale farmers were not 
considered separately in a tale being told of depression that was represented 
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as enveloping agriculture as a whole and, given the preponderance of farms of 
less than fifty acres in size, these still making up at least 60 percent of all 
farms in England in 1939, this must be regarded as surprising, especially since 
this demonstrates that the needs of a large majority of producers were either 
being largely ignored or did not exist.78  It will be shown later in this work that 
the difficulties experienced by the smallholders established under various 
ideologically informed Government initiatives79 were, indeed, recognised but 
that concern for their welfare failed to extend to incumbent small-scale 
farmers.  Such ignorance along with a general unwillingness to assess the 
effects of economic conditions on the actual numbers of existing farmers will 
be seen to be reproduced in the re-evaluation of the extent of depression that 
has been undertaken recently which is depicted in the next section. 
 
Historical Evaluation of Depression 
 
Brassley and Collins have both presented papers questioning the validity 
of the assumption that agriculture was beset by depression throughout the 
interwar years.80  The pictures both of agricultural decline and rural social 
decomposition have been further challenged in the 2006 work, The English 
Countryside between the Wars: Regeneration or Decline, in which Howkins 
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limits the periods of interwar agricultural depression to 1922 to 1925 and 1929 
to 1932.81  The book is styled as ‘revisionist’ by its editors, Paul Brassley, 
Jeremy Burchardt and Lynne Thompson, who make the point notably that, 
‘from whatever point of view one looks at the countryside in this period, there 
is abundant evidence of vitality and new growth, while the evidence for decline 
is less compelling than has usually been assumed.’82  The contributions from 
various authors generally take a culturalist approach, most of them addressing 
somewhat elitist rural issues that are important to this thesis but avoid the 
political economy of agriculture;83 nonetheless, between them, Brigden, 
Griffiths, Howkins, Mansfield and Sheail tackle some of the social and political 
aspects of pertinence to agriculture and Brassley examines the economics of 
interwar farming.84  Importantly, Howkins, in concert with this revisionist 
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theme, has made the argument briefly in his contribution that the incidence of 
depression was exaggerated in the interests of the farming community.85  This 
will be developed in later chapters where it will be shown how representatives 
and supporters of the agricultural community were in a position to use their 
social capital in the form of social and political influence to gain Government 
support and protection for agriculture.  This process depended upon 
uninterrupted publicity and agonising from representatives of farmers and 
their supporters which created a perception of a farming beset by economic 
woe, the consequences of which for rural society would be dire.   
The legislation enacted by Government on behalf of farmers, which 
began in 1923 with relief of agricultural rates and developed into the 1930s,86 
shows that, as a sector of the economy, agriculture undoubtedly benefited 
disproportionately from State help in comparison to other industries.87  This 
was due, it will be argued, to the association of rural England with the 
traditional ruling elite, but, it will be contended further, that small-scale 
farmers formed a significant section of those who prospered least from this 
attention if, indeed, many of them prospered at all.  Despite the doubts as to 
the ingenuousness of farmers’ representation of their interwar economic woes, 
the effectiveness with which farmers were able to make an argument for their 
affliction by depression is revealed by the legislation that was enacted to 
support them.  The effectiveness of the pleading of their case is something 
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that is rarely mentioned in the historiography that has been conditioned by its 
results; for instance, J.K. Stanford was reproducing the narrative of the 
despoliation of the interwar countryside by as early as 1956 in his official 
history of Friesian cattle in Britain, quoting Sir Alfred Munnings who wrote, in 
The Second Burst,  
You may remember how the war was followed, as most wars are, by a 
boom in all things which gradually died away as the nineteen twenties 
drew towards the ‘thirties. […] Beyond, as a background, the simple 
English landscape, hedges, fields and hedgerow oaks not yet hacked 
down.88 
In the 1980s, Brown titled a chapter ‘The Inter-War Depression’ in his study of 
agriculture whilst Newby depicts agriculture as blighted from 1914 to 1939 in a 
tellingly christened chapter, ‘Boom to Bust and Back Again’.  Even Howkins 
casts a gloomy cloud over the years of 1921 to 1939 with his selection of the 
title ‘The Locust Years’ to describe the period as experienced in rural 
England.89   
The persistence of the acceptance of this dolorous story of farmers’ 
interwar experience may have resulted from the social experiences of the 
Second World War.  Farmers enjoyed significant popularity after the War as a 
result of the public perception of their contribution to maintaining the nation’s 
food supplies during the conflict and a general feeling that they had suffered 
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in the 1920s and 1930s;90 they were rewarded with generous Government 
support.91  It was not until the 1970s that this perception began to be 
undermined as sociologists started to raise awkward questions about the 
nature of class relations in agriculture as they initiated a critical examination of 
the industry.92  The challenges that new groups of rural residents presented to 
farmers’ power over local decision-making in the countryside were also 
highlighted.93  Rural development had begun to be increasingly separated from 
farming and by the 1980s the countryside was recognised as having come 
under increased pressure from leisure and residential claims that competed for 
its use with farming,94 a phenomenon recognised with some perspicacity in 
1968 by Jones.95  Nevertheless, the public popularity of farming lasted until 
the 1980s when interrelated issues of environmental degradation, animal 
welfare and the dangers of human contamination from animal diseases, such 
as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, brought farmers’ methods into 
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question.96  Doubts began to be raised about the ethics of offering substantial 
State subsidies to the producers in an industry in which irresponsibility seemed 
increasingly apparent.97  Whether coincidental with these developments or not, 
the accepted version of the interwar period as one of unalloyed economic 
depression in agriculture in which the origins of this policy were to be found 
have begun to be put under scrutiny. 
Scrutiny of the veracity of this ‘discourse of distress’ in interwar 
agriculture might have begun earlier than the twenty-first century if the lead 
shown by Fletcher in 1961 in re-examining the ‘Great Depression’ in 
agriculture of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and finding that it had 
been somewhat exaggerated in geographical extent had been extended into 
the interwar years; Fletcher, apparently, abandoned such a course after brief 
reference in his 1954 M.Sc. thesis.98  Another opportunity was missed in Edith 
Whetham’s 1978 contribution to The Agrarian History of England and Wales 
which had the potential to act as a catalyst for a positive reappraisal of the 
performance of the industry.  Indeed, scattered throughout Whetham’s work 
are references to aspects of farming reflecting structural change in the 
industry and some benefits associated with it, such as that between 1924 and 
1935 the volume of agricultural output at 1930-1 prices had increased by 25 
percent as a result, generally, of greater production of products other than 
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grazing animals and cereals, such as milk, pig meat, poultry and eggs, the 
producers of which benefited from the low cereal prices bemoaned by arable 
farmers.99  However, Whetham reproduced the general feeling of gloom with 
regard to the period, despite showing increases in productivity per worker and 
the more intensive production that had led to an increase in agricultural output 
of 2 to 3 percent between 1924 and 1939, giving more prominence to the 
decrease in the numbers of agricultural workers and the reductions in cereal 
and crop acreages and concluding that the depression of the 1930s worked 
against the agricultural interest.100   
Whetham’s overall pessimism perhaps reflects the concluding 
paragraphs of her 1974 article, ‘The Agriculture Act and its Repeal – the “Great 
Betrayal”’, which, rather than drawing attention to the advantages gained by 
agriculture during the 1930s and since the War, focused attention on a 
verification of the existence of distress in interwar agriculture.  Reference was 
made in this article to her 1970s interviews with farmers in which persistent 
mention had been made of the damage caused by the so-called ‘Great 
Betrayal’ of farmers in 1921 by the Lloyd George led coalition Government.101  
This ‘betrayal’ involved the rapid withdrawal of price support for cereal 
growing in 1920 as portions of that year’s Agriculture Act were repealed.  The 
support had continued until 1921 and resulted from the 1917 Corn Production 
Act but was removed despite an assurance in the 1920 Agriculture Act that 
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any such withdrawal would only take place with four years’ notice.  The result 
was that, after the event, a narrative developed throughout the interwar years 
that pinpointed this withdrawal, or ‘betrayal’, as one of the chief causes of 
farmers’ difficulties, despite its being welcomed by farmers at the time.102  
Whetham institutionalised this narrative of ‘betrayal’ in 1974 and reinforced it 
by making references in her 1978 work to the financial disorder that would 
have been surrounding agriculture as market forces were reintroduced to the 
industry as a consequence of the ‘betrayal’,103 despite cereal farmers being 
compensated substantially in 1921 for the withdrawal of price support.104  This 
version of events, as produced and reproduced by farmers and members of 
the ruralist and agricultural community, with which Edith Whetham, as 
daughter of the landowner and agricultural economist Sir William Cecil 
Dampier-Whetham and with access to farmers to interview, was undoubtedly 
connected and sympathetic, went unchallenged until 1986.105   
Edith Whetham’s work implies that support for agriculture from the 
1930s onwards was the result of recognition by Government of its own 
responsibility for the betrayal and the associated depression from which the 
industry had represented itself as suffering during the interwar period.  The 
suggestion that such recognition by Government of its own responsibility 
existed is confirmed by 1923 MAF documents.  These make reference to the 
House of Commons debate in 1920 over the continuation of the Corn 
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Production Act and the adverse effects of the repeal of the relevant elements 
of the Agriculture Act.  In this debate, the documents note, ‘Farmers were 
assured that “whatever befalls, agriculture will never be neglected by any 
Government”.’  This is reinforced in the same documents by reference to a 
speech made by Lloyd George at Caxton Hall from 1919 in which he assured 
the agricultural industry of price support for the ‘staple products’ of farmers to 
‘safeguard them against serious loss’.106  This was a speech referred to in the 
NFU Record during the period in which farmers claimed, soon after, that they 
had suffered unduly,107 the claims repeated by Whetham’s interviewees in the 
1970s.  This concentration by Whetham on the contribution by Government to 
the pressure on its relations with agriculture seems to have diverted attention 
within academic circles away from questioning the generally accepted image of 
adverse fortunes in the industry during the period of the creation of the 
‘discourse of distress’ of the interwar years which had helped substantially in 
constructing this image.  This occurred in spite of Whetham’s own 
acknowledgement of the more nuanced picture of farming’s relative interwar 
success and failure from her 1978 work that is outlined briefly above.   
It seems pertinent that Whetham’s work on the role of Government in 
the genesis of agricultural difficulties was published at a time when farming 
was beginning to attract attention for its high level of subsidy and for other 
issues relating to its undertaking within the European Economic Community.108  
In turn, the diversion into the politics of the ‘Great Betrayal’ had the effect of 
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delaying the reappraisal of the economic performance of the agriculture of the 
interwar years that Whetham’s 1978 work, taken alone, might have prompted, 
given that Whetham had failed to exhibit the significant economic data on 
interwar British agriculture that would have verified the existence of severe 
difficulties in agriculture and justified the laments of the farming community.  
F.M.L. Thompson provided another missed prompt for a reappraisal of 
interwar agriculture in 1991, having perhaps missed in his own work on 
landownership in 1969 the one provided by Fletcher in 1961, referred to 
above.  Thompson’s 1969 work, as with that of Sturmey in 1955, identified 
problems created for themselves in the interwar years by farmers who had 
been willing or, in some cases, apparently compelled to purchase their farms 
in the years between 1918 and 1927 as landowners divested themselves 
propitiously of farms and estates in a land market that would prove to have 
been substantially inflated.109  Neither Sturmey nor Thompson examined in 
detail the wider interwar economic situation and both left the impression that 
land sales had been merely another factor contributing to depression.  
Thompson returned to the theme of land sales between 1990 and 1993 in a 
series of articles in which the impression was once again given of an 
agriculture afflicted by depression, but the work suffered from a concentration 
on the subject of continued aristocratic and gentry landownership after the 
First World War rather than on the fortunes of farmers in general and of small 
                                        
109 Thompson, F.M.L., English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century, pp.327-49; Sturmey, 
‘Owner-Farming 1900 to 1950’, pp.283-306. 
Chapter 1: The Discourse of Distress 
 
47 
 
farmers in particular.110  The theme of land sales is one revisited by Thompson 
in 2007 in a debate with Beckett and Turner over the extent of sales in the 
period of 1918 to 1922.  This debate, itself, can be seen as stimulating the re-
evaluation of interwar agriculture insofar as Beckett and Turner have 
questioned the historical existence of the extent of land sales at very high 
prices whilst Thompson’s reply maintains that they did, indeed, take place.111  
Since owner-occupation has been claimed to have been a major cause of 
interwar financial problems for farmers, the proof of fewer purchases would 
imply that such a cause may have been exaggerated along with the generally 
depressed state of agriculture.   
Thompson, however, in another 1991 work referred to the nostalgia 
and long memories of farmers before the Second World War which conferred 
upon the third quarter of the nineteenth century the status of a ‘“golden age”’ 
which seemed never to have been matched, thus creating the illusion of 
hardship in interwar levels of profit and standards of living.112  Thompson 
pointed out that, even between the Wars, agricultural prices fell at only the 
same rate as ‘the general price level’.  He also observed that the impression of 
agricultural decline may have been strengthened by its shrinking contribution 
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to the total national output which, despite being a general feature of mature 
industrial economies, may have led to the conclusion amongst farmers that 
they were suffering, thereby creating an unconstructive mental attitude; the 
contribution of Self and Storing in noting the ‘depression psychology’ with 
which legislation regarding agriculture was formulated in the 1930s helps to 
confirm Thompson’s observation, further strengthened by another he made 
that, although farmers’ incomes were low in 1931, they fluctuated over the 
interwar period, such fluctuations in themselves perhaps deepening 
uncertainty and pessimism.113  Thompson’s assertion of an overly self-pitying 
attitude amongst farmers is confirmed, somewhat, by the 1929 comments of 
A.W. Ashby, the agricultural economist.  Ashby maintained that, with regard to 
farmers’ mental states and the ‘depression’, ‘Both the individuals and the 
group tend to develop long memories, and to remember their disappointments 
more vividly than their successes.’114  Furthermore, Thompson implied that the 
historiography of farming might be affected by a flawed methodology insofar 
as the income levels of farmers which had been relied upon to judge living 
conditions were rather crude, consistently failing to assess direct consumption 
of produce on the farm by the farm family, the inclusion of the value of which 
would increase the measure of the standards of living of farmers and negate 
some measures of impoverishment interpreted by historians as contributing to 
depression.115   
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Perren provided the ammunition in 1994 for another potential assault 
on the stronghold of historicised interwar depression.  Perren noted that the 
output of agriculture expanded by over 15 percent between 1930-1 and 1936-
7, mainly as a result of Government tariffs, subsidies and marketing 
assistance.  However, he still concluded gloomily that the revisionism 
regarding growth that was estimated to have taken place in the economy as a 
whole across the interwar period, despite extreme periodic downturns, had not 
extended to agriculture and that the existence of a severe agricultural 
depression between 1924 and 1940 in the industry could not be 
contradicted.116 
 
Agriculture and Economy in Interwar Rural England: Regeneration 
 
Recent work on the fortunes of agriculture in interwar England has 
given a more positive outlook that corresponds somewhat with the recent 
vibrancy assigned to the cultural developments of the countryside between the 
Wars.117  Progress has been made on a revision of the performance of 
interwar agriculture.  Those historians, such as Howkins, Brassley, Collins, and 
Martin who, working individually, have made a re-evaluation of the economic 
performance of the agricultural industry at the time have seen in it the same 
                                        
116 Perren, pp.52-61, 68. 
117 Brassley, P., Burchardt, J., and Thompson, L., ‘Introduction’, in The English Countryside 
Between the Wars: Regeneration or Decline?, ed. by Brassley, P., Burchardt, J., and 
Thompson, L. (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006), pp.1-9, (pp.5-9); Brassley, Burchardt, 
Thompson, ‘Conclusion’, pp.235, 245-9.   
Chapter 1: The Discourse of Distress 
 
50 
 
limited success identified by Whetham but not previously fully capitalised 
upon.118   
It is difficult, initially, to understand Perren’s gloomy outlook in the light 
of either this subsequent work or, even, some of earlier vintage.  Grigg, in 
1989, preceded Perren in seeing upward movements in interwar agricultural 
output in England and Wales, estimating that it increased by 1.6 percent per 
annum from 1922/4 to 1936/9, this being the fastest rate of growth since the 
peak growth of 1.8 percent per annum achieved during the period of 1821 to 
1861.  These figures seem to have received little attention which may be due 
to the fact that they appeared merely as a feature in a general study of the 
long-term history of English agriculture.119  Grigg’s suggestion that growth 
took place encompasses the period of 1931 to 1936 in which Perren estimated 
there to have been significant growth but tends to contradict Perren’s 
downbeat assessment of the period of 1924 to 1940 in estimating increases in 
output to have taken place. 
Brassley, however, has demonstrated that agricultural output in the 
years 1920 to 1922 was at its lowest since 1867 to 1869 so initial growth 
increases after 1920 to 1922 would effectively be making up ground lost 
earlier, but his figures certainly correspond with those of Perren in showing an 
increased volume of output in the 1930s and with Grigg in showing increased 
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output volume from the mid-1920s.120  These assessments also correspond 
with the assertion by Howkins that agricultural depression is evident in the 
interwar years but that it was concentrated principally in the years from 1922 
to 1925 and 1929 to 1932 leaving the majority of the years in the interwar 
period free of serious problems for growth to have taken place.121  Howkins’ 
assessment makes it apparent that both Grigg and Perren have included some 
years of depression in the periods of growth that they suggest existed.  This 
can be interpreted as showing even more significant upswings in farmers’ 
fortunes in the growth that followed the years of depression.  Collins and 
Brassley both describe increases in both agricultural productivity and output 
that occurred between the wars despite low prices for agricultural commodities 
and increased international competition.122  Calculations from Brassley’s figures 
indicate that, overall, by including the average output of the years 1920 to 
1922 and 1935 to 1939, there was a rise of 27 percent in output from 1920 to 
1939123 which, taken at face value, can hardly be said to be demonstrative of 
the depression in agriculture which has contributed so heavily in creating the 
impression of a blighted interwar countryside.124  Evidence to support the 
notion of a contemporary and subsequent over emphasis on agricultural 
decline can be seen to some degree in the kind of economic data from the 
interwar years themselves that economic historians use; for example, total 
agricultural output increased during the 1930s and was 20 percent higher for 
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the year 1934 to 1935 at 235.5 million pounds, valued at 1930 to 1931 prices, 
than the 195.5 million pounds for 1930 to 1931.125  The trend indicated by 
these figures corresponds generally with those suggested to have existed by 
Grigg and Perren as well as by those seeking to establish a positive view of 
agriculture in the interwar English countryside.     
Another indicator of fortunes in farmers’ incomes exists and these do 
not appear to have been severely compromised by depression in the interwar 
years.  The agricultural economist D.A.E. Harkness spoke to a paper given to 
the Agricultural Economics Society in 1934 and stated that claims about drastic 
falls in farmers’ incomes in the years from 1924 to 1931 had been exaggerated 
as had the amounts that farmers had paid out in wages, concluding that 
farmer returns on capital were still significant and stating that, on tenants’ 
capital estimated at £440 million in mainland Britain, ‘After paying a labourer’s 
wage to the farmer it would have been possible to have paid 11.4 percent in 
the best year and 7.8 percent in the worst year on this amount of capital.’  
W.H. Senior supported Harkness’ paper in its assertions whilst A.G. Ruston 
voiced doubts over the findings but, if verifiable, and Harkness went into his 
methodology in some detail, they are hardly supportive of the notion of the 
existence of hardship amongst farmers as an entire group of individuals.126   
Harkness’ contemporary account has some echoes in the assessment of 
farmers’ fortunes by Brassley, Burchardt and Thompson who have looked at 
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the income levels rather than simply at the economic output for agriculture, 
reflecting Cooper’s statement with regard to ‘practical farmers’ being 
‘concerned only with their material condition.’127  Levels of net farm income fail 
to demonstrate that distress was suffered by farmers across the whole of the 
interwar period having been above those seen before the First World War from 
1918 to 1923, and considerably higher in the years 1920 to 1923, achieving 
higher than pre-War levels again from 1935 to 1939.  Whilst Bellerby had 
confirmed as early as 1969 that rising income levels could be seen for farmers 
from 1933 to 1938,128 the calculations made by Harkness suggest that these 
later authors might even be able to reassess farmers’ incomes in the years 
between 1924 and 1929 and conclude that distress was more imaginary than 
real and created by various factors, including those referred to above by Ashby 
and Thompson, such as the farmers’ long memories of the ‘“golden age”’ of 
farming before the 1870s and, by Thompson, of the ‘money illusion’ created by 
rising and falling incomes at times of inflation and deflation.129     
Brassley has, however, sounded a note of caution in his assessment of 
agriculture at the time.  Data on farm incomes indicates that there was some 
justification for the existence of the picture of a distressed interwar 
agriculture.  Brassley highlights a pattern of fluctuating farm incomes: 
following post First World War prosperity that lasted until around 1923, the net 
farm income fell.  The index of UK net farm income fell below the 1904 to 
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1910 level (100) in 1923 and did not rise above it again until the period from 
1935 to 1939 when it reached 139.8 having reached a low of 77.4 in the 
period from 1924 to 1929.130  The years over the interwar period in which the 
net farm income was above the 1904 to 1910 index level of 100 were 
outnumbered by those in which it was below.131  Harkness’ figures on incomes 
might suggest that Brassley is being over-cautious, especially in estimating 
how far farmers’ incomes fell in the 1920s, but it has been noted that there 
was an objection to Harkness’ figures from A.G. Ruston who suggested 
Harkness had overestimated the portion of the annual net income that was 
available to farmers.132  In counterpoint to Senior and Brassley, the notion that 
distress was being exaggerated in the 1920s is certainly given credibility by a 
report from the Ministry of Agriculture; commissioned in 1927 as a result of 
‘what has been said in the press and elsewhere’ about the existence of 
agricultural depression at the time, it indicated that there was ‘little sign of any 
depression’ to be found despite some pessimism within the agricultural 
community.133   
 There is, it appears, some justification for the assertion that agriculture 
prospered overall in the interwar period, but this is a judgement made within 
the realm of orthodox economic theory, a point made by Brassley, Burchardt 
and Thompson who state that ‘surely the most important gauge of economic 
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success’ in assessing British agriculture is its output.134  However, it can be 
seen that increases in output can be countermanded by falling prices for that 
output so that increases are not reflected in rising incomes.  Prices for 
agricultural produce certainly saw considerable falls in the interwar years.  
Index numbers based on 1911 to 1913 prices as representing 100 show falls 
from a high of 292 in 1920 to a low of 107 in 1933 rising to 113 in 1934 
whilst, at the same time, the cost of living index, which had been lower than 
the agricultural produce index between 1916 and 1920, being at 249 in the 
latter year and, thus, demonstrating earlier rises in farm incomes, fell more 
slowly from 1920 and stood at 141 in 1934.135  This would vindicate Brassley’s 
figures on falling farm incomes from 1923 to 1935 but there is a caveat to be 
drawn which supports the assertion made above by Thompson that farm 
incomes may be higher than such indices suggest because of the food that can 
be produced and consumed on the farm which incurs little expenditure and, 
effectively, raises the value considerably of the money income of farms.136  
The cost of living index mentioned above shows that food accounted for 60 
percent of total expected working class household expenditure.137  The 
advantage of not paying for all or much food consumed on the farm thus 
appears to be substantial.  Consequently, whilst apparent farm incomes may 
well have been falling as a result of prices for agricultural produce falling faster 
than the index of the cost of living, they were falling effectively from a higher 
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starting point to a higher finishing point than might be assumed if the 
expenditure for the majority of the food component of the index were to be 
extracted.  Furthermore, another of the elements used in calculating the cost 
of living index was local taxes paid in the form of rates.  These were reduced 
and then eliminated on agricultural land by legislation in the 1920s,138 
removing another financial burden on farmers and reducing their comparative 
cost of living.  Therefore, the cost of living index can be seen to be 
increasingly irrelevant in estimating farmers’ incomes since two major 
elements contributing towards it were largely inapplicable to farmers, and 
farmers’ incomes have to be assumed to have been higher than initial 
indicators might suggest.   
 The intuitive assumption must not be made that the increases in 
agricultural output noted by Perren, Grigg and Brassley equate automatically 
to increases in incomes for farmers since it is reasonable to assume that these 
authors are referring to gross output, whereas net output was considerably 
lower.  Astor and Rowntree showed that increases had taken place since the 
1870s and especially in the 1930s in the amount of inputs into farming, such 
as imported feeding stuffs which rose from 6.8 million tons to 8.1 million tons 
between 1931 and 1937, for which farmers had to pay, effectively reducing 
the return to farmers from growing output.139  However, this could be argued 
to have represented good business practice since, as Harkness pointed out, 
the prices of imported feeding stuffs had been falling faster from 1927 to 1931 
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than the prices paid for agricultural produce and these lower input costs 
relative to returns on produce would help to maintain the real purchasing 
power of farmers’ operating capital.140  Moreover, the increased use of feeding 
stuffs reduced the amount of labour it was necessary for farmers to pay, 
increasing their share of the returns on produce, this coming on top of the 
improved share of the income they received because of the increasing 
productivity of labour to which John Orr referred in 1931 but which many 
farmers and landlords had been keen to deny.141  
Much of what has been said so far in this chapter has been suggestive 
of the ability of the agricultural community in the interwar years to deal more 
effectively with the structural changes forced upon the industry than had been 
acknowledged by historians before the twenty-first century and to avoid the 
worst of the scourge of depression by which it claimed to be afflicted.  Change 
and adaptability had not gone unnoticed during the 1930s, Astor and 
Rowntree noting in 1938 the existence of increases in productivity due to 
mechanization and specialization that increased overseas production had 
forced upon agriculture: ‘All this represents a change in response to the 
shifting levels of prices [and] an increased use of raw materials’.  The 
beginnings of economic modernization in the 1930s suggest that the 
alternative case for the interwar countryside as one of vigour and regeneration 
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proposed by Brassley, Burchardt and Thompson undoubtedly has some scope 
for further investigation.142   
  Astor and Rowntree go on to say, however, that change and 
modernization in agriculture involved ‘a decreased use of British land and 
British labour’.143  The two main economic measures that have been used in 
recent work to demonstrate the relative success of agriculture in the interwar 
years when compared with the previously existing historiographical perspective 
can be seen to be gross output and net incomes.  There are problems 
associated with these measures which go some way to undermining the 
revisionist picture of agriculture.  Increasing economic output in any sector, 
such as agriculture, is not necessarily synonymous with rising incomes for all 
those operating within it or with increasing employment by businesses or with 
increasing numbers of employers which, in this case, means farmers; less 
labour is needed if less land is used and this may have extended to a 
requirement for fewer farmers.  Decreases in numbers of farmworkers are well 
known to have taken place but structural changes in employment patterns 
may also have extended to farmers and this possibility needs to be examined.  
It was not until the late 1930s, when Government support for agriculture was 
starting to take effect, demonstrated by increases in wheat acreages and 
numbers of cattle,144 that any real sign of recovery could be seen in British 
agriculture.  This recovery may have started at a time when some inefficient 
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and marginal farmers had been eliminated if patterns in the agricultural labour 
market are replicated by those of employers and businesses.   
Self and Storing estimated that four-fifths of subsidy paid to agriculture 
in the interwar years was paid to the producers of wheat.145  The 
concentration on arable subsidies would do little to remedy falling incomes for 
most farmers, especially small-scale ones for whom wheat growing was 
insignificant according to evidence given by the agricultural economist and 
farmer R. McG. Carslaw146 to the Royal Commission investigating tithe 
rentcharge.147  Therefore, what income was left after disregarding the 
subsidies must have either been shared out amongst all farmers meaning that 
the majority of incomes fell, creating a mood of depression, or some farmers 
may have failed, which could have created the same perception of overall 
depression; most likely it was a combination of the two things.  It remains to 
be seen whether falls in income were shared equally by all farmers or 
ameliorated by falls in farmer numbers for those who survived.  Variations in 
the numbers of farmers over the interwar period will be examined in detail in 
the next chapter. 
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Conclusion 
 
A picture has emerged of a historiography that highlights decline in 
interwar English agriculture alongside re-evaluated evidence that points to less 
severe problems when measured by output and by incomes relative to cost of 
living.  The recent study of economic performance that supports a view of a 
less depressed agriculture than had appeared to exist would, if accepted 
uncritically, indicate that sedimentation of error has occurred in the 
historiography of farming between the two Wars.  The pertinent point to 
understand is that the historiography reflects the rural ‘discourse of distress’ 
which emerged in the interwar period itself.  This discourse was one in which 
the countryside as a whole was seen to be in decline so that a picture of a 
blanket depression covering the whole of agriculture was not difficult to 
establish.  Where contemporary commentary made any distinction it was 
between relative levels of distress at a vague geographical level, merely 
suggesting that in an agriculture suffering universally, farming in the eastern 
arable districts was more severely depressed than elsewhere.  This would 
indicate, if verifiable, that large arable producers were the main victims of 
agricultural depression.  It would be wrong to state that small farmers were 
overlooked altogether because a vigorous debate took place during the 
interwar years over the merits of smallholdings; further chapters in this work 
will examine the fortunes of smallholders as a measure of the economic 
problems of small-scale farmers, since it is as a result of this debate with the 
concerns of these producers that significant and relevant evidence exists on 
the conditions in small-scale farming.  However, the mainstream argument for 
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the existence of agricultural woe tended to elide distinctions in scale of 
production and simply to express the judgement that all agriculture was 
suffering.   
The recent examination of the economic output of agriculture as a 
measure of success has highlighted gains relative to the historically established 
image of interwar decline.  However, this examination has its limitations since, 
as with all such scrutiny, it does not reveal the levels at which production was 
taking place by different operators and whether returns to production were 
evenly spread amongst producers or whether there was structural change as 
producers of larger or smaller scales prospered at the expense of others.  It 
does not even indicate whether failure amongst many was masked by success 
by a few and this is not remedied by the recounting of the fortunes of one or 
two individuals, such as has occurred over the years.148  In social terms, this is 
not tenable because the social effects of economic developments are not 
measured.  The revisionist arguments for the presence of growth in agriculture 
and dynamism in rural society and culture have been conspicuous in their 
overlooking of the numbers of farmers who operated the businesses of the 
interwar countryside with the exception of a brief account by Brassley of 
increasing numbers of farmers in Devon.149  Brassley’s understanding of the 
importance of the use of the numbers of the personnel involved in farming as 
an indicator of economic fortunes in the industry is recognised in the subject 
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of the next chapter of this work.  The chapter is written on the premise that 
changes in the numbers of farmers operating in English agriculture are a 
useful measure of success and failure in the industry.  It will initially examine 
changes in farmer numbers as a measure of prosperity or decline since it is of 
great relevance to chart the level of the continuing involvement of farmers in 
agriculture or to discern any signs of their disappearance.  It will continue by 
starting to examine the structure of farm businesses by size to assess the 
circumstances of farmers of varying scales, thereby creating an indicator of the 
economic fortunes of small-scale farmers in interwar England.  Walton 
observes, ‘Social history is ultimately about the experiences, relationships and 
values of all sorts and conditions of people’;150 it would be unforgivable to 
judge any economic activity involving people without including the fortunes of 
those people.  A measure of failure or success can be found in increases or 
decreases in numbers of farmers and in the sizes of their operations relative to 
their overall numbers. 
                                        
150 Walton, J., Lancashire: a Social History 1558-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1987), p.4. 
Chapter 2: Numerical Decline of Farmers 
 
63 
 
Chapter 2: Numerical Decline of Farmers in Interwar England 
Introduction 
 
 
The existence of economic distress amongst the farming population between the 
two world wars had been regarded as almost incontrovertible by historians 
between the Second World War and the early twenty-first century.  It formed 
part of an emotionally charged pro-farming historiography in which the more 
positive performance indicators of interwar agriculture were, indeed, 
acknowledged1 but, as shown in Chapter One, generally, elided. The 
historiography reflected a picture of relentless decline in interwar English 
agriculture that had been painted by agricultural interests during the 1920s and 
1930s, as outlined in Chapter One, above, where a challenge to that depiction 
that has emerged in recent historical study has also been detailed.2  The 
challenge is premised on those figures for the economic output of the industry 
that were available formerly but had been largely ignored.  These figures 
suggest that farmers as a group did not suffer economic hardship to the extent 
that had generally been accepted.  
 The historiography of interwar English rural society as a whole had 
formerly been dominated by versions of a decline which had accompanied the 
agricultural hardship of the two decades between the Wars and, thus, formed 
part of the ‘discourse of distress’ of rural England; indeed, the economic travails 
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of agriculture appeared as synonymous with rural social malaise.3  The recent 
economic challenge to the formerly established reality of the travails of interwar 
agriculture, mentioned above, has parallels in revisionist considerations of 
aspects of interwar rural society4 that stress the existence of vitality between the 
Wars.  The result is that two divergent versions of the conditions in the economy 
and society of the interwar English countryside have been constructed in the 
relatively short time since the period under examination: the earlier one stresses 
decline whilst the more recent one depicts a more healthy and vibrant rural 
economy and society.  The causes of this disparity require investigation.  Such 
an investigation is particularly relevant for this thesis, given its focus on farmers 
and their business operations, because farmers and their supporters were 
influential in creating the ‘discourse of distress’, as outlined in Chapter One.5 
 Judgements upon the social condition of interwar rural England appear to 
be made upon normative associations wherein estimations of the quality of life in 
the countryside at any time coincide with the contemporary economic conditions 
in agriculture6 or, more importantly, upon the representation of success or 
failure that is given to those conditions.   The historiography suggests that this is 
true whether these judgements are based upon indicators of economic 
performance that are stressed by revisionist modern historians or upon the 
stated evidence of those running agricultural businesses and those with interests 
                                        
3 Newby, Country Life, pp.157-80. 
4 Howkins, ‘Death and Rebirth?’, pp.10-25; Brassley, Burchardt, Thompson, ‘Conclusion’, pp.235-
49; Howkins, Death of Rural England, pp.95-112. 
5 Chapter 1, above. 
6 Miller, S., ‘Land Use and Leisure: Leslie Scott and the Contested Countryside’, in The Contested 
Countryside: Rural Politics and Land Controversy in Modern Britain, ed. by Burchardt, J., and 
Conford, P. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), pp.19-38; Sheail, pp.150-63. 
Chapter 2: Numerical Decline of Farmers 
 
65 
 
in maintaining an agricultural countryside, as has been shown to have been the 
case during the interwar years7 and in the post-World War Two twentieth 
century.8  The contrast to this is the contention that versions of interwar success 
and of failure may both be tenable and brought into resolution with one another 
by proceeding from the position adopted by Howkins in 2003, albeit somewhat 
modified, wherein some groups prospered, overall, whilst others declined.9  
There is no reason to suggest that such differentials of prosperity between 
certain social groups as were identified by Howkins cannot be extended to 
groups within farming given that it is an industry that varies widely in types and 
scales of production.  Agriculture could contain certain groups of business 
operators who might well have enjoyed more success than others.  Good 
reasons exist and are outlined in this chapter for suggesting that the success or 
failure of farmers can be measured by examining statistics that reveal trends in 
the numbers of farmers within identifiably different groups operating over the 
course of the period in question.  Identification of such groups contradicts the 
norm whereby farmers have developed the identity of a single social and 
economic group and are consequently treated as such.10  Some reference has 
been made by historians to increased success in agriculture in the interwar years 
                                        
7 Chapter 1, above; Burchardt, Paradise, pp.143-9.   
8 Cox, pp.147-8; Howkins, A., 2008, ‘“The Land of Lost Content”: Ruralism, Englishness and 
Historical Change in the Countryside, 1890-1990’, in The Contested Countryside: Rural Politics 
and Land Controversy in Modern Britain, ed. by Burchardt, J., and Conford, P. (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2008), pp.187-202; Marsh, J., ‘Agriculture’s Role within the U.K.’, in The Contested 
Countryside: Rural Politics and Land Controversy in Modern Britain, ed. by Burchardt, J., and 
Conford, P. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), pp.61-80, (pp.69-70); Matless, D., Landscape and 
Englishness (London: Reaktion Books, 1998); Wiener, M. J., English Culture and the Decline of 
the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987).  
9 Howkins, Death of Rural England, pp.1-4. 
10 Burchardt, ‘Introduction: Farming and the Countryside’, p.8. 
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being attributable to farming type, particularly dairy farming,11 but scant 
attention has been paid to numbers of farm businesses or their operators; such 
numbers will be examined in this thesis but with regard primarily, but not 
exclusively, to the proportions of business operators occupying contrasting sizes 
of farm with some subsequent attention being paid to the effects of economic 
conditions on farms of varying size in different branches of agriculture.  Firstly, 
however, the very feasibility of measuring the numbers of those farmers who 
survived or failed must be assessed; this is the task of this chapter.  
 An exposition follows of the shortcomings of the approaches taken in the 
historiography to date, the main one being the absence of a thorough analysis of 
changes in farming over the interwar years as represented by any fluctuations in 
both the numbers of farmers operating businesses and the numbers of farms in 
existence.  An appropriately redemptive analysis of these changes is then 
undertaken which outlines the numerous difficulties that may have led to the 
absence of any similar such examination in the previous work on the interwar 
period.  A systematic attempt is made to reduce such difficulties by looking at 
data on numbers of farmers contained in various sources, including the Census 
from 1911, 1921 and 1931 and the National Farm Survey of 1941.12  The results 
of this analysis are brought to bear on data on the numbers of farms found in 
                                        
11 Martin, Development, pp.11-13.  
12 HMSO, Census of England and Wales, 1911, Volume 10 Part I: Occupations and Industries 
(London: HMSO, 1915), Table 3 (p.16); HMSO, Census of England and Wales, 1921, Occupations 
(London: HMSO, 1925), Table 2 (pp.13-16); HMSO, Census of England and Wales, 1931, 
Occupation Tables (London: HMSO, 1935), Table 1 (p.1); Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
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the annually published Agricultural Statistics.13  The analysis of statistical data 
from the period will show that there took place a surprisingly large fall in the 
numbers of farmers in England over the course of the interwar period.  Such 
results might tend to support the argument that farmers did suffer somewhat 
over the years between 1918 and 1939.  This will set the parameters for the 
remainder of the study which will explore whether particular groups of farmers, 
differentiated, firstly, by farm size as well as by farming type, were affected 
more than others by changes in the interwar countryside.  This will lead to the 
exploration of the issue of why there seems to have been little exploration of the 
varying experiences of such groups within either the accepted narrative of a 
general decline of agriculture and of farmers or of the revised story of a 
seemingly successful interwar farming.   
                                        
13 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops 
and the Number of Live Stock in England and Wales, 1919, Volume 54 (London: HMSO, 1919), 
Tables 1-12, pp.17-41; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics: Report on the 
Acreage under Crops and the Number of Live Stock in England and Wales, 1920, Volume 55 
(London: HMSO, 1920), Tables 1-14, pp.21-54; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural 
Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops and the Number of Live Stock in England and 
Wales, 1921, Volume 56 (London: HMSO, 1921), Tables 1-10 pp.17-44; Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops and the Number of Live 
Stock in England and Wales, 1922, Volume 57 (London: HMSO, 1922), Tables 1-8, pp.21-44; 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops 
and the Number of Live Stock in England and Wales, 1923, Volume 58 (London: HMSO, 1923), 
Tables 1-5, pp.21-43; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics: Report on the 
Acreage under Crops and the Number of Live Stock in England and Wales, 1927, Volume 62 
(London: HMSO, 1927), Tables 1-8, pp.35-59; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural 
Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops and the Number of Live Stock in England and 
Wales, 1929, Volume 64 (London: HMSO, 1929), Tables 1-8 pp.49-72; Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops and the Number of Live 
Stock in England and Wales, 1931, Volume 66 (London: HMSO, 1931), Tables 1-8, pp.41-65; 
MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1935, Volume 70, Tables 1-12, pp.15-87; Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops and the Number of Live 
Stock in England and Wales, 1938, Volume 73 London: HMSO, 1938), Tables 1-11, pp.15-43; 
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Limitations of Non-Political Economy in the Study of Interwar England 
 
The core of the contemporary British countryside is farming; farming, not 
agriculture, because agriculture implies merely the production of food 
from the land, whereas farming rightly shifts the emphasis to the people 
who produce the food.14  
The work of post-Second World War historians on the interwar 
countryside has been addressed here in the light of a revised understanding of 
the conditions of agriculture at the time.  The result has been to suggest that 
significant support exists for the developing body of academic opinion that 
decline and deterioration were not universally experienced across rural England 
and in its farming during the interwar period; this was, it must be said, an 
opinion held by Fletcher as early as 1954.15  It is also clear that the argument 
presented here has so far depended largely upon the narrow sort of 
‘productionist’ approach which Jeremy Burchardt has criticised for its dominance 
hitherto of the study of the countryside.16  This approach, on its own, is open to 
criticism not merely because its results fail to reflect the full range of what was 
occurring in the countryside at the time but also because the definitions of 
success and failure in agriculture in this approach rest to a large extent on 
measures of economic performance or reflections upon it.  Economic 
performance in agriculture is a useful starting-point for evaluating success and 
failure but little has been said about those people directly involved in agricultural 
                                        
14 Burchardt, ‘Introduction: Farming and the Countryside’, p.1. 
15 Fletcher, ‘Economic Development’, p.276. 
16 Burchardt, J., ‘Agricultural History, Rural History, or Countryside History?’, Historical Journal, 
50 2, (2007), 465-81, (p.465). 
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production at the time and it would seem that varying degrees of fortitude and 
adaptability must have been required on their part in order to prosper or, in 
many cases, to survive, despite what has been said about the exaggeration of 
distress.  It is those who were engaged in agriculture that must be turned to 
now.    
 Burchardt’s appeal for a more subtle and detailed history of the 
countryside is timely.  He asserts that such a study must be one that extends 
beyond the formulation of rural England merely as a site of agricultural 
production, a formulation that resulted from the economic relationship between 
the agricultural and industrial revolutions established by distinguished historians 
of modern Britain, including Tony Wrigley and F. M. L. Thompson.17  Alternative 
approaches to the history of the twentieth century countryside exist, with David 
Cannadine’s The Decline of the British Aristocracy and Madeleine Beard’s English 
Landed Society in the Twentieth Century standing as examples of a previously 
established but somewhat elitist approach to the countryside that Burchardt 
suggests must also be looked beyond.18  Burchardt cites the work on the landed 
gentry of Gordon Mingay as an example of how elitist subjects, he feels, have 
dominated the field of rural history outside of the study of agriculture.19  F.M.L. 
Thompson’s work on rural social history in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries consisted, much like that of Cannadine, Mingay and Beard, mostly of 
work on the aristocracy and landed gentry and the associated theme of 
                                        
17 Ibid., p.466. 
18 Beard, M., English Landed Society in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1989); 
Cannadine, D., The Decline of the British Aristocracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
19 Burchardt cites Mingay’s, The Gentry: the Rise and Fall of a Ruling Class and English Landed 
Society in the Eighteenth Century.  Burchardt, ‘Agricultural History’, p.466. 
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landownership.20   However, the demotic territory between the economic study 
of increasing levels of agricultural output and the cultural study of the lifestyles 
of the landowning elite remains largely uncharted.  A cultural history that ties 
national identity to landscape exists but has lacked an agricultural dimension 
because the understanding of the relationships between farmers, class and 
status have not been explored and so farmers’ attitudes to landscape have not 
been contextualised.21  Lacunae such as these demonstrate that work on the 
social relations of production in farming and particularly the circumstances of 
small-scale farmers is, logically, equally absent from the historiography of the 
interwar years. 
 The fact that landownership is a theme in the works already mentioned 
means it would not be true to say that a separation has taken place entirely 
between the studies of economic production in the countryside and of some of 
its inhabitants, merely that they have concentrated upon the British rural elite 
who were until the interwar years some of the greatest beneficiaries of that 
economic production and, according to F.M.L Thompson, often continued so to 
be.22  It is recognised in the work mentioned above on the aristocracy and 
gentry that much of the wealth that formed the economic basis for the lives of 
social distinction which the elite led came from rents paid for farms on land that 
they owned.  However, it is not the case that the nature of the interrelationships 
                                        
20 Ibid., p.468. 
21 Howkins, ‘“Lost Content”;  Matless; Mandler, P., ‘Against “Englishness”: English Culture and 
the Limits to Rural Nostalgia, 1850-1940’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6 7, 
(1997), 155-76; Miller, S., ‘Urban Dreams and Rural Reality: Land and Landscape in English 
Culture, 1920-45’, Rural History, 6 1, (1995), 89-102; Howkins, A., ‘The Discovery of Rural 
England’, in Englishness, ed. by Colls, R., and Dodd, P. (London: Routledge, 1986), pp.62-99. 
22 Thompson, F.M.L., ‘English Landed Society II’, p.20. 
Chapter 2: Numerical Decline of Farmers 
 
71 
 
of the rent paying farmers, rent receiving landowners and largely propertyless 
rural workers has been adequately explored, especially in their exploitative 
dimensions, although the work of labour and social historians and some 
sociologists on related issues must not be ignored.23   
 This inadequate treatment of rural society results partly from an 
inadequate study of agriculture itself.  Generally, approaches to agriculture have 
been dominated by studies of its performance as a sector of the economy rather 
than by studies of the social relations of production that underpin that 
performance; that is, the interrelationship of social and economic factors in 
agriculture has been ignored.  The separation of the study of the economy from 
social processes that Burchardt appears, unfortunately, to be perpetuating in 
arguing for a more detailed social and cultural history24 is something that was 
rigorously opposed by Karl Marx.   
Marx recognised the instrumentalism of the capitalist class and its 
economic apologists, such as J. B. Say, Thomas Robert Malthus, and John Stuart 
Mill,25 in creating a political economy with an apparently scientific, and hence 
                                        
23 Griffiths, Labour; Mansfield, N., English Farmworkers and Local Patriotism, 1900-1930 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); Howkins, A., ‘Peasants, Servants and Labourers: the Marginal 
Workforce in British Agriculture, c.1870-1914’, Agricultural History Review, 42 1, (1994), 49-62; 
Howkins, A., ‘Social History and Agricultural History’ in, Agricultural History Review, 40 2, (1992), 
160-3; Armstrong, A., Farmworkers: a Social and Economic History, 1770-1980 (London: 
Batsford, 1988); Donajgrodzki, A. P., ‘Twentieth Century Rural England: A Case for “Peasant 
Studies”?’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 16 3, (1985), 425-42; Howkins, A., Poor Labouring Men: 
Rural Radicalism in Norfolk, 1870-1923 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Newby, H, 
Deferential; Bell and Newby; Mutch, A., ‘Rural Society in Lancashire, 1840-1914’ (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1961); Groves, R., Sharpen the Sickle! The History of the 
Farmworkers’ Union (London: Porcupine Press, 1949).  
24 Burchardt, ‘Agricultural History,’ p.466. 
25 Barber, W. J., A History of Economic Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984). 
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unquestionable,26 set of laws that operated immutably, beyond human or social 
control.27  These ‘laws’ he recognized to be, in reality, merely unjustified, 
untested and unproved theories,28 the creation of which Maurice Dobb refers to 
as ‘hypostatization’ in bourgeois economics.29   
 The implication of such claims was that existing social structures were 
merely the result of the naturally existing economic laws of competition that 
characterise bourgeois political economy and were, thus, rationally beyond 
human interference.30  Marx shows that the operation of qualitatively different 
relations of production in earlier epochs contradicted such bourgeois claims for 
the mechanisms of their preferred economic system to be naturally occurring, 
likening bourgeois economists to theologians of differing beliefs for whom the 
only true religion is their own.  Thus, Marx recognised that ‘laws’ of political 
economy were the creation of human beings and, as such, originated in society 
as part of a social and historical process whereby capital, or productive wealth, 
was accumulated as private property.  The distribution of wealth was, therefore, 
the product of human behaviour and not of laws of free markets existing beyond 
the control of human beings.31 
                                        
26 Hearn, F., Domination, Legitimation and Resistance: the Incorporation of the Nineteenth 
Century English Working Class (Westport: Greenwood, 1978), p.138. 
27 Marx, Capital: Vol. 1, pp.174-5 fn.34. 
28 Gill, R. T., Economics: a Text with Included Readings (London: Prentice-Hall International, 
1974), p.413.  
29 Dobb, M., Political Economy and Capitalism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 
pp.127-133. 
30 Bottomore, T., and Rubel, M., Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982; 1st published 1956), pp.77-8. 
31 Poulantzas, N., Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: Verso, 1979; 1st published 1974); 
McLellan, D., Karl Marx: Selected Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp.345-6. 
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 Marx insisted, very much like Burchardt, that the actual conditions of 
society can be revealed through its study.  However, unlike Burchardt, Marx was 
clear that that this cannot be achieved without recognising that the type of 
distribution of economic factors amongst the members of a society, the form of 
production which that distribution creates and maintains and how that 
distribution is managed politically, legally and culturally, play a fundamental part 
in the varied experiences of the members of a society as they interact within the 
‘entire social edifice’; this is true because these processes of distribution, 
production and management regulate the range and type of choices that any 
member of a society can make – they place differential limits on human 
agency.32  Thus, it follows that the study of the economic relationships between 
human beings based on the distribution of productive resources amongst them 
and the potential productive power of those resources – the relations of 
production – plays a fundamental role in understanding society; economic 
production cannot be avoided in the study of society because production is 
essential to any society but it must be seen in the context of being production by 
humans.  This production is based, obviously, on conditions ‘directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past’33 and, thus, is pre-structured 
and conforms to certain similar general conditions that together make up a 
particular, predominant, mode of production.  He insists, however, on 
recognising the existence of ‘endless variations and gradations in […] 
appearance’ of a predominant mode of production, such as variations in racial 
                                        
32 Marx, Capital Vol. 3, p.927. 
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relations,34 which is testament to his dialectical understanding of society; 
empirical analysis of these endless variations is essential in proving or disproving 
the existence of the dialectical development of the general underlying processes 
and tendencies that would conform to the social relations of production of any 
particular predominant mode of production.  The need for such analysis is as 
true of the countryside as of anywhere else and will be shown so to be by this 
study.  Put simply, the development of society is not predetermined, nor is it 
governed by exogenous economic laws; but economic forces and the distribution 
of wealth amongst a society’s population, emanating from the past, have 
enormous influence on any society and thus cannot be ignored in the study of 
social development.  Thus, this study requires that farmers be analysed as 
producers but ones whose social existence is very much influenced by the extent 
of their productive agricultural capacity in the form of land and wealth. 
 The macroeconomics of ‘productionist’ analysis of agriculture have, 
generally, ignored the social relations of production, as has been suggested; that 
is to say that such analysis ignores the roles and fates of human beings in 
production, as recognised by Brian Short who stated that a separation of 
economic and anthropological approaches to the countryside had occurred in 
studies of farming in the events of the Second World War that follow, 
historically, immediately upon those events under consideration here.  When he 
commented, ‘To help redress this imbalance, this article will also point to the fact 
that previous studies have tended to separate production from its social 
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context,’35 Short might just as well have been commenting upon existing studies 
of the interwar countryside.  This is especially true considering that the War 
effectively brought to a conclusion many aspects of laissez faire political and 
economic thinking that had been severely tested during the interwar years and 
found wanting, the early developments of the replacement for which would form 
the bedrock for Wartime and post-War policy.36   
 Prior to the requests of Burchardt for a wider, more culturally determined, 
field of rural study, and of Short for a reunification of social and economic 
approaches, Alun Howkins had been arguing for some years, almost in vain, for 
a more comprehensive social history of the countryside.  Howkins had been 
criticizing the taking of too narrow an economic approach, observing that, ‘There 
is seldom a human face seen in a subject which often describes the complex and 
varied experience of farm labour as a “factor of production”.’37  However, the 
tendency to ignore the stark reality of the inequalities produced by the 
development of the capitalist social relations of production in the countryside is 
at least as old as capitalism itself, as Terry Eagleton observes in The Guardian in 
a review of Roy Strong’s Visions of England: 
There was nothing timeless or idyllic about this landscape of capitalist 
landowners, grinding poverty, depopulation and a decaying artisanal 
class. [...]  The great eighteenth-century landscape painters may show 
the landowner gazing benignly on his flocks of sheep and abundant 
                                        
35 Short, B., ‘War in the Fields: the County War Agricultural Committees in England, 1939-1945’, 
Rural History, 18 2, (2007), 217-44. 
36 Ibid., p.218. 
37 Howkins, ‘Social History’, p.161. 
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harvest, but Strong reminds us that there is no sign of those who actually 
till the soil.38 
The interaction of human beings in the process of producing wealth in the 
foremost industrial activity of the countryside must be examined if the picture of 
an interwar rural England of experiences varying according to ownership of 
productive resources is to be sustained or rebutted; it is clear that support for 
such an examination exists. 
 Howkins’ appeal can be seen as an extension to farm labour of an opinion 
voiced by T.W.Fletcher with regard to the farmers who employ agricultural 
labour.  Fletcher observed that, ‘Suffering and joy are attributes of human 
beings, in this context of the thousands of farmers who form part of the 
agricultural community’,39 which was made in relation to an earlier period, that 
of the late nineteenth century.  This quote comes from a particularly appropriate 
source for two reasons.  Firstly, this study is responding to demands for the 
reappraisal of an established interpretation of a period as one of blanket 
depression in agriculture much as Fletcher was writing about a period which was 
once regarded as being one of depression in agriculture so great and all- 
encompassing that it carried the title ‘The Great Depression’.  Fletcher’s quote is 
important, secondly, because, this study’s concentration is upon the experiences 
and relationships of one section of the farming community, namely, farmers, the 
same group to which he attaches importance. 
                                        
38 Eagleton, T., ‘“England’s Dreaming”’ (review of Visions of England by Roy Strong), Guardian 
reviews section, 2 July 2011.   
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It must be recognised that fluctuations in the number of farmers in 
existence over the interwar period might be one reasonable way of judging the 
fortunes of the industry as an addition to economic measures of output and 
makes necessary an attempt to establish the existence and magnitude of such 
fluctuations.  The available statistics facilitate the establishment of the existence 
of any regional variations in farmers’ fortunes which can then be analysed in the 
context of the economic fortunes of farmers of varying scales of production.  
This allows for differentiation to be made between the social experiences and 
economic fortunes of farmers of varying scales of production, any differences 
suggesting the need for a study of the relations of production that existed 
between small scale farmers and other status groups and classes in the social 
space.  It thus acts to bridge the gap between the conflicting portrayals of the 
economy and society of the countryside in the interwar years that exist in the 
historiography, as outlined in Chapter One.40 
 The most compelling reason, perhaps, for assessing the fortunes of 
farming through changes in the numbers of farmers involved in its undertaking 
across the interwar period is revealed in the particular understanding or 
perception that farmers appear to have of their own lifestyles as farmers, at 
least as far as this can be assessed through publications in which they have been 
quoted or represented.  Agriculture was (and continues to be) represented as an 
occupation with responsibilities that exceeded those of industrial or professional 
employment and as one which offered the rewards of a vocation, constitutive of 
an existence not to be forsaken except under duress and thus unlikely to witness 
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the numbers of those engaged in it shrinking unduly.  The interwar works of the 
farmer and journalist, A.G. Street, whose most popular work, Farmer’s Glory, is 
well known within rural history circles and which describe the author’s life as a 
farmer, recount the economic difficulties faced by farmers but are also replete 
with references to the rewards that arise from the pursuit of agriculture as a way 
of life rather than merely a means of employment.41  Elsewhere, the idea of a 
spiritual remuneration to be gained from farming is reproduced in suggestions of 
a certain satisfaction amongst farmers with the ultimate purpose of agricultural 
cultivation, the production of high quality foodstuffs, despite the demanding 
nature of the task.  The implication is that farmers must be assumed to be 
reluctant to give up their vocation except where the most difficult of financial 
situations might demand it; thus, the chairman of the Central and Associated 
Chambers of Agriculture, George Lambert M.P., could be paraphrased as follows 
in the organisation’s journal in 1935:  
The farmer of today was no drowsy dullard, hunting 3 days a week and 
marketing, or rather going to market, the other 3 days. The 
agriculturalist, to be successful, had to work seven days a week; there 
was no question of Sunday off.  British agriculturalists produced the finest 
stock and the largest crops.42 
 The rewards emanating from farming went beyond the mere enjoyment 
of the means and ends of cultivation, however.  The metaphysical rewards are 
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represented in various publications as being located in farmers’ enjoyment of a 
sense of value to be found in their role in the very origins and existence of the 
nation.  Montague Fordham, in a letter to the Times in May 1927, was typical of 
a long tradition of associating farmers’ wellbeing with the wellbeing of the nation 
as a whole.  Fordham argued that the threat to farmers’ livelihoods presented by 
the fall in prices for agricultural produce would lead to national disaster: 
Tenants, in common with all other cultivators, undoubtedly suffer from 
the vacillation and to a large extent the insufficiency of prices.  This, the 
price problem, is, I suggest, the problem we have to solve if we are to 
save English civilisation from decay.43   
Such ideas can be found in the writings of agriculturalists of the nineteenth 
century, including William Cobbett’s 1830 homage to the countryside, Rural 
Rides.44 
Bourdieu has exposed how the desire for association of social groups with 
‘ancient’ cultural practices, such as those pursuits which, including agriculture, 
are redolent of the countryside, is used as a means of appropriating the type of 
cultural capital which has the potential for transformation into financial capital.45  
Such a process being undertaken by fractions of the agricultural community in 
the interwar years might well be seen as implying the existence of financial 
insecurity amongst its members.  The following 1920 article from The Yorkshire 
Herald attests to the fact that farmers were certainly making the kind of 
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attempts to associate themselves with a role in their nation’s development and 
security that justified some kind of financial indulgence.  The article describing 
the annual dinner of the Darlington Chamber of Commerce contained an account 
of the glowing tribute to tenant farmers offered by Brigadier-General H. Conyers-
Surtees, D.S.O., C.B., M.V.O., M.P., himself a farmer and landowner, who 
‘proposed the toast of “The Tenant Farmers”,’ saying, ‘It was this vigorous and 
virile race of yeomen that had made England great – (applause ) - and in the 
future as in the past they would be always the backbone of the race (applause)’; 
so typical of the kind of tribute offered by agriculturalists to farmers at the time 
is this example that it was followed immediately by another in the reply from Mr. 
J.W. Fell who said that, ‘the tenant farmer was a national asset’.46 
 Subtly disguised claims to special treatment are found in other farming 
publications. The NFU Record, representing over 100,000 farmers by the 
1920s,47 was making representations for farming being ‘the nation’s most 
important industry’ in 1922 whilst the Mark Lane Express which acted as a 
mouthpiece for farmers had been referring to agriculture as ‘the oldest and most 
important industry of the country’ in July 1921.48  Similar sentiments were 
conveyed to Parliament by MPs during the debate on the repeal of the Corn 
Production Act in July 1921 where various speakers made assertions as to 
agriculture’s importance, with Sir Harry Hope, for example, making the assertion 
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that, ‘The agricultural industry is the mainstay of this country’.49  Thus, the 
metaphysical returns from farming to its practitioners were regularly expressed 
during the interwar period as arising from the often unrecognised importance of 
farmers to the continued material and spiritual health of the nation and its 
people who, by implication, owed them a debt of gratitude.   
 Appearances suggest, therefore, that it was considered by those 
associated with the agricultural industry that some elements of the intangible 
rewards that arose from farming could, in certain circumstances, be temporarily 
relinquished and that the debt of gratitude owed by the ‘nation’ to farmers could 
be quantified and ought to be paid in cash by the Government.  This kind of 
quantification of otherwise ethereal qualities can certainly be seen as indicative 
of the first stages of a hardship that might lead to numbers of farmers being 
forced to leave their cherished way of life.   Protection of farmers had a long 
history, including in the Corn Laws that protected grain prices in the first half of 
the nineteenth century and in certain duties on imports in the latter half,50 but 
the recent precedent was in payments made to arable farmers under the Corn 
Production Act during and after the First World War, the origins of which lay at 
least partially in the evidence given by influential agriculturalists in support of 
farmers in 1915 to the Milner Committee which had been charged with 
investigating the possibility of increasing wartime food production in Britain.  
M.J.R. Dunstan, Principal of South Eastern Agricultural College, had made the 
intellectual connection between the productive activities of farmers and the 
                                        
49 NA/MAF/48/234, Corn Production Acts Repeal Bill 1921. 
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effects on the physical and spiritual health of the realm in iterating that farmers 
must be appealed to through ‘patriotism and profit’, thereby giving a material 
dimension to the opinion of Trustram Eve, secretary to the Farmers’ Club, which 
was that farmers were ‘the most patriotic and reasonable Englishmen’.51  The 
intimation of an agricultural exceptionalism that was deserving of financial 
remuneration for its practitioners had extended as far as The Times by June 
1927.  The newspaper, an august and elitist pillar of the Establishment, was 
making the plea for any decline of agriculture to be considered through the 
prism of national wellbeing and to be addressed with some form of support, 
invoking the War of almost nine years’ memory as a cautionary reminder of the 
dangers of neglect: 
Apart from the War and other risks to our food supplies, it is surely 
essential for the endurance and welfare of the nation that an energetic 
and prosperous agriculture should be counted among the fundamental 
forms of industrial production.52 
Even greater significance should be attached to the attitude of MAF in 
regard to the ways in which Dunstan’s intellectual connections between farming 
and national security and health were being replicated by the Ministry, even 
before The Times was imitating it.  Despite its role as the advisor to Government 
on food issues, MAF was deepening its support for the farming fraternity 
throughout the interwar period by increasingly coming to represent it within 
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Government rather than to mediate between food producers and Government53 
and was suggesting by as early as 1923 that agriculture’s ‘deep importance to 
the welfare of the nation warrants a peculiar interest being devoted by the State 
to the financial position of the food producer’.54  The ultimate recognition of the 
esteem in which the members of the agricultural fraternity held the occupation 
of farming and its protagonists can be found in the following exchange between 
Sir Harry Verney, a representative of the 1915 Milner Committee, and M.J.R. 
Dunstan who clearly felt that some intangible element existed in the very 
existence of farmers in England that justified the exaltation of the agricultural 
producers of the nation:  
Verney: Why should the farmer be placed in a privileged position outside 
the rest of the country, and not come under compulsion? 
Dunstan: Simply because the English farmer is what he is.55    
Furthermore, agriculturalists have been revered and treated accordingly 
by mainstream commentators since the Second World War, reflecting the self-
regard of its practitioners, even where agriculture as a process and, thus, as 
something quite abstract has been found wanting in some areas, such as animal 
welfare.  Any familiarity with the coverage by the press of serious outbreaks of 
disease affecting British farm animals since the 1990s, such as bovine 
spongiform encephalitis and foot and mouth disease, might lead to some doubt 
over the extent to which such commentators have continued to support the 
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industry’s business owners.  However, it is notable that, until recently, it is rarely 
farmers as a group and the business methods and imperatives of the social class 
to which they belong that have been apportioned the blame for such 
outbreaks;56 rather, an irresponsible individual farmer is sought as the origin of 
the problem and then structural factors, such as bureaucratic and governmental 
ineptitude are blamed for the subsequent spread of disease.57  This evasion of 
responsibility continues despite the fact that it is recognised in academic circles 
that the technology employed by agriculturalists in their drive for profit has 
played a role in the likely spread of disease by subverting scientific attempts at 
objectivity in the study of animal disease in a manner that makes it a microcosm 
of the fate of science in the wider society.58  The reverence for the farmer is, 
thus, reproduced in the twenty-first century and is exemplified by Graham 
Harvey writing gushingly in the Daily Mail in 2007 on the subject of livestock-
keepers, irrespective of the disasters that had afflicted British farm animals since 
the 1990s:  
I once heard a farmer describe the job of keeping livestock as “a calling”.  
Indeed, when you look at the sort of money dairy, beef and sheep 
farmers have been making in the past few years, it would be hard to 
come up with any other reason for doing the job. […]  This is probably 
just as well when you consider what they do for the nation. Livestock 
areas are principally the grassland regions of Britain - the rolling green 
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hills, the heather moors, the river valleys, the salt-marshes of river 
estuaries.59 
The spiritual benefits to the nation of the maintenance of agriculture found in 
the modern conservatism of the Daily Mail might appear to have been inspired 
directly by journalism from the interwar period.  Similarly, it is certainly the case 
that the reverence for the countryside that consumes Graham Harvey’s piece is 
seen to be a replication of earlier writing.  The Lincoln Gazette was eulogising on 
the countryside in 1923: 
There is no picture more pleasant than that which the harvest in this 
island invokes in the memory.  The sunlit work, the mirth and amenities 
of the harvest field, the genial humours and associations of the harvest 
wagons, the harvest-home, the harvest festival and thanksgiving – how 
great a part these play in the immemorial tradition of our country life.60 
The relationship between the health of the nation and the countryside with its 
agriculture was reiterated in 1935 in The Home Farmer which states in ‘A 
Greeting for 1935!’ by Robin Field that, ‘without a happy and contented 
countryside we cannot have a happy and contented Old England.’61   
 The evidence and opinions presented above form an encomium to 
farmers and to the farming way of life and to the countryside in which it was 
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continued.  Burchardt even locates in the way of life of the farmer the solution to 
the alienation of human beings in a commodity society,62 an alienation which is 
derived, it would appear, given the terminology used and its context, from 
Marx.63  It is a tribute to the tranquil benefits of a life of agricultural production 
that is even able to ignore the oft quoted benefit of the ‘independence’ that 
remains so beloved of the farmer,64 leaving little effort to be made in imagining 
the reluctance that would surely have been felt by any farming practitioner 
forced to relinquish their occupation and lifestyle.  There can be little doubt that 
such reluctance would imply that any overall fall in the numbers of farmers 
operating between the Wars to be revealed through statistical analysis of the 
period would be representative of some measure of economic distress being 
suffered by farmers during the period.  
 The above extract from the Lincoln Gazette of 1923 is particularly 
evocative of a pastoral vision of peace and harmony but a close look at the 
article by Robin Field from the Home Farmer, quoted above, reveals a slightly 
different literary tone in existence than that being used twelve years earlier in 
the Gazette.  ‘Let us try to capture a new note of enthusiasm’, implores Robin 
Field in the Home Farmer, continuing, ‘We have seen the farmer work under a 
cloud; we have seen the farmer gradually become forgotten like the townsman, 
                                        
62 Burchardt, ‘Introduction: Farming and the Countryside’, pp.3-4.  However, it must be noted 
that he fails to recognise that the farmer’s de facto alienation would once again materialise in the 
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1993; 1st published 1939), p.196. 
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and if we like we can remedy it all.’65  Little doubt can exist that the cheerfulness 
of 1923’s Lincoln Gazette has been replaced with something more cautious as a 
result of some intervening disruption; indeed, Field refers to agricultural policy as 
having become a ‘neglected Cinderella’.66  What remains to be seen is whether 
the likely origins of this cautionary note can be deduced from trends in the 
statistics on the numbers of farms and farmers in England in the interwar period. 
 
Changing Numbers of Farmers in Interwar Rural England 
 
 The identification of variations in the numbers of farmers over time in 
Britain might appear initially to be a relatively simple task, given the existence of 
the United Kingdom Census of Population (Census) which has been taken every 
tenth year since 1801, with the exception, due to wartime considerations, of 
1941.  It includes, in its publication of regional statistics, aggregate totals for the 
numbers of people working in the various sectors of production, these being 
broken down also into a more detailed categorization of occupations.67  
Simplicity does not exist, however, in the calculation from the Census of the 
numbers of those involved in the different branches of agriculture.  Difficulties 
were recognised in 1934 by Bridges who was examining agricultural employment 
trends for the Agricultural Economics Society; Bridges states, ‘In presenting the 
Census and other employment statistics I fully realise that they are not the ideal 
material for a detailed discussion of changes in the industry.  Still, they are the 
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best material available.’68  R.B. Jones was recognising the same existing 
difficulties in 1957, saying that in England and Wales at that later date, it was 
‘doubtful even whether we know the total number of farmers’.69  Difficulties arise 
even from the delineation of the geographical extent of this study, which is of 
England; given that the most relevant published Census statistics refer either to 
individual counties or to the combined England and Wales, it is the latter, in the 
absence of statistics for England alone, to which will be referred here in order to 
gain a general picture of trends in numbers of farmers during the interwar 
years.70  
One deficiency of the Census, of course, is found in the ten year gaps 
between issues which means that short term changes that might be related to 
specific events are difficult to trace; therefore, use of other sources, notably the 
annually collected Agricultural Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops and 
the Number of Live Stock in England and Wales (Agricultural Statistics)71 which 
detail numbers of existing agricultural holdings, in conjunction with Census 
material should help to determine trends in farmer numbers.  Longer term 
trends ought, logically, to be easier to identify through the Census and it would 
be useful for this study to be able to track changes over the years from 1921 to 
1941.  These two specific years of collection could be seen, roughly but as 
accurately as possible given the limitations of the years of collection, as acting to 
bookend the period under examination in this thesis, but establishing them as 
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such through the Census material is made impossible by the non-existence of 
the Census for 1941,72 as understood by Holderness who recognises that ‘what 
happened’ in terms of farmer numbers between 1931 and 1951 is extremely 
difficult to assess.73  The Census alone is useful only in estimating numbers of 
farmers up until 1931 but the Ministry of Agriculture’s National Farm Survey of 
England and Wales: a Summary Report (hereafter, National Farm Survey 
Report), published in 1946, details numbers of farmers and also of agricultural 
holdings for 1941;74 however, as will be shown, there are difficulties of 
comparison between its data and that provided in the Census.  Reference will 
also be made to other contemporary interwar, and more recent, texts containing 
statistical data on numbers employed in agriculture but it will become clear that 
these present their own problems.75 
 Bridges, quoted above, may have been alluding to other problems, 
however.  These are the same problems encountered by Whitby in 1966 and 
relate to variations merely in the actual presentation of the data in the Census 
publications themselves, especially problems in variations from one decade to 
the next.76  One example of such a problem is in the categories into which 
farmers are divided; the 1911 Census has separate categories for ‘Farmers’ and 
‘Market Gardeners’ in England and Wales and, whilst the two categories appear 
in the 1921 publication, there are now found added categories numbering 
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poultry farmers as well as farmers connected with ‘Flower and Seed Growing and 
Nursery Gardening’ whilst the number of subdivisions within the ‘Agriculture’ 
category has increased from thirteen to 123 or, with the inclusion of forestry, 
131.77  The subdivisions under ‘Agriculture’ have then been significantly 
rationalised for the 1931 Census which for the first time contains a single 
category denoting the number of farmers. 
 Effective deciphering of the Census category of ‘Agriculture’ (‘Agricultural 
Occupations’ in 1931) to establish totals for numbers of farmers in England and 
Wales for the years 1911, 1921 and 1931 can be achieved.  The resulting 
numbers, especially those relating to change between 1921 and 1931, have to 
be treated with caution, not least because, as noted above, the numbers of 
subdivisions have been drastically reduced between those years but also 
because it appears that a significant degree of reclassification of occupations has 
taken place; for example, many agricultural labourers seem to have been 
reclassified under ‘Gardeners, Nurserymen, Seedsmen, Florists’ in 1931 which 
means that, taken at face value, the number employed in these occupations has 
increased by over 95,000, or 75 percent, to 220,971 from 125,777, whilst the 
number of agricultural labourers appears to have fallen to 494,753 from a figure 
for 1921 which is very difficult to calculate but was given in 1938 by Lord 
Addison, in reference to the Census, to be 743,313.78  This would represent a fall 
of such magnitude as to be almost unbelievable, especially when contrasted with 
the figure given by Addison for the number of labourers employed in 1936, 
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which is 636,000, a figure that would, thus, represent a large increase on that 
for 1931.  Whether such reclassification would have extended to categories 
including numbers of farmers is difficult to ascertain although numbers of 
farmers do appear to have been given with more clarity than those of 
agricultural labourers in the Census across the years.79  
 The results of the calculation of farmer numbers from the Census show 
that there was a 15 percent increase in farmer numbers of 34,226 from 
228,78880 in 1911 to 263,014 in 192181 and then a 5.6 percent fall of 14,768 to 
248,246 in 1931.82  Thus, the figures show an upward movement in farmer 
numbers during the period including the First World War and the three years 
following it, when farming is regarded to have moved from being in a stable to 
an exceedingly prosperous condition, and then a fall during the 1920s and into 
1931 that was not as large as the rise from 1911 to 1921.  Whitby’s figures 
demonstrate a similar trend but indicate a more substantial fall between 1921 
and 1931.83  This fall during the 1920s occurred during a period regarded, as has 
been shown above, as having been one of difficulty in British agriculture, 
especially during the years from 1922 to 1925 and from 1929 to 1932 and 
despite the variations in opinions regarding the extent of prosperity and decline 
that have already been commented upon.  Documents from the Ministry of 
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Agriculture from 1923 lend support to statistics showing falling numbers of 
farmers during the early 1920s, mentioning farmers who owned their own farms, 
to whom this thesis will return, ‘having been forced to retire from farming owing 
to its general unprofitability and to the new and onerous obligations which they, 
in many cases, unavoidably assumed in circumstances of extreme difficulty.’84  
Newby has written of farmers being ‘rendered destitute in large numbers’ after 
1929.85 
86 
 Sources other than the Census are of differing levels of help in clarifying 
the information on absolute numbers of farmers between 1911 and 1931.  
Addison puts a much higher estimate than is to be found in the Census on the 
numbers that might be termed ‘farmers’, referring to the number of ‘Employers’ 
who were ‘Occupied in Agriculture and Horticulture in Great Britain’.  His figure 
of 364,602 for England and Wales for 1911 is substantially higher than the 
228,788 shown to be farmers in the 1911 Census but is of little value as it 
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includes various categories, some of the occupants of which are clearly not the 
direct proprietors of farm businesses, such as ‘relatives assisting in the work of 
the farm, farm bailiffs, foremen [sic]’.  Others, such as ‘graziers’ and ‘those 
engaged in Horticultural Occupations included under the headings “Managerial” 
and “Working on Own Account”’, could be considered to be farmers but it is, 
therefore, difficult to understand why they are not simply categorised as such in 
the Census which is from where Addison derives his figures. 87  
It is of note, however, that whilst the actual numbers that Addison quotes 
differ from the ones provided here, the overall trends he shows are similar, the 
most notable being a fall in numbers of ‘Employers’ of 5.2 percent between 1921 
and 1931 which is not greatly dissimilar to the 5.6 percent fall in the number of 
‘Farmers’ noted above. 88  
 Astor and Rowntree serve merely to cloud the issue further with their 
unreferenced 1939 statement that, ‘There are approximately 300,000 persons 
describing themselves as farmers, 250,000 in England and Wales and 75,000 in 
Scotland.’89  It is immediately obvious that their arithmetic is faulty, the figures 
that they give for England and Wales and for Scotland adding up to 325,000 
rather than the 300,000 that they quote and there is nothing to indicate which 
figure should be considered incorrect or whether it should be both.  Of more 
interest than their arithmetic is their assertion that, ‘Their [farmers’] numbers 
have remained remarkably stable in the last 60 years,’ which appears to be a 
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88 Figure 2.1 and Ch.2 fn.86; HMSO, Census, 1911, Table 3 (p.16); Ch.2 fn.13.  
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misinterpretation of Lord Ernle’s assertion of 1936, Ernle having merely 
compared numbers of farmers in 1871 and 1931 and found them similar but with 
no reference to figures or stability in between.90  The notion of stability  is not 
borne out by reference to Addison who shows that the number of male 
‘Employers’ had risen from 313,398 to 385,344 in the 30 years between 1891 
and 1921, a rise of 23 percent, and had been falling until 1931, numbers hardly 
depicting stability.  The figures of Astor and Rowntree as well as their assertion 
of stability would also be disputed by Howkins who, much more recently, has 
published figures for numbers of farmers in England and Wales that suggest that 
there were as many as 475,633 farmers in 1901 and that this number had fallen 
rapidly by 1911 to 383,333,91 a figure fairly close to that of Addison.  Howkins 
includes women farmers in his estimates, but only for 1901, which, despite its 
laudability in striving for historical accuracy, further confuses the issue since they 
are not, apparently, included for 1911; it must be added that the figures quoted 
above direct from the Census were a combination of the numbers of farmers of 
both sexes.  The disparity between estimates is, again, hardly helped by D.A.E. 
Harkness who, in presenting his paper to the Agricultural Economics Society in 
1934, stated, ‘The number of farmers and persons working on their own account 
is estimated at about 360,000 (300,000 in England and Wales and 60,000 in 
Scotland).’92   
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 The fact that the figures of Harkness are for 1934 and of Astor and 
Rowntree for 1939 at least serve as a reminder that numbers of farmers for the 
years after 1931 have not yet been addressed here.  It seems fairly clear that 
while the Census will help illuminate general trends in numbers of farmers in 
England and Wales in the first third of the twentieth century, further sources will 
have to be consulted in an attempt to establish any patterns of change from 
1931 to 1941 since, as stated, no Census was taken in 1941.  The difference 
between Harkness’ figure of 300,000 for numbers of farmers in 1934 and that of 
Astor and Rowntree of 250,000 for 1939, if taken as correct, would indicate that 
there were significant falls in numbers of farmers during the 1930s, especially if 
Addison’s figure of 365,283 for 1931 were to be taken into account.93  However, 
it should have become clear that whilst these figures may be suggestive of a 
general downward trend in numbers of farmers, the true extent of any fall 
remains to be explicated.   
 The assessment of numbers of farmers after 1931 leads merely to 
uncertainty, some suggestions as to the likelihood of increases in farmer 
numbers between 1931 and 1951 being contradicted by a contraction in the 
number of farm holdings in existence.94  This uncertainty is augmented by there 
being no available Census data between 1931 and 1951.  Uncertainty over 
numbers of farmers existing just after the end of the interwar period can be 
partially overcome through the use of data from the National Farm Survey 
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Report which is useful in assessing farmers’ numbers in the period from 1931 to 
1941. 
 The data presented in the Ministry of Agriculture’s National Farm Survey 
Report was collected between 1941 and 1943, ‘to assess both the needs and the 
capacity of each farm for increased food production’ and ‘to assist local war-time 
administration in the widest sense’.95  An assessment was made of every 
‘agricultural holding’ of five acres or more in size and the numbers of ‘occupiers’ 
of those holdings was recorded.  The result is that reasonably accurate figures 
for the numbers of farmers in existence is available for 1941,96 a year outside of 
the scope of this study but sufficiently close to make its consideration 
worthwhile.  It might intuitively appear that the omission of the quite significant 
number of holdings of less than five acres in extent would make inappropriate 
any comparison between the numbers of occupiers recorded in the National 
Farm Survey Report and the numbers of those working in agriculture as 
employers or managers recorded in the Census of 1931, an observation made in 
the report.97  However, the report continues by noting that figures published in 
the Census would have excluded ‘the occupiers of spare-time, accommodation 
and residential holdings, as these would have been entered under their main 
trade,’98 and whilst it is not the case that all farms under five acres in size would 
have been run on a spare-time basis so that the occupiers would not have 
appeared as ‘farmers’ in the Census, it is reasonable to say that this would have 
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been the case in the large majority of cases; the Census, then, effectively, 
recorded the numbers of full-time farmers, the vast majority of whom would 
have been occupiers of holdings of over five acres in size.  This inference that 
occupiers of holdings of fewer than five acres were unlikely to be classed as 
farmers in the Census because farming would not be their main trade is given 
more weight by the observation in the National Farm Survey Report that even 
the dependence upon farming of some of the occupiers of larger holdings than 
five acres was questionable and that ‘some of the full-time farmers might more 
accurately have been classed part-time, and those in the part-time class as 
“regular” spare-time occupiers.’99  Given that the report publishes a figure for the 
number of full-time occupiers of agricultural holdings, it can be assumed, even if 
with a little trepidation, that an assessment of changes of the numbers of full-
time farmers between 1931 and 1941 can be made by comparing the numbers 
of people classified under ‘Farmers’ in the 1931 Census with the number of 
occupiers of full-time holdings shown in Table 1 of the National Farm Survey 
Report.  The report gives the figure of 215,900 as representing full-time farmers 
which is smaller by 32,346 than the 1931 Census figure of 248,246 that can be 
regarded as roughly representing full-time farmers.100  These figures, therefore, 
show a thirteen percent fall in the number of farmers between 1931 and 1941.  
Overall, between 1921 and 1941, the number of full-time farmers on holdings of 
five acres or more in England and Wales appears to have fallen by 47,114 or just 
under 18 percent.   
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 Examination of Census and other sources demonstrates that the 
estimation of the fortunes of agriculture as measured through the calculation of 
numbers of farmers is fraught with difficulty but that does not mean that it is not 
worthwhile.  The examination here has achieved its goal insofar as it has 
demonstrated that general trends can be elucidated from the available data.  
The trend over the interwar years was towards a fall in the number of full-time 
farmers; that this fall was as high as 18 percent suggests that, when measured 
by the numbers of farm business operators, agriculture was subject to 
considerable change and suggests that around one in five farmers who might 
have been classified as full-time in 1921 have either disappeared from the 
industry or passed into another classification, the most likely being that for part-
time farmers.  Agriculture may not have suffered too badly, overall, when figures 
for growth in the sector are considered as the appropriate measure of 
performance101 but it appears that the bald economic evaluation is somewhat 
lacking when the effects on those running a large number of the sector’s full-
time businesses are to be considered the measure of success or failure, decline 
or prosperity.   
 Caveats must be drawn to the use of this figure of 32,346 as a definitive 
measure of the fall in numbers of full-time farmers between 1931 and 1941.  
The National Farm Survey Report tends to give the impression of overstating the 
numbers of both full-time and part-time farmers in existence on its own terms by 
just under 5 percent in Table 1 by listing the number of holdings rather than of 
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occupiers, given that some 10,000 occupiers occupy more than one holding.102  
Another issue that must be taken into consideration is that some persons 
enumerated in the Census as farmers would have been farming as a primary 
occupation on a holding of over five acres but with a secondary occupation that 
would have discounted them from counting as one of the 215,900 full-time 
farmers in the National Farm Survey Report; this would suggest that there were 
fewer full-time farmers and more part-time farmers in 1931 as defined in 1941 
by the National Farm Survey Report than shown in the Census and so the fall in 
numbers between 1931 and 1941 would be smaller.  Whether this simply means 
that there was a larger fall in full-time farmers between 1921 and 1931 and that 
the overall fall of 47,114 between 1921 and 1941 should be recognised as 
accurate would depend on what definitions were used to classify persons as 
‘Farmers’ in the 1921 Census.  Conversely, it is also possible that the Census 
may have underestimated the numbers of farmers by classifying those who 
appear in the National Farm Survey Report as ‘Part-time’ occupiers of farms 
under another occupation altogether.  This occupation may have existed within 
the overall occupational category of ‘Agriculture’, such as ‘Agriculture, 
employers, managers, etc.’ as stated in the National Farm Survey Report, or in 
another overall category, given that many part-time occupiers of holdings had 
additional occupations.  Thus, it is also possible that the 18 percent fall in the 
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numbers of farmers between 1921 and 1941 mentioned above is an 
underestimate.103   
 Another significant area of incompatibility between the data from the 
Census and the National Farm Survey Report concerns the categorization of 
producer retailers, that is, farmers who marketed their own produce directly to 
customers, often farming ‘on the fringes of the urban area’ and ‘within the 
centre itself.’104  Producer retailers were classified in the National Farm Survey 
Report as farmers but were just as likely to have been categorised as retailers in 
the Census since their income was derived from direct retailing, the National 
Farm Survey Report itself stating that, for its own purposes, ‘Producer retailers 
might with advantage have been given a class to themselves.’105  The effect 
would be for the Census to underestimate the numbers of farmers in existence 
and, given that in the mid-1930s there were 45,000 to 50,000 producer retailers 
selling milk and dairy products alone,106 any underestimation might be quite 
considerable and, in the event, would make comparison of the Census with data 
from the National Farm Survey Report quite misleading. 
 It should be recognised that there is far more likelihood of inaccuracy 
occurring in the Census data on numbers of farmers than in that of the National 
Farm Survey Report simply as a result of the method of data collection.  Data for 
the National Farm Survey Report was collected by field reporters who visited 
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farms and recorded the information themselves whilst Census returns are usually 
filled out by the individuals named on the forms who might distort the 
information they gave.  Farmers may have regarded the Census merely to be the 
kind of Government interference of which they were suspicious and resentful, as 
shown in the evidence given to the Milner Committee in 1915 of Mr. J.R. 
Dunstan, Principal of an agricultural college, who speaks of farmers’ suspicion of 
anything non-local except the National Farmers Union;107 further evidence of 
farmers’ suspicion and resentment of dealings with officialdom is presented in 
later chapters of this work.108 
 More pertinently, farmers may have considered that the Census had 
potential for use for evaluation of their incomes. It is quite possible, therefore, 
that part-time farmers would have referred to themselves under their secondary 
or ancillary occupation in the Census, rather than as farmers, in an attempt to 
conceal their farming activities and levels of income.  This is a tendency to which 
farmers have been shown by Newby et al. to be prone109 and one that was 
directly stated to be existent, especially amongst smaller scale farmers, by the 
agricultural economist J.Hammond in a discussion held by the Agricultural 
Economics Society in 1954;110 similarly, Sturmey attests to farmers being highly 
protective of information on their financial status with regard to mortgage 
concealment on the part of farmers.111  The result of part-time farmers 
appearing under an occupation other than that of ‘Farmer’ in the Census would 
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be an underestimation of the numbers of farmers shown by the Census to exist 
as farmers.  Such an activity would accord with farmers’ resentment at being a 
source of Government tax revenue, taxes being bitterly resented by farmers as a 
perceived subsidy to urban dwellers.112  Evidence of such resentment comes 
from the British Farmer and Journal of Agriculture of 5 November 1921 which 
stated in its ‘N.F.U notes’, 
A resolution from the Helmsley Branch was adopted […] asking that 
agricultural employers and workers should be exempted from contributing 
[…] for any National Insurance scheme for the relief of the unemployed, 
for the reason that there is very little unemployment among agricultural 
workers. 
This seems to demonstrate either disingenuousness on the part of the NFU or 
simple self-deception, given that Howkins has detailed fairly significant rural 
unemployment in 1921 to 1922;113 definite evidence of such unemployment was 
revealed in a report to the Ministry of Agriculture (MAF) in 1930.114  
 Other circumstances existed that may have led to an underestimation of 
farmers in the Census; for example, it is possible that some part-time farmers 
who had become unemployed from their ancillary occupations may have been 
reluctant to allow themselves to be classified as farmers because of the effect 
that they may have perceived that this would have had upon any entitlement to 
unemployment benefit.  This possibility certainly seems to be reflected in events 
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surrounding two schemes to supply smallholdings to unemployed men in 
Cleveland, a report on their circumstances being completed in June 1934:  
In each case, the number of applicants have been limited, but this seems 
to have been due to doubts in the men’s minds as to the effect on their 
Unemployment Benefit, especially is this true of the men with families 
[sic].115  
 Precision cannot be achieved in the assessment of any changes that took 
place in the numbers of farmers in England and Wales over the interwar years 
due to inconsistencies in the data existing in the sources heretofore addressed.  
Contention has arisen from the measure of changes in farmer numbers by the 
cross referencing of the data in the Census, the National Farm Survey Report 
and other sources as well as from inconsistencies in the Census itself.  
Inconsistencies in the Census result from changes in methods of categorization 
from one decade to the next and the suggestion of possible flaws in the process 
of recording data caused by reticence amongst part-time farmers in categorising 
themselves as farmers and the erroneous categorization as farmers of those who 
occupied agricultural land but should have been otherwise recorded, as they 
were in the National Farm Survey Report.116  However, the existing evidence 
does seem to be consistent in showing a fall in the number of farmers, a trend 
that contradicts Brassley’s assertion, based apparently on a sample taken from 
                                        
115 NA/MAF/48/94, Depressed Areas Investigation: Provision of Smallholdings for Unemployed, 
1932/4. 
116 MAF, National Farm Survey, p.11. 
Chapter 2: Numerical Decline of Farmers 
 
104 
 
the Census for Devon, that farmer numbers remained stable between the two 
world wars.117   
 It is important to note that the most conservative estimate that can be 
made of changes in the number of farmers is arrived at by adding together the 
number of full-time and part-time farmers shown to be in existence in 1941 by 
the National Farm Survey Report and taking the result as representing the 
number of farmers in existence in 1941; the total of 248,400 is still over 14,500 
fewer than that shown in the Census for 1921, a fall of 5.5 percent.  This fall in  
numbers is a much lower estimate than the 18 percent fall presented above but, 
as the evidence shown above also suggests, it is likely that figures for farmer 
numbers presented in the Census for 1921 and 1931 are an underestimation, 
especially with regard to producer retailers, and, furthermore, that many farmers 
classified as ‘Part-time’ in the National Farm Survey Report should not have been 
included in the total number of farmers118 making the above 1941 figure of 
248,400 something of an exaggeration.  It is likely that the genuine percentage 
figure for the change in the numbers of farmers in the interwar years lies 
somewhere between 5.5 and 18, but there is little doubt that falls in numbers of 
farmers operating in English agriculture took place.  Better accuracy in assessing 
the actual extent of the decline in farmer numbers demands that supplementary 
evidence should be sought.  This may be found, rather than in the unreliable 
statistics on the numbers of farmers themselves, in analysis of changes in the 
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numbers of actual farm operations of farmers which will be undertaken in the 
next section.119 
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Changing Numbers of Farms and Farmers in Interwar Rural England  
 
 A reasonable expectation exists that changes in numbers of farms, or 
‘holdings’, would be reflective of trends in the numbers of the farmers who farm 
them.  Data on numbers of farm operations exists in the form of statistics on 
agricultural holdings in the annually published Agricultural Statistics which detail 
specifically the numbers of such holdings.  The National Farm Survey Report 
indicates that these statistics can be regarded as a relatively good guide to 
trends in changes in the numbers of farmers over time, if not to absolute 
numbers of farmers at any given time, because the statistics are consistent in 
the manner in which they have been collected and presented,120 unlike the data 
on numbers of farmers given in the Census which, as has been shown, appears 
to vary from one publication to the next.  Indeed, the National Farm Survey 
Report makes it clear that it was to a similar interpretation of what constituted a 
farm holding that was adhered both by the Field Reporters responsible for 
collecting data for the National Farm Survey Report and the Crop Reporters for 
the Agricultural Statistics.  Thus, the numbers for farm holdings over five acres 
in size published in the Agricultural Statistics appear to have been recorded and 
calculated in much the same way as for the National Farm Survey Report.121  
Additional value exists in these figures in that data is published for England, the 
focus of this study, as well as for England and Wales. 
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 One issue that might be considered of significance revealed by sources 
from the interwar period is that some farmers occupied more than one holding 
and thus that numbers of holdings shown to exist in the Agricultural Statistics 
would not be representative of the numbers of farmers in existence.  The 
monthly publication of the National Farmers’ Union, the NFU Record, revealed in 
June 1927 that farmers often owned or farmed more than one holding but these 
holdings would not generally have appeared as individual holdings in the 
Agricultural Statistics.122 Further evidence comes from the Minutes of Evidence 
Taken before the Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge (hereafter, Tithe 
Commission) in 1934 where one large-scale farmer, Mr. Ratcliff representing the 
NFU, stated that he farmed ‘a collection of eleven farms in a block’.123  In his 
statement  to the Tithe Commission, Mr. George Bayliss of Wyfield Manor in 
Newbury claimed himself to be ‘the largest tithepayer in South England also the 
largest arable farmer [sic]’, farming a total of 13,000 acres made up by a 
number of farms.124  Christopher Turnor, a large Lincolnshire landowner, had 
implied in his evidence to the Milner Committee in 1915 that it was not 
uncommon for a farmer to be farming two farms at once.125  Thus, the 290,600 
holdings in existence in 1941 were occupied by 277,000 separate occupiers, 
many of whom were not full-time or part-time farmers, according to the National 
Farm Survey Report, the difference between the two numbers being accounted 
                                        
122 NFU Record, June 1927. 
123 Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge, Minutes of Evidence, p.122. 
124 Ibid., p.636. 
125 NA/MAF/42/9. 
Chapter 2: Numerical Decline of Farmers 
 
108 
 
for by 10,000 occupiers who were responsible for more than one holding, their 
total number of occupancies totalling 23,600.126 
 However, it is made clear in the National Farm Survey Report that where 
more than one holding was actually being farmed by the same occupier, these 
holdings had been regarded as a single holding for statistical presentation in 
both the National Farm Survey Report and the Agricultural Statistics: 
Holdings which were under the same occupancy and day to day 
management and had a common source of labour, machinery and other 
permanent equipment were regarded as forming a single unit, and thus 
one survey record would be obtained, for example, for three such 
holdings of 4 acres, 16 acres and 30 acres, together making a 50-acre 
holding.127 
This method of recording of several holdings as one where they were being 
operated as one business and the relatively low level of single occupier multi-
ownership of holdings – just over eight percent of holdings and 3.5 percent of 
occupiers in 1941128 – means that the number of holdings shown to exist by the 
Agricultural Statistics throughout the interwar years would be a reasonable 
representation of the number of occupiers of agricultural holdings and will act as 
a good guide to identifying trends in numbers of farmers over the period.  The 
Crop Reporters recording details for the Agricultural Statistics were slightly less 
assiduous in determining when holdings should be treated as a single business 
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than the Field Reporters whose data informed the National Farm Survey Report.  
The result is that around 10,000 more holdings were recorded by the Crop 
Reporters for the figures that would have formed the 1941 Agricultural Statistics, 
had they been published, than appeared in the 1941 National Farm Survey 
Report,129 the three percent difference in the numbers of holdings being 
attributable to ‘the greater tendency to amalgamate holdings under the Farm 
Survey.’130  This suggests that a similarly low level of over-estimation of the 
number of existing holdings may have occurred in the Agricultural Statistics for 
the other years during the interwar period but, insofar as there can be assumed 
to have existed a consistent level of slight over-estimation, no effect will be had 
upon the trends in changes in numbers of holdings.131  Grigg has made a slightly 
ambiguous and unreferenced statement about the consistency of collection of 
the numbers of holdings in the Agricultural Statistics which suggests that 
consistent comparison can only be made from 1922 onwards132 but the actual 
figures from the Agricultural Statistics themselves indicate that earlier figures can 
be trusted since there appears to be no anomalous behaviour in the figures 
between 1921 and 1922; the information Grigg has used appears to be 
contained on page twelve of Part One of the Agricultural Statistics for 1922.133 
 The consequence of the above exploration of the possibilities of using the 
data on the numbers of farms presented in the Agricultural Statistics for 
measuring change in farmer numbers is that, allowing for some low level of 
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inaccuracy in collection of data, some confidence can be assumed in using the 
numbers of farms shown to exist in the Agricultural Statistics from 1919 to 1939 
as representative of genuine trends in changes in farm and, thus, farmer 
numbers over the interwar period.134  It can be assumed that changes shown in 
the Agricultural Statistics over the interwar period will, indeed, be representative 
of trends in numbers of farmers, if not of precisely accurate numbers.   
 There are other advantages in using the data from the Agricultural 
Statistics.  The first is that data is presented in detail and includes figures for 
numbers of holdings for individual counties so that regional changes in 
agricultural practice can be assessed whilst, also, some data is available for 
England alone, as well as for England and Wales in combination, an advantage 
insofar as this thesis is concerned with farming in England.  The second is that 
the Agricultural Statistics differ from the National Farm Survey Report insofar as 
they also present statistics for agricultural holdings of one to five acres in size.  
These small farms were excluded from the National Farm Survey Report mainly 
on the grounds that they ‘comprise less than one percent of the total area of 
crops and grass’ although they numbered, in 1941, 70,000.  Thus, whilst their 
productive capacity in relation to the war effort was regarded as being limited, 
they maintained or contributed to the livelihoods of a substantial number of 
people and, as this study has stated its commitment both to the study of 
people’s relationships as they are involved in productive processes and to the 
conditions of small agriculturalists, changes in the numbers of these farms 
cannot be ignored.  Clarity will be ensured, however, where reference to 
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statistics that either include or exclude farms of one to five acres is being made.  
The definition of a farm or ‘holding’ of over five acres used in the Agricultural 
Statistics is identical to that of the National Farm Survey Report: 
For the purposes of the survey it [a ‘holding’] comprises any area of land 
of 5 acres and above used for the growing of crops (including grass), 
which is being farmed separately, that is to say as a self-contained unit.135   
The National Farm Survey Report states that holdings of over five acres in size 
existing in 1941 in England and Wales would virtually all have had some 
agricultural purpose and so it can be assumed that the same would be true for 
holdings of such size in the Agricultural Statistics which demonstrates further 
their utility in analysing the fortunes of farmers as measured by their occupation 
of holdings.136   
  Data from the Agricultural Statistics confirms the impression given above 
that the interwar years saw falls in numbers of farmers as represented by the 
numbers of holdings of over five acres.  The fall in numbers between 1919 and 
1939 in England alone,137 with which this study is primarily concerned, was of 
33,008, from 283,063 to 250,055, a fall of almost 12 percent.  The Agricultural 
Statistics show that farm numbers actually increased between 1919 and 1921 so 
that the fall from 1921 to 1939 in farms of over five acres was 35,355 or 12.5 
percent.  The fact that there were over 47,114 full-time farmers apparently 
disappearing between 1921 and 1941 according to the analysis of the Census 
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and National Farm Survey Report, as noted above, a figure greater than that for 
the disappearance of holdings above five acres shown in the Agricultural 
Statistics is explicable. Firstly and obviously, the number of years between 1921 
and 1941 is greater than 1921 to 1939, giving more time for farmer numbers to 
fall.  Some disparities exist in measurement between the Census and the 
National Farm Survey Report which may mean that the figure of 47,114 that 
represents the disappearance of full-time farmers is slightly exaggerated, as has 
been discussed.  It might also be suggested that some farmers, rather than 
disappearing from the statistics along with their holding were merely taking on 
much smaller holdings but this is not proved by the evidence.  The years 1920 to 
1939 witnessed a fall of 21 percent of holdings of less than five acres in size in 
England so for farmers to be entering onto farms in this size category from 
larger farms would have required farmers in this category to be leaving the 
industry or, less likely, to be trading up to larger farms.138  It is more likely that 
there were farmers who farmed holdings of less than five acres but still 
considered themselves to be, first and foremost, farmers and were thus included 
in the appropriate category in the Census and, therefore, disappeared from that 
category if they ceased to farm.  The inclusion of farms of one to five acres in 
size increases the figure for total numbers of farm disappearance between 1919 
and 1939 to over 14 percent and, between 1921 and 1939, to 15 percent; 
holdings of less than five acres cannot be ignored altogether because, as well as 
many spare-time farms existing within this category, some full-time and part-
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time intensive poultry-rearing and market gardening units would have made up 
its numbers and it is small farmers that are the main interest in this study.139   
 A convincing explanation for the fall in holdings being lower than that of 
farmers, however, is that not all holdings would either disappear into dereliction 
and abandonment nor be swallowed up directly as part of another business if the 
original occupier had ceased to farm.  As the National Farm Survey Report 
explains, some holdings were owned by one farmer but had no apparent 
occupant, being managed by another individual or firm independently but under 
the auspices of the owner.140  Thus, if a vacant holding was bought up by a large 
firm or another farmer after the failure of its occupier, the former occupier may 
have disappeared from the statistics in the Census whilst the holding remained in 
operation and, despite being part of a larger business of farm ownership, the 
holding might be counted in the Agricultural Statistics separately from other 
holdings in that farm business.141  In such a case, the Agricultural Statistics 
would have continued to treat the farms as separate holdings that would be 
assumed to have an occupant.  Thus, there would exist an increasing tendency 
for the statistics to underestimate the disappearance of farmers from agriculture 
as measured by the numbers of holdings in existence, this phenomenon of 
multiple holdings under single management being noted as one that was 
developing further after the Second World War.142  The Agricultural Statistics for 
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1922 state explicitly that ‘an appreciable number of owner-occupiers finding 
farming less profitable have retired from farming and have let their farms.’ Some 
of these farms would have undoubtedly been managed in the way suggested 
above and this would have had the effect of increasing the underestimation of 
falls taking place in the numbers of farmers as judged by changes in farm 
numbers.143 
 A more detailed analysis of the falls in numbers of holdings of varying 
sizes will be undertaken in later chapters in relation to those benefiting from 
interwar policy and legislation concerning agriculture.  Most interestingly, this 
type of practice of amalgamation of farms under the auspices of a single 
business owner which was occurring in English agriculture, whether those farms 
were represented as one or more holdings in the Agricultural Statistics, can be 
seen as representative of the tendency towards centralization and concentration 
of capital that Marx depicted as the inevitable result of the process of capital 
accumulation in advanced capitalist economies.144  It is certainly the case that 
the falls in numbers of farm holdings shown in the Agricultural Statistics are 
consistent with Marx’s theory since the output in the agricultural sector, which it 
has been shown grew by 27 percent over the interwar period,145 would be 
assumed to have generated profits that were being shared amongst fewer 
producers than formerly.  The theories of centralization and concentration will be 
discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
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 The most convincing argument for the fall in farm numbers being less 
than the fall in farmers is that the figures calculated from the Agricultural 
Statistics for 1919 and 1939 on the disappearance of farms, though striking, are 
an underestimate.  They do not reveal the true extent of the disappearance of 
farms because the difference between the 1919 and 1939 figures only 
represents the net decrease in the number of farms.  Any examination of the 
change in numbers in the existence of a particular group of social subjects only 
at the start and end points of any time period fails to recognise that some 
replenishment of the population under scrutiny might occur across the duration 
of the period as some subjects disappear from the group; for example, a 
regiment might be at the same strength in numbers at the end of a war as a 
result of recruiting soldiers to replace those killed in the campaigns during that 
war, but this will not mean that those soldiers killed did not die and that their 
deaths should not be counted amongst the total numbers of casualties.  An 
estimate, constructed from figures given by Smith for the years 1919 to 1926 
and 1932 to 1937 and by Lord Ernle for 1927 to 1931, indicates that 19,624 
publicly funded small farms of under 50 acres individually in extent, known as 
‘smallholdings’ were created in England and Wales over the interwar period with, 
using estimates for 1932, about ten percent of them in Wales.146  English 
smallholdings numbered, therefore, at around 17,500 but these were not created 
all at the same time.  Smallholdings were being created incrementally with, for 
example, 3,485 created in 1919, 7,089 in 1920, 4,445 in 1921 and 1,681 in 
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1922147 and thus were adding to the total number of farms in existence at the 
same time as this total was being reduced by the disappearance of farms; 
therefore, there came into existence over the interwar period at least 17,500 
farms more than were shown to be in existence in 1919, not counting any other 
farms that might have been created without the assistance of the State.  The 
figure of 17,500 that represents the number of smallholdings created should be 
added to the total number of farms in existence in 1919 as shown by the 
Agricultural Statistics if the gross number of farms that disappeared between 
that date and 1939 is to be calculated accurately. 
 The number total representing the farms that existed between the two 
World Wars that should be used to calculate the change in total farm numbers 
up to 1939 is 370,933 which takes into account the 17,500 smallholdings 
brought into being in the period, as opposed merely to the 353,433 that 
represents the 1919 figure for numbers of farms of an acre and above in 
existence.  Subtracting 303,639, which is the number of farms in existence in 
1939, increases the numbers of farms that disappeared across the interwar 
period in England to 67,924, making the gross failure rate of all farms just over 
18 percent.   The 18 percent figure for falls in farm numbers more closely 
resembles the fall of almost one in five farmers that was estimated from the 
Census and National Farm Survey. 
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148 
 
 Further credence is given to the suggestion that falls in numbers of 
agricultural holdings over time are indicative of falls in numbers of farmers 
which, in turn, suggests that difficulties were being experienced by some of 
those farmers in English agriculture during the interwar period, by data that 
shows a substantial reduction in the acreage of land under crops and grass from 
1919 to 1939.  The reduction in England was from 24,069,298 acres to 
21,946,501, a fall of 2,122,797 acres or almost 9 percent.149  This 9 percent fall 
is smaller than the net reduction of over 14 percent in holdings of all sizes which 
the Agricultural Statistics suggest took place over the same period and, thus, 
indicates that the average size of farms increased.  The increase indicated by the 
Agricultural Statistics, which does not take account of the amount of rough 
grazing on farms, was of over 5 acres or 7.5 percent, from 67 to 72.3 acres.150  
                                        
148 Figure for total holdings for 1919 is made up of total holdings shown in Agricultural Statistics 
for 1919 plus total nos. of smallholdings created between 1919 and 1939 in order that all 
holdings that are known to have come into existence during the interwar period, at least through 
Government schemes, can be represented. Figure for total holdings for 1939 is from Agricultural 
Statistics and includes total smallholdings extant in 1939. Figures do not include data for 
Monmouth. MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9); Smith, N.R., Land, p.234. 
149 Figure 6.1 and Ch.6 fn.21. 
150 Table 3.2 including *Note and Sources. 
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Whilst this actually underestimates the average size of holdings, especially in the 
latter year, because permanent grazing land was being classified increasingly but 
erroneously as rough grazing,151 it testifies to the process of a gradual 
concentration of agricultural capital in the form of land in the hands of fewer 
farmers.  Concentration of capital in agriculture itself would be underestimated 
for the time by some holdings contributing to the total numbers in the 
Agricultural Statistics despite having no occupant and being part of another 
farming capital, as indicated above. 
 The east of England is known for its farms of above average size152 and 
as being particularly hard hit by difficult economic conditions in the interwar 
years.153  This suggests that the relative sizes of farming operation may have 
been a factor in the experience of difficulties by farmers.  The intuitive response 
would be that, if depression was concentrated in the east, large-scale farms 
must have suffered most; however, this has been shown not to be the case 
across the country as a whole.  Whether it was the case that large-scale farms 
suffered more than small in the arable farming of the east of England and that 
elsewhere this pattern is reversed must be looked at and so an examination of 
patterns of regional farm disappearance needs to be undertaken, a task for the 
next chapter.  The alternative suggestion is that large-scale farmers may have 
been instrumental in the construction of the discourse of distress in agriculture 
and that such a representation was made on the basis of the adverse effects of 
economic circumstances of small-scale farmers but was presented as an 
                                        
151 Grigg, ‘Farm Size’, p.182. 
152 Howkins, Death of Rural England, p.5; Caird, p.ii. 
153 Howkins, ‘Death and Rebirth?’, p.11; Brown, Agriculture, p.76.  
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industry-wide phenomena in order that pressure would build for legislation that 
would benefit large-scale farmers.  It may have been true that large-scale 
farmers did, indeed, suffer during the 1920s and then recovered in the 1930s 
and that this can be elucidated by the statistics.  Patterns of disappearance of 
small-scale farms may also fluctuate over the whole of the interwar period.  
Therefore, there is considerable justification for a chronological examination of 
developments in farm disappearance and size to accompany the regional 
comparisons in the next chapter.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The argument has been made in Chapter One and continued in this 
chapter that the relative success and failure of farming can be measured by the 
trends in numbers of farmers in the industry.154  These trends first needed to be 
identified.  Establishing the trends in farmer numbers in England for the years 
from 1919 to 1941 has been undertaken here and was necessary because it has 
never been done as a scientific exercise before, largely because of the perceived 
lack of Census data for 1941.  
 The most important immediate result of the investigations undertaken in 
this chapter is to show that a general trend existed for the numbers of farmers 
and farms in England to fall overall across the interwar period.  Inconsistencies 
in the available data have made exact calculation of the size of the fall difficult 
but it has been demonstrated that the fall in numbers of farmers was likely to 
                                        
154 Chapter 1, above. 
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have been in excess of the falls in the numbers and percentages of farms of over 
five acres shown to have occurred across the period by the Agricultural 
Statistics.  Thus, it is apparent that almost twelve percent of the farms that were 
most likely to be full-time farms disappeared from the statistics between 1919 
and 1939 and that the fall between 1921 and 1941 in the numbers of full-time 
farmers may well have been as high as 47,000, or 18 percent.  If numbers of 
farms of under five acres, farmed predominantly but not exclusively on a part-
time basis, were to be included, these percentages of farm and farmer 
disappearance would be higher showing falls of fifteen percent between 1921 
and 1939.  Most striking of all is the figure for farm disappearance of almost one 
in five of all farms in existence at some point between the Wars that takes into 
account the creation of smallholdings by the State; even this figure may be an 
underestimate. 
 Recent and timely reassessment of the economic performance of interwar 
agriculture by historians has suggested that farmers and their supporters may 
have exaggerated the extent of economic depression in interwar agriculture.  
Even the existence of the limited economic success that has been suggested 
took place in farming in interwar England that has been recounted in Chapter 
One must cast doubt upon the veracity of the ‘discourse of distress’ in the 
industry that has been, until recently, reproduced so consistently in the 
historiography, but figures on the disappearance of farmers cast doubt upon the 
extent to which the farming community experienced success as a whole.   
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 The figures presented here on disappearance of farmers from the 
statistics may not contradict the brighter re-evaluation of the economic 
performance of the industry as a whole but they can certainly be taken as 
showing the existence of some detrimental social effects of the economic 
conditions in interwar agriculture.  Whether distress was exaggerated or not, 
evidence on the numbers of farms and farmers has shown that there can be 
little doubt that distress was experienced.  Falls in numbers involved in farming 
can be treated with added significance as a measure of distress because of the 
factors of ‘independence’ so beloved of petty bourgeois business owners and 
especially farmers but even more so because of the ‘love of the land’ that is so 
often professed by farmers and on their behalf; 155 in this vein, Burchardt states, 
‘It can hardly be questioned that farming holds the potential for an unusually 
integrated, satisfying and deeply rooted way of life.’156 
 The interwar period in agriculture has been characterised latterly as one 
in which economic growth is apparent over the period as a whole.  Economic 
logic suggests that the increasing gross output and improving productivity of 
agriculture, on the one hand, and falling numbers of farmers, on the other, 
indicate that at least some of those surviving farmers, farming during a period of 
farm-size increase,157 would have been increasing their profits.  The period has 
also been characterised as one of falling prices in general and of depressions 
occurring from 1922 to 1925 and 1929 to 1932 around which the said economic 
                                        
155 Bechhofer, F., and Elliot, B., ‘The Voice of Small Business and the Politics of Survival’, 
Sociological Review, 26 1, (1978), 57-88, (p.77); Newby et al., Property, pp.153-4.  
156 Burchardt, ‘Introduction: Farming and the Countryside’, p.10. 
157 Table 3.2. 
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growth is apparent.  It is more than possible, as statistics on falling numbers 
have indicated, that farms could have been failing during or as a result of 
periods of depression. 
 It is hypothesised that the discourse of distress in farming emphasised 
conditions of depression to which Governments responded with legislation that 
was beneficial to larger-scale farmers and not those of lesser size.  It is the task 
of the following chapter to show that it was, indeed, the case that groups of 
farmers with certain common circumstances relating to the size of their holdings 
rather than their location or production type suffered most as measured by falls 
in numbers of farms. The hypothesis is that many small farm businesses struggle 
at very low income levels and will, eventually and inevitably, fail, even if not in 
the period under direct examination, especially given the tendency for farm 
commodity prices to fall and concentration to occur in agriculture.158 
 
                                        
158 Sampson, A., The New Anatomy of Britain (London: Book Club Associates, 1971), p.557;  
Marx, Capital: Vol. 1, pp.762-870. 
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Chapter 3: Farm Size as the Explanation of the Existence of Contrasting 
Narratives in Interwar English Agricultural History 
Introduction 
 
Studies undertaken since the Second World War have drawn one of two 
contrasting conclusions as to the performance of agriculture during the interwar 
period.  Conspicuous revisionism in twenty-first century works by Brassley, 
Howkins and Martin views the economic performance of agriculture in a way 
which conflicts with earlier versions which maintain that adverse conditions were 
experienced by farmers amidst a failing agriculture.1  Chapter One of this study 
has highlighted Brassley’s reappraisal which shows the output of agriculture to 
have increased over the interwar period leading to the suggestion that the 
industry was moderately successful between the Wars.2  Brassley’s upbeat 
assessment of agriculture is supported by consideration in accompanying and 
subsequent studies of some unexplored social and cultural aspects of the 
countryside which have been found to have shown some vitality at the time.3  
The economic, social and cultural revisionism presents a united front against the 
impression of a depressed interwar agriculture created between the Second 
World War and the final years of the twentieth century.  This earlier impression, 
                                        
1 Chapter 1, above; Martin, Development, pp.6, 8-35. 
2 Brassley, ‘British Farming’, p.245.  
3 Burchardt, J., ‘State and Society in the English Countryside: the Rural Community Movement 
1918-39’, Rural History, 23 1 (2012), 81-106; Burchardt, J., ‘Rethinking the Rural Idyll. The 
English Rural Community Movement 1913-26’, Cultural and Social History, 8 1, (2011), 73-94; 
Burchardt, J., ‘Rurality, Modernity and National Identity between the Wars’, Rural History, 21 2, 
(2010), 143-50; Howkins, ‘Death and Rebirth?’, pp.16-25; Burchardt, J., ‘“New Rural 
Civilization”’, pp.34-5; Thompson, L., ‘Agricultural Education in the Interwar Years’, in The 
English Countryside between the Wars: Regeneration or Decline?, ed. by Brassley, P., Burchardt, 
J., and Thompson, L. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006), pp.53-72, (p.72); Jeremiah, pp.116-31; 
Wallis, pp.102-115; Howkins, Death of Rural England. 
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reviewed above in Chapter One, had been created using selective contemporary 
evaluations of the operating conditions of farmers and suggested that English 
agriculture was in decline between the Wars.4  It was reinforced by interwar 
commentary on the state of both the society and landscape of rural England that 
emphasised deterioration and is an impression that still gains qualified support.5   
 One major achievement of this study, so far, has been to show that an 
analytical process exists by which either of two versions of the condition of the 
interwar English countryside and its agriculture can be made to appear tenable, 
depending on which particular elements of existing evidence are given emphasis.  
Previously unexamined contemporary interwar sources have been presented in 
Chapter One alongside some subtle reinterpretation of existing studies, both of 
which simply give added veracity to the two versions of the conditions in 
interwar agriculture and the countryside - one of failure, the other of success - 
that have been presented in the historiography.6 
 Importantly, it appears that, in the existing historiography, whichever of 
the two conclusions has been reached as to the economic condition of interwar 
agriculture, it must be applied to the industry as a whole and, by implication, to 
all farmers.  However, the argument will be made in this chapter that neither of 
the positions maintained in the historiography is entirely accurate and that both 
                                        
4 Chapter 1, above. 
5 Tranter, R.B., ‘Agricultural Adjustment on the Berkshire Downs during the Recession of 1921-
38’, Agricultural History Review, 60 2, (2012), 214-40, (p.227); Short, B., ‘The Social Impact of 
State Control in Agriculture in Britain, 1939-1955’, in War, Agriculture and Food: Rural Europe 
from the 1930s to the 1950s, ed. by Brassley, P., Segers, Y., and Van Molle, L. (London: 
Routledge, 2012), pp.172-92, (p.172); Martin, ‘Structural Transformation’, p.17; Short et al., 
‘“Front Line”’, p.4. 
6 Chapter 1, above. 
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suffer from a failure to correctly distinguish between significant groups of 
farmers which experienced contrasting economic fortunes.  There exists an 
apparent desire to brand the entirety of interwar English agriculture as either a 
success or a failure, as described in Chapter One.  This desire extends to farmers 
who are represented as a cohesive social and economic group and has resulted 
in a misunderstanding of the actual situation.  It appears that the possibility 
within agriculture of relatively extensive failure coexisting with some success has 
not been considered.  It may simply be the case that there existed a range of 
experiences amongst farmers beyond either the failure that the twentieth 
century historiography7 and some recent studies8 have concluded had enveloped 
interwar agriculture or the success that more recent studies have espoused.9  
Thus, it is hypothesised that failure was, indeed, applicable to some, but not all, 
farmers, as demonstrated by falls in farm numbers, whilst others experienced 
difficulties but survived in business and others were successful.   Scope for 
recognition of mixed fortunes in interwar agriculture does actually exist in the 
historiography because recognition has been made within the contexts of both 
agricultural success and failure that arable farmers fared less well than pastoral 
ones.10  However, success and failure are not seen in existing narratives to have 
coincided.  Thus, the twentieth century historiography recognised only distress in 
interwar agriculture with arable farmers suffering most badly whilst more recent 
studies see increased output in the agricultural sector as indicating some degree 
of prosperity, with dairy production representing the most profitable branch of 
                                        
7 Chapter 1, above. 
8 Tranter, p.227; Short, ‘Social Impact’, p.172; Short et al., ‘”Front Line”’, p.4. 
9 Chapter 1, above. 
10 Chapter 1, above; Martin, Development, pp.12-15. 
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farming.  The presentation of such contrasts across the historiography as a 
whole suggests that further exploration of interwar farming is necessary, 
especially if any kind of logical reconciliation of the two versions is to be 
achieved.    
 More detailed analysis of statistical data may help to identify groups of 
agricultural producers that were more likely to experience either success or 
failure.  One option would be to examine in more detail the relative fortunes of 
farmers in arable and dairy farming; however, a more promising alternative 
exists.  Since study of these major farming types has permitted conclusions to 
have been drawn which support narratives, confusingly, both of success and of 
failure in interwar agriculture, added insight into interwar farming conditions 
appears necessary and this will be gained from addressing another structural 
feature of agriculture: farm size.  Newby et al. and Bell and Newby, in their 
examinations of small and large scale farmers, raised the possibility some time 
ago of the existence of differing levels of influence of certain structural factors, 
such as farm size, upon farm operations.11  It can be inferred that such an 
analysis of farm size can be applied to historical data and is an analysis that is 
sorely needed, as a description of the existing work on the history of farm size in 
England will demonstrate. 
 Historians of agriculture, in general, have failed to recognise the 
possibility that farm size may well have been a significant influence upon 
farmers’ success or failure between the Wars and have either included the period 
                                        
11 Newby et al., ‘Farming for Survival’ pp.38-70; Bell and Newby, pp.86-107. 
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in long term studies of trends in farm size12 or have made only passing reference 
to it in a narrative dedicated to other aspects of interwar agriculture.13  However, 
it is well established in the historiography and contemporary interwar sources 
that arable agriculture has tended, in general, to be practised on larger farms 
than has pastoral farming.14  Thus, the tendency in the historiography, which is 
to claim that arable farms suffered either greater hardship or, more recently, less 
success than dairy farms, leads to the expectation that an examination of farms 
in different size categories would find that a higher proportion of the larger 
farms in existence disappeared than smaller ones. This is borne in mind, below, 
where the shortcomings in examination of the fortunes of farms of differing sizes 
by historians are examined so that rectification can begin.  The result is that 
identification is made in terms of farm size of particular groups of both failing 
and achieving farmers.  It will then become apparent that the failing and 
successful farmers form groups broadly identifiable by farm size.  The 
experiences of one or other of these contrasting farm size groups may, it 
appears, have been used in the historiography to represent English agriculture in 
the interwar period in such a way that, formerly, it was seen as having been in 
distress and, subsequently, as a success; however, no reference has been made 
in that historiography to the use of the particular size group as the one being 
employed at any particular time to represent all farmers and the entirety of 
agriculture.  It appears, in actuality, that it has never been recognised by 
historians that it was such farm size groups that they were utilising as their 
                                        
12 Grigg, ‘Farm Size’, pp.179-89. 
13 Tranter, p.227. 
14 Howkins, Death of Rural England, p.5; Whetham, Agrarian History, p.44; Venn, J.A., 
Foundations of Agricultural Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), pp.60-1. 
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examples; this resulted from the restricted nature of the sources they were 
employing and this and its causes will be explored in this and in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
Farm Size, Farming Types and the ‘Discourse of Distress’ 
 
 The following passage will show that the two versions that have been 
proposed in the historiography of the condition of interwar agriculture have 
taken the same approach in their examinations by looking at two broad farming 
types: arable and pastoral.  Thus, it might be assumed that they ought to have 
come to a similar conclusion.  However, the contrasting conclusions that have 
resulted and which exist in the historiography as to the conditions in agriculture 
in interwar rural England give rise to the contention that there has been a 
degree of selectivity or partiality during interpretation, as will become clear.  
There has existed an over-zealous tendency to focus upon conditions in only one 
or other of the two farming types and to base conclusions for the industry as a 
whole upon those particular conditions. 
 The two opposing conclusions on the state of interwar English agriculture 
are in effect in accord about which group of farmers fared better and which 
worse, but their conclusions as to the overall condition of agriculture at the time 
are at variance, the one espousing overall success for the industry as a whole 
based on the conditions considered to be prevailing in the dairy branch of 
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pastoral farming,15 and the other decline, based on arable conditions.16  The 
possibility arises that existing evidence has been misinterpreted by the adherents 
of one or both of the two versions of interwar agricultural conditions as a result 
of the approach taken to date and that there existed both success and failure in 
farming.  Success or failure may have been more likely depending upon which of 
the two types of farming was being practised but it must be assumed that there 
existed a degree of adaptability between the two types.  An alternative approach 
to interwar agriculture starts to look appropriate which examines more the 
degrees of adaptability of identifiable groups of farmers within the broad types 
that might have allowed some groups to survive and prosper and others to 
experience distress or failure.  The qualities defining such groups will be 
identified below and Chapter Four will explore the factors influencing the 
degrees of adaptability which contributed to each group’s particular experiences 
of prosperity or distress.   
 The argument for the existence of agricultural distress between the Wars, 
which retained credibility until the twenty-first century and still has adherents,17 
was premised on contemporary interwar commentary which emphasised the 
existence of distress amongst arable farmers.  Sources are available which 
confirm the existence of a perception of difficulties within arable farming areas at 
times during the 1920s.  An internal Ministry of Agriculture letter of August 1921 
from Sir Thomas Middleton to Sir Francis Floud highlights a growing feeling of 
                                        
15 Brassley, ‘British Farming’, pp.194-5; Howkins, ‘Death and Rebirth?’, p.13; Martin, 
Development, pp.12-13.  
16 Newby, Country Life, p.106; Brown, Agriculture, pp.76-95; Whetham, Agrarian History, p.142; 
Murray, 1955. 
17 Tranter, pp.214-40. 
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disquiet within the Ministry before the earlier of two periods of ‘depression’ 
identified by Douet and, later, by Howkins:18 ‘And if many of the large corn 
growing farmers of the south and east are now in the plight which Falconer 
described, there will be a “depression” before the next harvest is ready.’19  The 
Boston Guardian was reporting the cancellation of various agriculturally 
associated events during the second period of stated depression in Lincoln-
Holland, a county division with 78 percent of its cropland given over to arable in 
1919.20  In January 1931, the newspaper reported that the annual dinner of the 
Wainfleet and District Branch of the National Farmers’ Union had been cancelled 
because the union had considered that, ‘[o]wing to the present state of 
agriculture, it is not a suitable time for festivities of this nature.’21  The number 
of regular agricultural shows that took place in Lincoln-Holland in the 1920s is 
remarkable and many small towns advertised their own but their relevance was 
beginning to be questioned by 1931, given that their role was traditionally as a 
promotion of the centrality of agriculture to a thriving countryside.  The 
newspaper, having become the Lincolnshire and Boston Guardian on February 
14 1931, was asking on March 28, ‘Should Shows be postponed?’, going on to 
mention one of the Lincoln-Holland villages specifically:  
Tydd St. Giles Show… will not be held this year, the Committee having 
decided that it would be difficult to justify spending a large sum of money 
                                        
18 Howkins, ‘Death and Rebirth?’, p.13. 
19 NA/D/4/7, Agricultural Credit Bank. Credit to Farmers, 1921-1922. 
20 Table 5.8 and *Sources. 
21 Boston Guardian, 3 January 1931. 
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on promoting the show during the present period of agricultural 
depression.22 
 Douet’s 1989 study confirms that a widespread perception of depression 
existed between the Wars in another eastern county, Norfolk, where 75 percent 
of land had been given over to arable production in 1919.23  Douet confirms that 
conditions appeared particularly bad during the period from 1929 to 1933 in 
which the newspaper extracts mentioned above demonstrating the existence of 
a similar perception in Lincoln Holland were published and that Norfolk had seen 
similarly hard times in the years between 1921 and 1923.24  G.C.A. Robertson 
was writing of the intensively arable East Riding in the Journal of the Royal 
Agricultural Society of England in 1928: ‘Without doubt the farmers in this area 
have felt the recent depression acutely.’25 
Table 3.1 Acreage under Crops and Grass, Acreage of Arable Land, and 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle: England 1919-1939* 
 
1919 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
    
Total Acreage under Crops and Grass 24069298 21946501 -2122797 
Acreage Under Arable Cultivation 11412353 8396941 -3015412 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle 1693808 1977224 283416 
    
*Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23).    
 
                                        
22 Lincolnshire and Boston Guardian, 28 March 1931. 
23 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol. 54, Table 3 (pp.20-9). 
24 Douet, A., ‘Norfolk Agriculture, 1914-1972’ (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of East 
Anglia, 1989), pp.113-5, 127-41. 
25 Robertson, G.C.A., ‘Farming in Yorkshire’, Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England, 
89, (1928), 50-67, (p.62). 
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 The argument for arable distress was supported by statistics on a decline 
in the acreage of farmland dedicated to growing arable crops over the duration 
of the interwar period.  Murray’s despondent 1955 account of the period pointed 
out that Great Britain had lost 4 million acres of crops ‘other than grass’ between 
1918 and 193926 whilst the Agricultural Statistics show that England’s arable area 
fell by over a quarter from 11,412,353 acres in 1919 to 8,396,941 in 1939, a fall 
of just over three million acres or more than a quarter of the acreage under 
arable crops.27  Data from the Agricultural Statistics, National Farm Survey and 
the Census that show falls in farm and farmer numbers of, in some cases, more 
than 18 percent, presented in Chapter 2, add weight to the twentieth century 
historiographical accounts which have stressed the problems of farmers 
although, not in themselves, specifically of arable farmers.28  However, other 
evidence also from statistics on changes in the agricultural workforce tends to 
support the notion of interwar difficulties amongst arable farmers.  Arable farms 
required greater manpower for a given area than livestock farms and tended to 
be larger and thus to employ more labour;29 figures from the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Special Committee on Agricultural Policy from 1930 show that 
arable farms of greater than 20 acres in extent required 3.5 times as many 
workers as similarly sized grassland farms.30  George Edwards, the prominent 
supporter of agricultural labour and an MP for South Norfolk during the 1920s, 
reported on behalf of the TUC to the Ministers of Agriculture and Health that, by 
                                        
26 Murray, p.22. 
27 Table 3.1 including *Sources. 
28 Chapter 2, above; Figure 2.2. 
29 Howkins, Death of Rural England, p.5. 
30 NA/MAF/38/18. 
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as early as 1926, arable farmers were cutting their labour requirements quite 
dramatically amidst the general malaise:  
There is bad cultivation in many parts of Essex.  There was more thistle 
and rubbish in certain named areas than there was barley and wheat.  
Many farms that used to employ ten men are now employing three and 
four.31    
The reduction in the hired labour component of agriculture suggests that the 
economic conditions during the interwar years may well have affected arable 
farmers in particular.  Numbers of regular agricultural labourers fell by over 31 
per cent from 685,000 in 1921 to 471,000 in 1939 whilst numbers of casual 
workers were cut nearly in half, from 184,000 to 99,000.32 
 A significant contrast is found between twenty-first century historical 
reappraisals of interwar agriculture and the earlier written histories.  The 
twentieth century tale of a failing interwar English agriculture with its particularly 
unfortunate arable sector has been replaced in the twenty-first century by an 
estimation of general interwar agricultural prosperity based on increases in the 
total output of the industry over the interwar period.33  The construction of this 
picture of prosperity, relative to the earlier versions, has emphasised the 
increased role of branches of husbandry in English farming other than arable, 
thereby tending to downplay, at least tacitly, the difficulties documented 
amongst arable farmers.  Dairy farming has been seen as particularly important, 
                                        
31 NA/MAF/48/206. 
32 Armstrong, p.175. 
33 Brassley, ‘British Farming’, pp.192-4.  
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Martin regarding it as the source of agricultural recovery in the 1930s and 
Howkins, as well as Brassley, seeing it as a central feature of the defence 
against the agricultural difficulties that they regard as having been previously 
overstated.   
 The focus on dairy farming was not, necessarily, new in the twenty-first 
century, however.  Despite emphasising the existence of interwar distress, 
earlier versions had also suggested, however briefly, that dairy production and 
livestock farming might have offered better returns to farmers than 
concentration on arable crops.34  Indeed, various accounts over the years have 
suggested that there existed geographical areas where dairy farmers witnessed 
at least some stability in the interwar years.  Fletcher identified by as early as 
1954 the existence of ‘steadily profitable’ dairy farming in East Lancashire, the 
key to which was a ‘milk to feeding stuffs price ratio’ whereby the price of milk 
was falling at a slower rate than that of the means of feeding milk cows.35  
Chapman’s 1961 study of the North York Moors evinced signs of interwar 
stability in a switch by some farmers from traditional low density sheep farming 
and virtual subsistence agriculture to the production of fresh milk for retailing in 
Teeside, Whitby and Scarborough in a locality of otherwise unrewarding 
agriculture.36  Taylor has located relative success for farmers up to 1930 in the 
production of fresh milk in various regions.37  These accounts of relative security 
in regional dairy farming are, however, all set within narratives constructed in 
                                        
34 Newby, Country Life, p.106; Whetham, Agrarian History, p.142. 
35 Fletcher, ‘Economic Development’, p.277. 
36 Chapman, J., ‘Changing Agriculture and the Moorland Edge in the North York Moors’ 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1961). 
37 Taylor, D., ‘Growth and Structural Change in the English Dairy Industry, c.1860-1930’, 
Agricultural History Review, 35 1, (1987), 47-64. 
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the twentieth century that emphasise the existence of interwar agricultural 
decline unlike the more recent version that stresses the major contribution of 
pastoral farming to an overall wellbeing in agriculture that is demonstrated by 
measures of increasing economic output.  
 The two major interpretations of the state of interwar English agriculture 
accept that difficult circumstances were faced by arable farmers relative to dairy 
ones even though they may disagree on the overall condition of farming at the 
time, one emphasising success and the other decline.  The conclusion that arable 
farmers suffered distress was presented openly in the twentieth century 
historiography that represented interwar farming in England as having suffered 
from depression;38 the twenty-first century revisionism that emphasises 
agricultural prosperity between the Wars has tacitly acknowledged difficulties 
amongst arable farmers both by avoiding extensive mention of them but at the 
same time emphasising that prosperity was to be found amongst pastoral 
farmers and, in particular, dairy farmers.  However, the ascription in twenty-first 
century revisionism of success to the interwar agricultural sector would seem to 
be, at best, a little premature since it has been shown to require the ignorance 
of the disappearance of substantial numbers of members of the agricultural 
workforce.  Ignorance is required, in this case, of falling numbers of farmers,39 
falls which are implicit in twentieth century written histories that emphasise the 
                                        
38 Perren, p.69; Brown, Agriculture, pp.76-95; Newby, Country Life, p.106.   
39 Chapter 2, above. 
Chapter 3: Farm Size as the Explanation of Contrasting Narratives 
136 
 
experience of depression in farming as well as of falls in numbers of workers, 
which are explicit.40 
 The failure of reasoning behind recent revisionism that ascribes success to 
interwar agriculture, following the earlier tendency in the historiography of 
applying its findings to farmers as a whole group, appears to be acute in the 
light of the substantive, new evidence on conditions in interwar agriculture 
revealed by falls in farmer and farm numbers in Chapter Two.  Falls in numbers 
of farms and farmers suggest that there were in reality fairly widespread 
difficulties amongst farmers even though revisionism has identified increases in 
agricultural output in England between the Wars.  Thus, there exists, as noted, a 
problem of definition;41 the increased output for agriculture as a whole42 could 
indeed be termed, in terms of pure economics, a ‘success’ but the decrease in 
the numbers of farmers contributing to the aggregate of production certainly 
indicates significant failure in human and social terms.  Decreasing farmer 
numbers also indicates that some farmers were indeed relatively more successful 
than others since the receipts from the increased output would have been 
distributed amongst fewer producers than formerly.  Furthermore, an 
assumption that input costs were falling at the same or a faster rate than 
produce prices, as occurred at least between 1927 and 1931,43 would indicate 
increases in profit for those producers with high input costs but not necessarily 
                                        
40 Armstrong, p.175. 
41 Chapter 2, above. 
42 Brassley, ‘Output’, pp.60-84. 
43 Harkness, p.29. 
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for all farmers; certainly, the falls in farm and farmer numbers indicate that 
financial benefits were not necessarily being shared equally across the industry. 
 The conclusions that either prosperity or distress affected interwar English  
agriculture as a whole that are narrated in the historiography to date have been 
exemplified by mysterious over generalization based upon the experiences of 
whichever particular broad farming type – arable or dairy - supports the 
particular conclusion desired by the authors concerned.  The possibility that 
arises from examination of both these versions of interwar agricultural 
performance is that interwar farmers as individuals might have experienced 
economic conditions that differed from one to another and which ranged from 
success through survival to absolute failure; this has not thus far been 
recognised.  This new possibility deserves exploration and perhaps a new 
approach that transcends the moribund method of analysing farming type.  
However, since it is the analysis of the two broad farming types together that 
has led to this possibility, it would seem that complete abandonment of analysis 
based on the two types might be untimely.  The question remains as to the best 
method of analysis and of discovering the actual factors contributing to the 
circumstances of contrasting economic fortunes amongst farmers that have been 
outlined.   
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The Potential of Agricultural Statistics in the Identification of Contrasts 
of Fortune amongst Interwar Farmers 
 
 The only realistic conclusion that can be drawn from examination of both 
versions of the condition of interwar agriculture extant in the historiography is 
that arable farming offered, at best, even less chance of success than dairy 
farming.  Any attempt to look for variations in farmers’ fortunes through 
extending the argument for interwar distress premised on arable problems whilst 
also demonstrating success based on pastoral farming might reasonably attempt 
to supplement the existing statistics with a detailed breakdown by farming type 
of the data on farm and farmer disappearance.  Previously analysed statistics 
show falls in the arable acreage that have long been used as a measure of 
interwar arable adversity44 whilst increases in numbers of dairy cattle between 
1924 and 1939 and in the use of pasture land45 are used to demonstrate 
prosperity in livestock farming and, indeed, in agriculture as a whole.  It might 
be expected that support for these conclusions would be likely to be found in the 
Agricultural Statistics.  Obstacles exist, however, that appear to have 
discouraged historians from using the Agricultural Statistics as evidence of 
difficulties or success in any type of farming.  
The data from the Agricultural Statistics, to which reference is made 
above, which show a fall in the acreage of farmland under arable crops in 
                                        
44 Hardy, D., and Ward, C., Arcadia for All: the Legacy of a Makeshift Landscape, (London: 
Mansell, 1984), p.21; Murray, p.22. 
45 Martin, Development, p.13. 
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England of just over three million acres46 would not in themselves prove the 
existence of difficulties amongst arable farmers, although they may be 
suggestive of them, because other reasons than simple arable adversity existed 
for changes in land use that might have reduced the area under arable crops in 
interwar England.  Land was bought for development by builders47 or, as shown 
by the debate in Parliament on the Housing (Rural Authorities) Bill in 1931, by 
the State for the construction of dwellings for rural workers48 and for the 
creation of smallholdings.49  Sales of farmland were not, therefore, necessarily 
the result of agricultural hardship and were not, thus, necessarily viewed by 
landowners as simply an alternative to accepting low rent returns on land let to 
hard-pressed farmers, arable or otherwise.  Statistics showing reductions in 
arable acreages could equally be interpreted as revealing a willingness of 
agricultural landlords to cash in on high prices for land for redevelopment; the 
existence of an inflated land market is made clear in the Papers Relating to the 
Agricultural Credits Bill, 1923 which indicate the existence of one particularly 
strong influence on land prices, stating that ‘[c]ompetition among purchasers 
was, moreover, increased in 1919 and 1920 by the entry into the market of the 
County Councils, who bought extensively for purposes of Land Settlement.’50  
Land sales cannot automatically be understood to be the result of farmers 
struggling to survive, especially, as has been documented, in the years 1918 to 
1921 when land sales boomed at a time when farmers were actually enjoying a 
                                        
46 Table 3.1. 
47 Murray, p.22. 
48 NA/MAF/48/208, Housing Bill and Act 1931. 
49 NA/MAF/53/64. 
50 Ibid. 
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period of post War prosperity and many were buying farms,51 such as those of 
Lord Leconfield in West Sussex.52  More significantly, decreases in arable land 
might be indicative merely of a move by farmers into more profitable 
circumstances in another branch of agriculture; it has been noted above, for 
example, that historians have for some time been suggesting better 
opportunities existed in livestock farming, especially in dairy production, between 
the Wars.53  However, decreases in arable land need to be examined alongside 
changes in land use by other farming types; any decreases in pastoral land use 
alongside a falling arable area, for instance, might be suggestive of more general 
problems in agriculture.   
A much more significant statistical pointer to arable farming problems 
than falls in the arable acreage alone would be any accompanying falls to be 
found in numbers of arable farmers together with declining farm numbers.  The 
disappearance of arable farms, taken on its own, might not demonstrate 
absolutely that difficulties were being experienced by arable farmers, for the 
same reason identified above regarding falls in the acreage of arable land which 
is that arable farms might have been converted to dairying; however, their 
disappearance seen in the light of the falls in farmer numbers, detailed in 
Chapter Two, and in the arable acreage, noted above, would be of considerably 
greater import.  It is important to reiterate here the assertion made in Chapter 
Two that falls in numbers of farmers should be seen as serious evidence of 
                                        
51 Thompson, F.M.L., ‘Land Market’, pp.289-92. 
52 Godfrey, J.D., ‘The Ownership, Occupation and Use of Land on the South Downs between the 
Rivers Arun and Adur in West Sussex, c.1840-1940’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Sussex, 1999), p.413. 
53 This Chapter, above.  
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difficulties in agriculture because of the deep desire of those involved in running 
farm businesses not to give up farming.  The President of the Agricultural 
Economics Society, Joseph Duncan, made it obvious in 1940 just how tenacious 
was the desire of such people to cling to the way of life associated with 
occupation of agricultural holdings.  Duncan made note of the tendency in 
Britain for new farmers to be sons of existing farmers rather than to emerge 
from groups whose proven management skills would be better suited to running 
farm businesses, referring to agriculture as ‘practically a closed industry’.54  
Martin’s work is consistent with the sentiments of Duncan, noting that farmers, 
during the 1930s, although in some cases farming part-time, were prepared to 
go to almost any lengths in order to remain as part of the agricultural industry.55   
Any attempt to reinforce the argument that contrasting fortunes affected 
farmers should take into account those claims by historians that contrasting 
conditions existed across the two broad farming types of pastoral and arable, 
since it is possible, in theory, that the conditions of the two types in relation to 
one another might be examined.  Declining numbers of arable farms that reflect 
problems in interwar arable farming accompanied by increasing or steady 
numbers of pastoral farms might constitute evidence of more prosperous 
conditions in dairy and livestock farming relative to those of arable.  Clearly, the 
number of pastoral farms could not be expected to have increased by as many 
as the total number of farms that disappeared, since it has already been 
established that overall farm numbers fell; however, it would be logical to 
                                        
54 Duncan, J.F., ‘Personal Factors in British Agriculture’, Journal of the Proceedings of the 
Agricultural Economics Society, 6 1, (1940), 21-38, (p.28). 
55 Martin, ‘Structural Transformation’, Exeter, p.23. 
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assume that any increase in pastoral farms came at the expense of arable 
holdings suggesting that arable holdings would have to have decreased in 
greater number than overall falls in the number of farms.   
The foregoing passage demonstrating the possible utility of examining 
changes in acreage and in numbers of farms and farmers in broad farming types 
to an exploration of agricultural conditions between the Wars makes it 
unfortunate, therefore, that there is no data on the particular specialities of 
production of individual farms in the Agricultural Statistics; nor is there any data 
on numbers of farmers in particular branches of production.  However, the 
above peroration is not purely idealistic; an attempt to examine contrasting 
circumstances for interwar farmers is not rendered impossible.  The absence of 
such conclusive data on individual farm specialities does, however, make an 
alternative approach to researching interwar conditions even more necessary 
than does the mere inconclusiveness shown to result from existing examination 
of broad farming types.  That the suggestion that widely differing economic 
circumstances ranging from success to outright failure may have been 
experienced by farmers has not been made makes it unsurprising, therefore, 
that the search for factors - other than broad farming types - that might have 
been common to farmers in groups undergoing any particular experience, has 
not been pursued.  One possible method of identifying factors common to 
farmers in groups undergoing any particular experience is to look at farm size in 
relation to the incidence of farm disappearance.   
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The Absence from the Historiography of the Decline of Small Farms in 
Interwar England 
 
 Little work has been carried out specifically upon changes in the size 
structure of farms in England in the interwar years.  Grigg has examined farm 
size in England and Wales between the mid-nineteenth and the late twentieth 
centuries and concluded that it increased as farm numbers decreased but the 
extended time period of his analysis resulted in his overlooking those extensive 
falls in farm numbers between the Wars that contributed to the increases in the 
average farm size he notes took place from the 1920s onwards.56  Tranter’s 
recent passing reference to falls in numbers of small farms arises from the 
Agricultural Statistics,57 a more detailed analysis of which, below, gives results 
that point to the existence of distinct contrasts in the fortunes of farmers 
depending upon the size of their farms. 
 The average size of interwar farms in England appears to be quite small in 
1919 at 67 acres.  An average of 67 acres is certainly small by modern 
standards; even in 1983, average farm size in England and Wales was 155 acres.  
This relatively low average size stemmed from the existence of a large number 
of farms among which a considerable majority were relatively small, being less 
than 50 acres in extent, and to which were referred at the time as ‘small’.  
Interwar agricultural economists who were expert in the subject of farm size, 
including J.A. Venn, called farms of under 50 acres in extent ‘small’ farms or  
 
                                        
56 Grigg, ‘Farm Size’, pp.187-9. 
57 Tranter, p.227. 
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Table 3.2   Average Farm Size in England and Selected Counties 1919-1939* 
        
 
Average Size 
 
Average Size Inc. Rough 
Grazing 
 
acres 
 
acres 
 
1919 1939 Change 
1919-1939 
 1919 1939 Change 
1919-1939 
 
       
England 67.0 72.3 5.3  75.2 84.8 9.6 
East Suffolk 88.5 83.2 -5.3  91.0 89.2 -1.8 
Essex 88.2 90.4 2.2  89.0 95.6 6.5 
Gloucester 69.8 80.3 10.4  71.1 84.3 13.2 
Hampshire 70.9 76.2 5.3  81.7 96.1 14.4 
Huntingdon 84.5 100.0 15.5  84.9 103.4 18.5 
Lancashire 42.4 41.2 -1.1  48.3 50.0 1.7 
Leicester 68.6 83.1 14.5  68.7 83.7 15.0 
Lincoln Holland 45.0 49.2 4.2  45.0 49.5 4.5 
Norfolk 79.6 80.4 0.7  82.6 86.9 4.3 
Warwick 70.7 80.8 10.1  71.2 83.0 11.8 
West Suffolk 99.9 108.0 8.1  104.6 117.7 13.1 
West Sussex 83.4 86.0 2.6  90.9 100.9 9.9 
Westmorland 74.0 81.0 7.0  136.2 175.3 39.1 
Yorkshire East    
Riding 
95.1 106.1 11.0  95.9 108.6 12.7 
Yorkshire North 
Riding 
70.2 79.5 9.3  96.8 117.4 20.5 
Yorkshire West 
Riding 
47.8 53.8 6.0  58.1 71.7 13.6 
 
*Note and Sources: Figures have been rounded to nearest tenth of an acre. MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, 
Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
 
‘smallholdings’.  The 50 acre upper limit for the ‘small’ farm was used for reasons 
associated mostly with the contrasting structures of the labour force between 
such farms and those of larger scale; a general rule of thumb was that farms of 
less than 50 acres in size could be classified truly as ‘family’ farms as they would 
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not have required the hired labour component necessary on farms of a larger 
size, although there existed of course some variation across the variety of 
farming types.58  Wynne makes it clear that, even by as late as 1944 to 1948 
when wartime had forced advances in mechanization and concurrent reductions 
in labour requirements, the labour force necessary per 100 acres on a 100 acre 
arable farm averaged almost 6 persons, on ‘intermediate type’ farms, almost 5, 
and, on grassland types, the equivalent of 4.5.59  Wynne’s figures should be seen 
in the light of research that suggests that family farm labour is much less 
productive than paid labour, suggesting that small farms of under 50 acres 
would still have needed to utilise the labour of several family members.60  
Henderson’s Farming Ladder shows that the amount of labour used in 1944 on 
an 84 acre mixed livestock farm where some arable crops were grown for feed 
was substantial, including 3 hired labourers, pupils from agricultural colleges and 
at least 4 family members.61   
 A total of 353,433 farm holdings of at least 1 acre in size was to be found 
in England in 1919, according to the Agricultural Statistics; of these farms, 
71,119 were of between 1 and 5 acres in size, a further 93,799 were between 5 
and 20 acres in size and another 63,865 were larger than 20 acres but smaller 
than 50 acres.  There were, therefore, 228,783 holdings of less than 50 acres in 
extent in England; however, these figures are reconsidered below where it is 
                                        
58 Venn, J.A., Foundations of Agricultural Economics (together with) an Economic History of 
British Agriculture during and after the Great War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1933), p.107.   
59 Wynne, p.31.  
60 Gasson, R., and Errington, A., The Farm Family Business (Wallingford: CAB International, 
1993), pp.125-31. 
61 Henderson, The Farming Ladder (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), pp.34, 111. 
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calculated that they actually underestimate the number of small farms by about 
7.5 percent meaning that small farms made up 66.5 percent of all farms existing 
in the interwar period and, thus, a large majority of the farms in existence.  
Contemporary commentators, such as Venn, Lord Addison, and Astor and 
Rowntree, were well aware of the existence of such a large number of small 
farms62 but it is a phenomenon that has attracted very little attention from 
historians although exceptions do exist, notably Thirsk63 and some recent, brief 
references to the persistence of small farms into the twentieth century in works 
by Sayer, by Short and by Overton and Griffiths.64 
 The existence of so many small farms makes it clear that they must have 
played a significant role in the development of agriculture in the interwar years 
and in the understanding, both contemporary and historical, of the condition of 
the industry during the period between the Wars.  Thus, the possible role for the 
analysis of farm size in the debate on interwar agricultural conditions, including 
on conditions as determined by farming type, makes the failure of the 
historiography to address - or even to widely acknowledge - the large number of 
small farms in existence between the Wars somewhat surprising.  
  A general assumption exists in the historiography of rural England about 
the historical development of the structure of the agricultural industry that sees 
                                        
62 Venn, J.A., 1933, Foundations (together with) Economic History, p.107; Viscount Astor and 
Rowntree, British Agriculture, p.330; Lord Addison, p.42. 
63 Thirsk, Alternative Agriculture.  
64 Sayer, K., ‘“His footmarks on Her Shoulders”: the Place of Women within Poultry Keeping in 
the British countryside, c.1880 to c.1980’, Agricultural History Review, 61 2, (2013), 301-29; 
Short, ‘Social Impact’, p.177; Griffiths, E., and Overton, M., Farming to Halves: the Hidden 
History of Sharefarming in England from Medieval to Modern Times (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), pp.156-79. 
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large farms as being the norm since Victorian times.  Distinction is rarely made in 
studies of interwar agriculture between farms of contrasting sizes; agriculture 
has been represented in most studies undertaken since the Second 
Table 3.3  Numbers of Farms in Large and Small Size Categories in England 1919-
1939* 
  
Number of Holdings 
 
Year 1919 1931 
Change 
1919-1931 
1939 
Change 
1931- 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
Farm Size 
       
1-5 acres 
 
71119 62615 -8504 53584 -9031 -17535 
5-20 acres 
 
93799 83749 -10050 71561 -12188 -22238 
20-50 acres 
 
63865 62929 -936 57909 -5020 -5956 
1-50 acres 
 
228783 209293 -19490 183054 -26239 -45729 
        50 acres 
and above 
 
124650 122238 -2412 120585 -1653 -4065 
        All Farms 
 
353433 331531 -21902 303639 -27892 -49794 
        * Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1931, 
Vol.66, Table 8 (pp.64-5); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9).  
World War as an industry of large farms owned by large landowners who rented 
them to farmers who hired labourers to work them.  The tripartite structure of 
English agriculture was deemed to have been firmly in place by the time of the 
‘Great Depression’ that began in the 1870s and little mention is made of any 
change in the twentieth century; for example, C.S. Orwin’s 1949 A History of 
English Farming, by referring to English agriculture as ‘an industry of little 
capitalists’ and citing only the operations of individual farm businesses that had 
been large-scale operations,65 elided the fact that farms of less than fifty acres 
had still been in existence in large numbers in the interwar period and beyond.   
Murray’s 1955 highlighting of the increases in farmers’ wartime output which 
                                        
65 Orwin, English Farming, pp.111-6. 
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was suggestive of great industrialised organization amongst farmers66 has been 
examined in the twenty-first century.  Brassley, Martin, and Short et al., have all 
recognised how the promotion by wartime officials of mechanization for arable 
farming implied the existence of an efficient, industrialised industry but do not 
mention that such farming could only have been undertaken economically on 
large farms and pay no attention to the ramifications of mechanization for small-
scale farms.67  In 1974, Whetham established the final removal in 1921 of First 
World War subsidies to cereal growers as the premier political event in farming 
in the twentieth century; by naming this act the ‘Great Betrayal’ and making no 
distinction between which farmers it particularly affected, Whetham effectively 
created the notion that the interests of all interwar farmers had been directly 
connected to cereal growing which, in reality, was mainly undertaken by large-
scale farmers.68  A resulting issue, addressed by Penning-Rowsell and Cooper, 
regarding farmers’ antipathy towards agricultural labour paid no attention to 
small farmers since they hired few workers and were thus irrelevant, whilst 
Moore’s response was merely to highlight the political influence of cereal farmers 
without reference to the size of the pastoral farms that he argued were the real 
victims of ‘betrayal’ at the time, many of which were small.69  
                                        
66 Murray, p.15. 
67 Short et al., ‘“Front Line of Freedom”’, p.9; Martin, ‘Structural Transformation’, p.33; Brassley, 
P., ‘Wartime Production and Innovation 1939-45’, in The Front Line of Freedom: British Farming 
in the Second World War, ed. by Short, B., Watkins, C., and Martin, J. (Exeter: British Agricultural 
History Society, 2006b), pp.36-54, (p.37). 
68 Whetham, ‘”Great Betrayal’”, 36-49. 
69 Penning-Rowsell, pp.176-94; Moore, S., ‘The Real “Great Betrayal”?  Britain and the Canadian 
Cattle Crisis of 1922’, Agricultural History Review, 41 2, (1993), 155-68; Cooper, ‘Another Look’, 
pp.81-104.  
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 Distinction by farm size is rarely made in reference to English farmers of 
the interwar period.  It seems, given the absence of differentiation in the 
historical literature, that all farmers were assumed to have been indeterminable 
from one another in the twentieth century.  Whitby’s 1961 analysis concentrated 
on the ages of farmers whilst Holderness’s 1989 single chapter study identified 
farmers only as full-time or part-time and even this distinction was not applied to 
the interwar period.70  Self and Storing in 1962 mentioned the ‘great diversity of 
farming systems’ but stated that ‘concepts of the “average” farm and the 
“average” farmer have very little meaning’ resulting paradoxically in their failing 
to differentiate in any way between farmers.71  Critical political analysis of the 
history of farming emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s72 recognising the 
developing interwar political desire for corporate agriculture and the rise of the 
NFU as the single representative of farmers without identifying the contemporary 
effects upon - or existence of - small farms.  Griffiths has made passing 
reference to the recognition by some interwar farmers of their interests being at 
odds with those of larger farmers but has not pursued the theme and has 
accurately parodied reality in representing farmers as a single body in her study 
of the representations and realities of farmers in society and culture.73   
 The accepted wisdom has been either that small farms had been finally 
eliminated during the enclosures accompanying the industrial revolution, as 
depicted in the early twentieth century by the Hammonds, Johnson, Gray, and 
                                        
70 Whitby, pp.83-94; Holderness, ‘Farmers’, pp.101-14. 
71 Self and Storing, pp.30-4.  
72 Smith, M.J., Agricultural Support, pp.57-86; Winter, pp.71-99; Cox et al., pp.30-47; Cooper, 
Conservative Politics, pp.160-83. 
73 Griffiths, ‘Heroes’, pp.209-29; Griffiths, Labour, p.285. 
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Bourne74 or, somewhat in contradiction of available statistical evidence, that they 
had been virtually extinct well before that time;75 Orwin had written in 1930 of 
‘systems and practices which were discarded generations ago by rural 
England’.76  The assumption had even been made that small farms, populated by 
peasants, had disappeared by the fourteenth century, one that M.M. Postan 
attributes to the bourgeois study of medieval history.77  Macfarlane persisted in 
1979 in this bourgeois vein in his highly selective use of evidence to support the 
argument that a peasantry has never existed in Britain.78    
 One possible explanation for the concentration on farming as an operation 
undertaken on a large scale is that Fordist79 tendencies extended from western 
society at large80 into the study of British economic and social history until the 
late 1970s.81  These tendencies led to the agricultural revolution being seen as 
the catalyst for the industrial revolution, placing it at the heart of historical study 
of the English countryside, resulting in an image of a unitary agriculture that was 
at an advanced stage of capitalist development by the nineteenth century.82  
Such overall advancement was not considered consistent with the idea of the 
                                        
74 Gintner, D. E., ‘Measuring the Decline of the Small Landowner’, in Land, Labour and 
Agriculture: Essays for Gordon Mingay, ed. by Holderness, B. A., and Turner, M. (London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1991), pp.27-48, (p.27). 
75 Ibid., p.47.  
76 Orwin, C.S., The Future of Farming (London: Oxford Clarendon Press, London, 1930), p.85. 
77 Beckett, J. V., ‘The Peasant in England: a Case of Terminological Confusion?’, Agricultural 
History Review, 32 2, (1984), 113-23. 
78 Macfarlane, A., The Origins of English Individualism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1979). 
79 Gramsci, A., Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971; 
repr. 2007), p.279. 
80 Harvey, D., A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; 1st 
published 2005), pp.11-12; Savage, M., and Warde, A., Urban Sociology, Capitalism and 
Modernity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), p.58. 
81 Hobsbawm, E. J., ‘The Making of the Working Class, 1870-1914’, in Uncommon People: 
Resistance, Rebellion and Jazz, ed. by E.J. Hobsbawm (London: Abacus, 1999), pp.76-99, 
(pp.77-8). 
82 Burchardt, ‘Agricultural History’, p.471. 
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existence of numerous small farms which tended to be associated with the 
‘backward’ agriculture of peasant societies, although the survival of farms 
corresponding to the peasant model in England in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries did enjoy a brief popularity in the 1980s.83  This Fordist 
perspective extended, with notable exceptions, to agricultural labour history into 
the 1990s and, in combination with contemporary political exigencies, can be 
argued to have contributed largely to creating an understanding of interwar 
agriculture as an industry conducted by large scale businesses.84  Labour history 
tended to concentrate on relationships between employer farmers and employee 
labourers from the nineteenth century onwards which by nature excluded 
twentieth century small farms of under 50 acres that hired little or no full-time 
labour.85 
 Such writing has been guided by earlier work such as by Venn in 1923 
who, despite acknowledging the existence of smallholdings and small farms, 
largely dismissed any importance they may have had, writing that the ‘small man 
and the farm worker lost their direct interest in the land’ in the decades of 
enclosures following the Napoleonic Wars.86  Lord Addison had served from 1930 
to 1931 as Minister of Agriculture in Macdonald’s Labour Government and, 
despite being well aware of small farm survival, wrote in similar vein in 1939, 
                                        
83 Howkins, ‘Peasants, Servants and Labourers’, pp.49-62; Reed, M., ‘“Gnawing it out”: a New 
Look at Economic Relations in Nineteenth Century Rural England’, Rural History, 1 1, (1990), 
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‘The extensive expropriations of land that accompanied the Enclosure Acts of the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in England destroyed a splendid 
and independent peasantry.’87  These writers were guided by trends towards the 
concentration and centralization in agriculture that would result logically in farm 
amalgamation and expansion, as mentioned in Chapter Two.88 
 Consequently, there seems to have appeared little point in studying the 
possibility of the continued existence of small farms.  Even where the structure 
of interwar farm tenure has been studied, to which work on farm size might well 
have contributed, it has been with regard to farm sales from landed estates that 
increased occupying ownership by farmers from about 11 percent to 37.5 
percent between 1918 and 1927.89  Inadequacies in the statistical data have 
contributed to diverting the debate amongst historians from structural aspects of 
farm tenure to concentrate on the extent and timing of the sales of landed 
estates that took place between the late nineteenth century and the 1920s, 
leaving little or nothing said about farm size.90   
 The impression created of an English agriculture of large farms has been 
reinforced by the apparent particularism and isolation of the communities 
characterised by small farms which were studied by Williams and, in Wales, 
Rees91 and by occasional pieces of work, such as by Quentin Bone in 1975, 
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which emphasised that small farms had been deemed uncompetitive from early 
in the interwar period.92  Donajgrodzki in 1989 at least demonstrated that 
differences in scales of production had persisted into the early twentieth century 
in the North Riding, showing that the manner in which farming was undertaken 
before the Second World War was not simply uniform, either in size or in relation 
to the market; however, like Williams, his study was very localised and, 
furthermore, was suggestive of the inevitable decline of a marginal, somewhat 
terminologically questionable ‘peasant’, way of life.93  
 The only grouping of interwar small farmers for whom any significant 
interest has been shown amongst university academics is that made up of 
individuals who chose to attempt small-scale cultivation on smallholdings, mostly 
created and subsidised by the State under various pieces of legislation from the 
1890s onwards.94  A renewed interest from the late 1960s onwards in organic 
farming and alternative forms of agriculture, landowning and settlement explains 
the turn towards the study of smallholdings amongst academics.  These 
academics are drawn from those middle class groups which were becoming 
either recently resident in the countryside95 or, in the case of the suburban 
middle class, perceiving, as part of a longer trend, that elitist cultural capital 
accrued to themselves from associating with, or ‘consuming’, the countryside.96  
The social and cultural values of these groups as they relate to the countryside 
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have turned out to be at odds with elements of the traditional power structure 
and of the farming practices of rural communities.97  Conflict has arisen between 
the new middle class residents of the countryside and farmers and landholders.   
The interests of farmers and landholders, often coincidental since the farmer and 
the landholder are frequently the same person, lie in maintaining the traditional 
structures of social control which are undermined by new middle class residents, 
the environmental and nature concerns of whom conflict with the industrial 
realities of modern farming.98  The precepts of these concerns are very much a 
feature of the particular manner of cultural consumption that Bourdieu 
recognises as pertaining to the middle class, a class from which, he makes clear 
through correspondence analysis, many academics are drawn.99   Thus, the 
interest of academics in early twentieth century smallholdings finds a modern 
ruralist idealism reflected in the chosen area of study.   
 The idealism surrounding the modern study of smallholdings is reflected 
in the work of Hardy and Ward from 1984.100  Arcadia for All addressed 
smallholdings within a wider study of the alternative rural communities that 
sprang up after the First World War as a reaction against modernism and 
urbanism, some of which stemmed from marginal political movements which 
later - in the 1960s - found adherents for reasons of ‘distinction’ amongst 
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sections of the middle class, such as anarchist geographers and teachers.101  
Thirsk’s work of 1997, Alternative Agriculture: a History from the Black Death to 
the Present Day, is, in essence, a history of the techniques and crops adopted by 
smallholders in the past that might give succour to those readers privileged 
enough to nourish a vision of – and perhaps enjoy - a life in the countryside 
more self-sustaining and less exploitative of the land than that offered by 
modern agribusiness, as evidenced by a section on the history of vegetarianism 
and references to articles in The Times and the Spectator.102  Thirsk is keen that 
modern alternative farming should learn from the interwar experience of 
smallholding and it appears that the statement, ‘Voices are being raised to 
appreciate the social and agricultural values of family farms and 
smallholdings’,103 is certainly true in academic terms as the renewed interest in 
the history of smallholdings shows.104  The values of the modern middle class 
and the cultural capital it sees in its appreciation of the countryside are 
particularly well reflected in Meredith’s study of the smallholding colony at 
Lingfield where such values were distinctly evident in the interwar period; highly 
valued at Lingfield, for example, were the privately funded role of ‘educated’ 
people in revitalising the rural economy as well as a status conscious 
                                        
101 Duane, M., ‘Education for What? A Guide to the Dartington Experiment’, Contemporary Issues 
in Geography and Education (Journal of the Association for Curriculum Development in 
Geography): Anarchism and Geography, 3 2, (1990), 113-39; Pepper, D., ‘Geography and 
Landscapes of Anarchistic Visions of Britain: the Examples of Morris and Kropotkin’, 
Contemporary Issues in Geography and Education (Journal of the Association for Curriculum 
Development in Geography): Anarchism and Geography, 3 2, (1990), 63-79. 
102 Thirsk, Alternative Agriculture, pp.199-204, 247-8. 
103 Ibid., p.247. 
104 Wade-Martins, S., ‘Smallholdings: a Social and Farming Experiment in Norfolk, 1890-1950’, 
Agricultural History Review, 54 2, (2006), 304-30; Meredith, A., ‘From Ideals to Reality: the 
Women’s Smallholding Colony at Lingfield, 1920-39’, Agricultural History Review, 54 1, (2006), 
105-21; Lockwood, pp.439-62. 
Chapter 3: Farm Size as the Explanation of Contrasting Narratives 
156 
 
exclusivity.105  These values were guaranteed by the requirement that Lingfield 
smallholders had a private annual income of £25 at a time when, as Sheila Todd 
reveals, young women earned about 10s 6d per week as domestic servants;106 
such typical wages amongst working class women would have excluded most 
women simply on grounds of the failure to possess adequate wealth.  The 
romanticised notion of a countryside of small farmers appears to attract 
attention amongst the elitist middle class today just as it did amongst the First 
World War rural elitist reconstructionists and the nationalistic Yeoman 
Movement.  The reconstructionists envisaged the establishment of 750,000 
smallholdings.107 The Yeoman Movement leaders, including Conservative M.P., 
W. Craven Ellis, were openly admiring of Hitler and Mussolini and their middle 
class support, but have gone unstudied despite desiring in the 1930s the 
creation of 500,000 smallholding families.108  Griffiths has, at least, noted that 
the Labour Party was able to shed its romantic attachment to smallholdings as 
the interwar period advanced but, like the modern romantics, does not include in 
her work the traditional, petits bourgeois small farmers who had survived in 
large numbers into the 1920s.109  
 The concentration on the study of aspects of smallholdings appears 
unwarranted from an economic perspective when it is considered that, according 
to the Ministry of Agriculture, only 29,355 publicly funded units of up to 50 acres 
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were established in England and Wales between 1908 and 1937.110  English 
smallholdings created between the Wars numbered at around 17,500 meaning 
that there were about fourteen times more small farms already in existence in 
1919 in England than there were smallholdings created in the next eighteen 
years.111  The limited studies of smallholdings do not address the prevalent 
understanding of the farm business structure of the interwar period as one 
characterised by extensive farms.  The large number of existing small farms in 
the interwar period has generally been ignored whilst smallholdings have been 
idealised as an attempt at revitalising small farms with assumptions being made, 
but with little confirmation, that they were relatively unsuccessful, their failure 
being regarded as constituting the disappearance of the last of the small farms 
in England.  Burchardt’s indication that there was little support for smallholdings 
in the 1920s and 1930s112 is only partially true, because these farms still had 
advocates across the period for reasons of national reinvigoration,113 and, 
particularly in the 1930s, for reasons of social control stemming from 
establishment fear of unemployment;114 Orwin was writing rather dismissively in 
1930 of the existence of ‘exponents of a Small Holdings policy for England’ 
whose desire was to set up farms run by ‘the family-farmer of the continental 
peasant type’.115  Burchardt, however, typifies the continued misunderstanding 
of the business size structure of agriculture meaning that the perception that 
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there were few or no small farms left by the 1930s has been perpetuated, with 
only limited, recent but fleeting, reference offering any amelioration of this.116 
 The accepted understanding of the farm business structure of the 
interwar years was perhaps conditioned, firstly, by the prevailing Fordist social 
compromise that emerged after the Second World War and lasted until the late 
1970s;117 during this period, farm size increased rapidly, reaching 155 acres by 
1983 at a time when only 15 percent of farms were less than 100 acres in 
size.118  Thus, in the 1980s when the historicist, post-Fordist reassessments of 
the middle class and small business took place and the renaissance of the 
discourses of the ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘small enterprise’ arose,119 there was little 
genuinely small-scale farming left and the term ‘family farming’ was being used 
to describe something quite different from that undertaken on the small family 
farms of under 50 acres in size found in England between the Wars.  Newby et 
al. commented upon the existence of circumstances where little paid labour was 
necessary for ‘small’ farmers at as late a date as 1981 but this situation resulted 
from the high levels of mechanization of agriculture that took place after the 
Second World War rather than the restrictions on labour inputs resulting from 
possession of inadequate farmland that had characterised interwar small 
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farms.120  Limited exploration of contemporary family farming in Britain took 
place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, notably by Gasson and Errington.121  
Farming in the 1980s was undertaken on a much greater scale in terms of 
capital and of land-capital employed than in the interwar years and was in a 
relationship with capitalism described by Gasson and Errington as ‘fully 
embracing at an economic level’.122  Even where farming was undertaken on a 
part-time basis, holdings were of a considerable size, averaging well above 50 
acres in the 1980s, and required substantial capital because of technical 
limitations that created excess machinery capacity and necessitated Government 
aid that was noticeably biased towards larger and full-time farms.123  In reality, it 
had become very difficult to equate the ‘family’ farm of the 1980s with the ‘small’ 
farm of the interwar period and this resulted in no real attempt being made to 
explore the extent of the persistence or viability of farms of under 50 acres into 
the twentieth century despite their existence in 1919 in considerable numbers, 
as shown by the Agricultural Statistics.   
 The lack of interest is understandable given that few studies sought to 
maintain that a small farm ‘peasantry’ had survived beyond the agricultural 
revolution and the enclosures.  Reed and Donajgrodzki, though undoubtedly 
raising a challenge to the accepted wisdom on the pre-nineteenth century 
disappearance of small scale ‘peasant’ farmers and possibly to the ideologically 
adventitious motives of Macfarlane, tended to convey a sense of the inevitable 
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decline and disappearance of a people involved in a noble but doomed cause.124  
Demonstrations of the survival of small farmers into the twentieth century are to 
be found in work on Cumbrian upland farmers by Shepherd and by Crowe, but 
both of these are localised, anthropological-economic studies of the years before 
the interwar period that ignore the wider implications of the existence of large 
numbers of small farms between the Wars.125  Winstanley’s local study asserts 
that small farms were integrated into the wider economy by the late nineteenth 
century but does not carry on the theme into the twentieth.126  
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The Decline of Small Farms between the Wars 
 
 A substantial decline took place in the fortunes of those farms considered 
to be ‘small’ between the close of the First World War and the 1980s when the 
limited attention noted above was paid to family farming.  Farms considered 
‘small’ in 1919 - those of one to 50 acres in size - made up over 65 percent of 
total farms in that year whilst the same ‘small’ category of farms in 1983, despite 
having doubled its upper size limit to include farms of up to 100 acres and 
excluded farms of less than five acres in extent, was constituted of less than 15 
percent of all holdings; simultaneously, the number of ‘statistically significant’127 
holdings in England, with the exclusion of Monmouth, had fallen between 1919 
and 1983 from 353,433128 to 185,993 in 1983.129  Thus, it is clear that a long 
term decline in farmer numbers had occurred that featured a disproportionately 
high level of disappearance amongst small farmers.  The decline in numbers of 
farms, as well as the disproportionate share that small farmers contributed to it, 
began between the Wars.  The total number of farms of one to 50 acres that 
disappeared between 1919 and 1939 was 45,729.  This is a figure equivalent to 
20 percent of the 228,783 small farms in 1919, a percentage somewhat higher 
than the 14 percent that represents the proportion of all farms that disappeared.  
Thus, it is no surprise that small farms, which constituted 65 percent of all 
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farms, made up over 90 percent of the 49,794 farms that disappeared between 
the Wars.130  
 Numbers of small farmers underwent decline between the Wars at a time 
when dairy farms were renowned for being smaller than arable ones;131 this 
certainly seems to contradict the simplistic narrative of dairy success or, at least, 
stability at the expense of arable that is presented in the historiography.  
Furthermore, calculations using data from the Agricultural Statistics show that an 
increase took place in the average size of farm in interwar England of almost 5 
acres.  England’s average farm grew by 7.5 percent from just over 67 acres to 
just over 72 between 1919 and 1939.132  This type of farm size analysis might 
actually be of relevance to a better interpretation of the narratives that are 
already in existence in the historiography because it could offer a statistical basis 
for the conclusions they make regarding interwar agricultural conditions which 
rely generally only upon commentary avowing contrasting circumstances 
affecting broad farming types.  Indeed, the method of the analysis of farm 
disappearance by size category could have been extrapolated at any time from 
the existing tendency in the historiography of basing conclusions on analysis of 
two broad farming types, such as dairy and arable.  This is simply because 
arable farms were regarded as covering larger average acreages than dairy 
ones.  This alone, in terms of the existing historiography, would be a suitable 
reason for examining farm size.  Thus, it would have been reasonable to suggest 
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that any fall to be found in the average size of all farms in England between the 
Wars, at a time when farms, farmers and arable farmland were disappearing at a 
considerable rate, would have been attributable to the disappearance of farms of 
larger than average size which were more likely to be arable farms.  This would 
be indicative, at least, of more difficult operating conditions for arable farmers 
than for dairy farmers which might then be explored further using other 
sources.133   
 However, the increase in average farm size between 1919 and 1939 that 
has actually been found is, clearly, not consistent with the simplified notion that 
arable farming as a whole was suffering and that dairy farming was, at worst, 
stable and was, perhaps, prosperous.  The expansion of farms indicated by 
increases in farm size is suggestive of prosperity amongst larger farms at a time 
when arable farms are considered to have been larger than dairy farms.  
Prosperity amongst arable farmers is one particular set of circumstances that the 
existing historiography maintains consistently was not apparent in the interwar 
years.  Of course, the increased average farm size may have been caused by 
increases in the sizes of pastoral and other non-arable farms.  Changes in the 
overall acreage of farmland in use and in the specific purposes to which such 
land was being put might confirm this.  The decrease in arable farmland of three 
million acres that the Agricultural Statistics show took place was greater than the 
overall decrease in farmland in use, indicating that arable land was being used 
for other agricultural purposes, such as dairying; the total acreage of farmland in 
England fell by 2,122,797 between 1919 and 1939 which is a figure significantly 
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less than that for the fall in the arable acreage, virtually confirming the 
conversion of around a million acres of arable land to use in other types of 
farming.  There was a concurrent increase of 892,615 acres in the area of 
permanent grass in England in the same years which tends to confirm the 
transfer of land from arable to pastoral use, thereby reiterating that difficulties 
existed in arable production or, at least, that pastoral production offered a better 
alternative, thereby adding another confusing element to the argument about 
interwar agricultural conditions.134 
 It is obvious that the debate on interwar agricultural conditions is 
characterised by contradiction which originates in past attempts to make 
conclusions regarding farming as a whole in England from the circumstances 
prevailing in one of two major farming types.  Contradiction appears to be 
compounded by the introduction of new statistical evidence but the confusion 
results more from the method of research previously undertaken than the 
statistical evidence itself simply because the statistical data appears to contrast 
with pre-existing conclusions made regarding both arable farm size and interwar 
conditions.  It is important that the search for any more information regarding 
farming fortunes as related to farming type at this stage recognises that farm 
size needs to be taken very much into account.  This is especially true given the 
weaknesses that have been exposed above in the existing arguments in the 
historiography for the use of broad farming type as the indicator of prosperity or 
decline of farmers and of agriculture as a whole; in this regard, it is notable that 
it is only generally by excluding either arable or dairy farms from conclusions on 
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interwar agricultural conditions that either success or failure can be ascribed to 
the industry as a whole, as historians appear wont to do.  Another contradictory 
element in the analysis is found in the disproportionately high rate of 
disappearance of farms of smaller than average size, farms that were less likely 
to be arable than dairy farms.  Small farm difficulties are likely to be, if anything, 
more suggestive of difficulties amongst dairy farmers than the arable farmers 
who have generally been assumed to have suffered.   
 The suggestion, made above, that contrasts in farmers’ fortunes existed 
between the Wars must be assessed in tandem with the unexpected increases 
found in average farm size and the disproportionately high numbers of 
disappearing small farms, both of which certainly suggest that farm size was a 
factor in the chances of interwar farm survival.  It seems that more 
understanding might be gained regarding the structural changes taking place in 
agriculture suggested by the evidence on farm size, especially the decline of 
small farms, from further statistical examination of the size structure of English 
farms, initially at the beginning and end of the period, than from extended 
probing of the existing historiography. 
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Size as the Primary Influence upon a Farm’s Chance of Interwar 
Survival  
 
 The stark contrast in the relative decreases in numbers of large and small 
farms, outlined above, makes it clear that the amount of land that was available 
to a farmer was an extremely important factor in the chances of survival in the 
interwar English agricultural industry.  Examination of data from the Agricultural 
Statistics on numbers of farms in two basic size categories in England at the 
beginning and end of the interwar period reveals a considerable difference in the 
fortunes of farms either bigger or smaller than 50 acres.  Decreases took place 
in total numbers in both groups but were far more extensive, both absolutely 
and relatively, amongst the smaller farms than the larger.  There were 124,650 
farms of 50 acres and above in extent in existence in 1919 and this number had 
fallen by 4,065 to 120,585 in 1939 so that their numbers decreased by less than 
3.5 percent between 1919 and 1939.  In contrast, since the Agricultural Statistics 
for England, excluding Monmouth, show that those occupying between one and 
50 acres decreased in number by 45,729 from 228,783 to 183,054, a fall of 20 
percent, the decrease in numbers of small farms is seen to be almost eleven 
times greater than the fall in the numbers in the category of larger farms.  It 
must, therefore, be recognised that the odds of failure of a small farm were far 
greater than those of a larger one: 1 in 5 small farms failed, according to the 
Agricultural Statistics, as opposed to only 1 in almost 31 farms of fifty acres and 
larger.135 
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 The reality is that small farms disappeared at an even higher rate than 
the 20 percent calculated from the Agricultural Statistics.  Reference has been 
made in Chapter Two to the figures calculated from the Agricultural Statistics for 
1919 and 1939 on the disappearance of farms being an underestimate due to 
the creation of 17,500 smallholdings in England between the Wars.136  The 
failure of the Agricultural Statistics to show the gross rate of farm disappearance 
means that, pertinently, they do not reveal the true extent of the disappearance 
of small farms, underestimating as well the disparity between the failure rates of 
large and small farms.  The figure of 17,500 representing the smallholdings 
created needs to be added to the number from the Agricultural Statistics used to 
show the total number of small farms known to have been in existence during 
the interwar period in order to calculate the full extent of the decrease occurring 
in the numbers of small farms between 1919 and 1939; there were, therefore, at 
least 246,283 farms of between one and 50 acres in existence between the 
Wars.  Small farms in 1939 numbered just 183,054 meaning that 63,229 of them 
had disappeared since the First World War, a figure representing over 25.5 
percent; 1 in 4 small farms ceased to exist during the interwar period.  It must 
be recognised that there is no evidence to suggest that farms of above 50 acres 
were created between the Wars and, thus, that no similar disparity can be 
assumed to have existed between the net and gross rates of disappearance of 
farms of greater than 50 acres in size to that of the smaller category.  No 
records exist of any systematic large farm creation akin to that by which 
Parliamentary legislation was enacted specifically to create smallholdings that 
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were of less than 50 acres.137  There is a contradiction apparent in the creation 
of 17,500 English smallholdings during the interwar period when times were so 
hard for small farms, especially given that larger farms appear to have been a 
more promising proposition, but this will be addressed in Chapter Five. 
 The greatest fall in farm numbers in size categories containing substantial 
numbers of holdings regarded as full-time farms occurred in farms of five to 20 
acres in size.  The National Farm Survey Report describes the category of five to 
20 acre farms as containing holdings farmed substantially by the type of occupier 
who should ‘be properly called a farmer’ or ‘properly regarded as a farmer and 
his holding as a farm’138 and Gasson maintains that 95 percent of farms of over 
five acres in size were full time farms between the Wars.139  The net fall between 
1919 and 1939 was of 25.5 percent, actual numbers of holdings falling by 
24,467 between 1920 and 1939, from 93,799 to 71,561; the rate would be 
higher were smallholdings that were created of this size included in the 
calculation but the numbers of smallholdings that existed in each size category is 
not known.140  Thus, at least a quarter of farmers on the smallest full-time farms 
seem to have gone out of business in the years between the Wars.  Holdings of 
between one and five acres cannot be ignored because they were not all part-
time holdings and many were created for various reasons during the interwar 
period as full-time and part-time smallholdings,141 as will be explored later in this 
thesis.  Even where they were part-time, these holdings may have contributed 
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significantly to the incomes of those running them and their families and may 
have been a factor in the construction of the identities of their occupiers.  Farms 
of one to five acres in extent saw a net fall of just over 25 percent 1920-39, not 
including smallholdings, a very slightly smaller fall than among those of five to 
20 acres, suggesting that considerable difficulty in achieving any kind of success 
in farming was faced by any cultivator of limited acreages, whether full-time or 
part-time.142  
 The next most hard hit size category of farm holdings after the five to 20 
acre group is the one immediately above it, that of holdings of 20 to 50 acres in 
size, which saw a considerable net fall in numbers of 8,361 from a 1920 total of 
66,270 to 57,909 in 1939, a fall equivalent to just over 12.5 percent of its 
total.143  This group falls within the category delineated by the National Farm 
Survey Report as containing holdings occupied by almost 95 percent of farmers 
who should be ‘properly called a farmer’.144  The fall in numbers in this group 
was still considerable but, as can be seen, was only just over a third of the size 
of the numerical fall in the category of farms of five to 20 acres and less than 
half its size in percentage terms.145     
 Farms above fifty acres in size shows a decrease over the interwar period 
of only 3.3 percent or a larger decrease of 3.8 percent if 1920 is taken as the 
starting date, the year 1919 to 1920 having shown an increase in the number of 
farms overall and in this size group.  Within this size category of farms of 50 
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acres and above, farms of 50 to 100 acres remained stable in numbers and 
would have shown an increase but for a fall between 1938 and 1939.   Farms of 
100 to 150 acres showed a fall of less than 1 percent between 1919 and 1939 
indicating that as size of holdings above 100 acres increased, a slightly greater 
chance of disappearance existed than amongst those holdings of 50 to 100 
acres.146   
 It is apparent that there existed during the interwar years in England an 
increasing chance of farm failure as size of holding decreased below 50 acres, 
demonstrated by the numbers disappearing from the smaller size categories 
being much higher than from the large.  It is also likely that the rate of small 
farm business disappearance may be underestimated since amalgamation of 
small farms in single businesses with the farm holdings still contributing 
individually to the total farm numbers in the Agricultural Statistics tends to be 
higher amongst small farms than large ones.147   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Clearly the incidence of failure amongst small-scale farmers was much 
higher than that amongst those farming larger acreages. It is also reasonable to 
say that the statistical data that has been amended to take into account the 
establishment of smallholdings indicates that small farms were, indeed, in a 
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considerably more precarious position than larger farms.  Furthermore, it must 
be argued that, measured by the level of farm disappearance and of the size of 
the holdings involved, the interwar period cannot realistically be judged to have 
been one of success for small-scale farmers or, at least, not for those whose 
farms and livelihoods numbered amongst the disappeared.  It must be 
recognised that the discovery that interwar failure was mainly experienced by 
small farmers means that the narratives of interwar agriculture that have 
ascribed failure to arable farming would, if it were wished that they remain 
tenable, have to at least be adjusted to suggest that it was only the smaller 
arable farmers that failed but it must also be recognised that there is no 
evidence so far produced to support such an assertion, whether here or 
anywhere else. 
 A serious shortcoming in the historiography of interwar English agriculture 
has been identified in this chapter.  There has been a tendency to date to make 
reference to difficulties amongst farmers engaged in arable farming and to 
success amongst dairy farmers but to ignore one or the other of them in 
conclusions relating to the performance of agriculture as a whole.   The tendency 
to overlook one or other of arable or dairy farming seems to stem from an 
apparent desire to ascribe either absolute success or failure to the performance 
of agriculture as an industry between the Wars.  This chapter has been open in 
confronting the possibility that farmers experienced a broad range of economic 
conditions in agriculture between the Wars but has addressed it from the new 
perspective of farm size thrown up by the general tendency to search for 
success or failure as governed by broad farming types.   
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 The widely accepted notion that arable farming was undertaken on larger 
farms than pastoral farming gave rise to a decision to look at fortunes of farmers 
taking into account changes in sizes of farms.  The expectation was that arable 
failure and dairy success would have resulted in diminishing average farm size.  
The surprising discovery is that average farm size in England has been found to 
have increased between the Wars, the corollary being that small farms have 
been found to have decreased in numbers by over 25 percent, a figure far higher 
than that for farms of more than 50 acres in extent.  Small farm disappearance 
is surprising because the existing historiography has either stressed or implied 
that any agricultural difficulties experienced were likely to have been on arable 
farms.  It would, thus, appear that any narrative of interwar distress in 
agriculture should not focus necessarily on arable farming, as was the case for 
most of the conclusions in the twentieth century historiography of the interwar 
period, but on small farmers.  The representation of interwar agriculture as a 
success in the historiography that has been written in the twenty-first century is 
a failing because of the lack of attention paid to the fate – even the actual 
existence - of small farmers.   
 The ignorance of the very existence of the vast majority of small farmers 
between the Wars, let alone of their demise, has been shown to have afflicted 
the written histories of the period.  Although some explanation has been offered 
for the failure of the historiography to address small farms, the causes of the 
gaps are by no means clear but they lie in the events surrounding agriculture in 
the interwar period itself and in the structures of rural society and agriculture as 
inherited by the interwar period. Consideration must be given to narratives of 
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distress that emerged during the interwar period being the result of the 
problems affecting mainly small farmers; however, the absence of the 
identification of small farmers from written histories of the period suggests the 
existence of a degree of selectivity in use of the original sources by writers, 
either during the period itself or afterwards or at both these times.  Such 
selectivity would act in support of the desire of large-scale producers and 
landowners hoping to benefit from potential Government aid to agriculture, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 New evidence needs to be brought to bear upon interwar agriculture in an 
attempt to identify how dairy farming has been represented in the more recent 
historiography as the saviour of interwar farming at the same time as those 
small-scale farmers who might be assumed to be its proponents appear to have 
been in severe decline; this is the task of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The Consequences of Arable Farming Difficulties for Small 
Dairy Farms in England between the Wars 
Introduction 
 
The statistical data confirming the existence of interwar agricultural hardship in 
the form of the disappearance of small-scale farms has been shown in Chapter 
Three to be inconsistent with the logic of the historiography of interwar English 
farming.  The historiography maintains that difficulties were, if existent at all, 
experienced in arable farming which is renowned for being a large-scale 
operation.  Suggestions that there existed difficulties in arable farming appear 
somewhat incongruous given the statistics presented here that demonstrate the 
prevalence of disappearance of farms belonging to categories of small farms.  
The statistics suggest that, if anything, pastoral and other types of farms were 
more likely to have failed since they are renowned for having been smaller than 
arable farms.1  Small farm categories would have included many of the dairy 
type of pastoral farms deemed in some twenty-first century accounts to have 
been flourishing and used as a measure to demonstrate the overall success of 
agriculture between the Wars.2   
 The inconsistencies between the historiography and the statistical 
evidence that have been demonstrated in Chapter Three suggest that farm 
failures may not have been confined to arable farming in England between the 
Wars; farm failures may have affected farmers wherever farms were small, that 
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is, in both of the more extensive branches of the industry as well as in other less 
conspicuous farming types.  The possibility emerges that small farm failure was 
ubiquitous in English interwar agriculture and the beginning of an investigation 
into this possibility is the task of this chapter.  In order for this to be undertaken, 
some generalised means of differentiating between small farms in different 
branches of agriculture and, in particular, in arable and dairy farming, would be 
best pursued.  Differentiation is necessary so that it can be established whether 
it was farming on a small scale of one or more particular types that led directly 
to farm failure, with arable farms being the likely candidate according to the 
historiography but dairy most likely according to the statistics.  The contradiction 
between the historiography and the statistics make it eminently possible that it 
was the very scale of small farming in general that was at the root of the 
problem.  The result will determine the direction from which an investigation can 
be launched in the following chapters into the reasons for the causes of the 
difficulties faced by small farmers between the Wars revealed by the statistics on 
farm disappearance; also enabled will be both a search for the reasons for the 
failure of the historiography to recognise this small farmer decline and an 
investigation into any connection between the causes of small farm failure and 
the failure of the historiography to recognise it earlier. 
 The identification of the cause of contradictions between the 
historiography and the statistical evidence is complicated by difficulties which 
have been shown to exist in differentiating between individual farms of any one 
particular farming type from another in the statistics; however, one avenue can 
be pursued.  An examination is undertaken in the following chapter of regional 
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farm disappearance that takes into consideration the existence of a general 
agricultural division in England.  The general understanding has existed that 
rural England, as a result of historical, geophysical and climatic conditions, is 
constituted of two regions of contrasting agricultural production, each region 
being largely characterised as arable or pastoral, and that this was necessarily 
the case between the Wars.3  Tendencies in the existing historiography suggest 
that economic problems of interwar English agriculture may have been generally 
experienced in arable farming whilst prosperity existed in pastoral farming and, 
in particular, in milk production.  It is possible that these contrasting economic 
conditions may have been experienced in the regions generally associated with 
each of these farming types.  Patterns of varying agricultural fortunes will be 
established from analysis of statistics available on the changing agricultural 
production and conditions in individual counties within these two regions in 
England.  The tendencies indicating difficulties in arable farming lead to the 
supposition that the arable region is more likely to have witnessed the 
disappearance of larger numbers of farms and farmers than the pastoral.  
Counties within the pastoral region that specialised in dairy farming would be 
expected to show patterns of farm disappearance at considerable variance with 
counties specialising in arable production. 
 Contradictions in the historiography of interwar agriculture based on the 
performance of contrasting farming types clearly need to be investigated and the 
existence of the two regions regarded as being characterised either by arable or 
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Whetham, Agrarian History, p.29. 
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pastoral production can be used as a general guide to conditions.  Data on 
numbers of farms and farm size from counties within the two zones regarded as 
being characterised by arable or pastoral production will be used in combination 
with other indicators of the economic conditions of agriculture to examine these 
inconsistencies.  Although dairy production forms only one branch of the pastoral 
farming of the northern and western pastoral zone, the focus will remain 
generally on the two farming types of arable and dairy, at least in the initial 
stages of investigation.   
 The origins of any perception that may have arisen from this study so far 
of only dairy and arable farming being undertaken in England between the Wars 
lie in the historiography to date which has used these types as the general 
measure of conditions in agriculture as a whole at the time, as has been shown, 
above, in Chapter One.  Reference is, indeed, made in written histories to other 
farming types and products4 but, overall, interwar agriculture has been judged 
by that specific evidence presented in the historiography which is suggestive of 
either failure in the arable sector or success in dairy farming.  Dairy farming, as 
a branch of pastoral farming, must be assumed to have predominantly taken 
place in the North and West but, given that it is only a subset of pastoral 
farming, the issue of the fortunes of the other major branch of pastoral farming, 
namely livestock grazing, will arise.  Consideration will also be given to other 
specialist farming types, the existence of which may have had an impact on 
statistics concerning the disappearance of farms, particularly where they may 
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have been undertaken on small-scale holdings, such as in the case of market 
gardening and poultry rearing.   
 Answers are required as to whether success and failure were seen on 
farms of varying sizes in different areas or whether the disproportionately high 
level of small farm disappearance in England coincided with counties where 
dairying and, thus, small farms were predominant.  The chapter will proceed, 
using statistical evidence, to demonstrate the veracity of the division of the rural 
England of 1919 into two zones, each one dominated by either arable or pastoral 
farming.  Average farm size will then be examined in counties within the two 
regions to establish that the generalization regarding the size of farm associated 
with each type of farming is valid for the interwar period.  Particular attention 
needs to be paid to whether small farm failure was concentrated in any 
particular areas or farming type; therefore, the investigation will proceed by 
looking at the incidence of the disappearance of farms in the counties of the 
West Riding and Lancashire, both considered to be dairy counties.  The 
exploration will continue to use primary and secondary sources as well as 
statistical data.    
 Evidence of the growing competition within the dairy industry after the 
First World War other than that provided by statistics will also be provided.  The 
year of 1920 saw the removal of State regulation used to control the dairy 
industry during the First World War.  The chapter will conclude with a brief 
overview of the developments in the industry between 1920 and 1933 focusing 
particularly upon the ways in which increased production in the industry affected 
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smaller farmers.  The year of 1933 was one of great significance for dairy 
producers as it saw the creation of the MMB, set up to control distribution in a 
dairy market that, left to its own devices, appeared to be behaving contrary to 
the interests of the very producers necessary to supply it with its single and, 
thus, vital product: milk.  The accuracy of the interpretation of the MMB as being 
of general benefit to farmers will be examined later in this thesis whereas the 
further evidence on the state of the milk market and the conditions for dairy 
farmers across England necessary to contribute to that interpretation will be 
provided in this chapter and the subsequent one. 
 
The Structure and Distribution of Interwar Dairy and Arable 
Agriculture  
 
 The following passage looks at two related propositions regarding 
interwar English agriculture that have been established in the historiography.  
The first proposition is that the countryside was divided roughly into two regions 
with one of the two broad agricultural types – pastoral and arable - tending to 
be undertaken predominantly in each region.  Secondly, each type was 
undertaken on farms of a certain size which were characteristic of each region, 
arable farms being generally larger than pastoral farms and, thus, by definition, 
than dairy farms. 
 A spatial division has been commonly made in the historiography in 
regard to farming types in England before the Second World War.  Each of the 
two broad types of farming, arable and pastoral, has been regarded as taking 
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place primarily in one of the two agricultural areas into which England can be 
roughly divided.  A basic geographical division of England into two zones of 
contrasting farming types exists in the early written history of nineteenth century 
agriculture, notably James Caird’s English Agriculture in 1850-51; indeed, the 
frontispiece of Caird’s text displays a map of the simplified division of production 
between the arable farming of the southern and eastern lowlands and the 
upland pastoral farming of the north and west.5  Thus, there exists a line that 
created two regions of broadly contrasting agricultural production which has its 
origins in a geological feature, a ridge of Jurassic limestone running south west 
to north east which, when extended to include the Hambleton and Cleveland 
Hills to the north-east, forms the division known as the ‘Tees-Exe’ line.6  
Howkins’ suggestion that the division into two agricultural regions is one that 
remained relevant throughout the twentieth century corresponds with 
Whetham’s earlier observation that the line merely shifts westwards or 
eastwards depending upon changes in the prevailing economic conditions.7  
Venn confirms that, in 1923, arable farming was the province of farms in 
southern and eastern counties whilst pastoral farming was characteristic of 
holdings of the north and west.8 
 Venn’s additional suggestion that dairy counties in the pastoral farm zone 
tended to be characterised by farms smaller than those in arable areas9 has 
                                        
5 Caird, frontispiece. 
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(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), p.8. 
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been made consistently in the literature concerning interwar agriculture.10  
Addison calculated that 83 percent of holdings of less than 50 acres in size were 
reliant to a considerable degree on dairying, even by as late a date as 1938.11  
Counties where arable was predominant would be expected to have an average 
size farm greater than the national average with the opposite being true for the 
pastoral zone and, thus, for dairy farms.  The assertion regarding contrasts in 
farm size between arable and pastoral farming is, indeed, borne out by statistical 
evidence from various counties situated in one or other of the two regions.  
Mean average farm size in 1919 in the northern dairy county of Lancashire was 
only just over 42 acres whilst, in the adjacent counties of the West Riding of 
Yorkshire and Cheshire which, like Lancashire, had large and accessible urban 
markets for fresh milk, average farm size was just under 48 acres and just over 
45, respectively; in England as a whole, average farm size was 67 acres and in 
England and Wales, just over 64.  The south-western county of Devon, a more 
rural pastoral county than those in the north but well known for its dairy 
production, had an average farm size of 70 acres, just over the national average.  
Another western county, Gloucestershire, shared farm size characteristics with 
Devon as well as other agricultural features.  It had an average farm size of 70 
and was more northerly than Devon only to the extent that Somerset separated 
the two, but it was certainly predominantly pastoral in character, having 62 
percent of its agricultural area in grazing land; it was mentioned as a significant 
contributor of fresh milk to two market areas in R.B. Forrester’s 1927 
                                        
10 This Chapter, above. 
11 Lord Addison, p.243. 
Chapter 4: Consequences of Arable Farming Difficulties 
182 
 
contribution on the fluid milk market to MAF’s Economic Series12 and had a dairy 
herd of almost 40,000 cattle.   Confirmation of the credentials of the milk 
counties as pastoral lies in the percentage of land that they dedicated to arable 
farming being considerably lower than the average for England, as a whole, 
which was just over 47 percent in 1919; in the West Riding it was 36 and in both 
Lancashire and Gloucestershire it was 38.13   
 Those counties in the south and east, well known traditionally for their 
arable cultivation would be expected to have exhibited farm sizes considerably 
above the national average in 1919 and to have a high percentage of land 
dedicated to arable production.  Hampshire, on the south coast of England, 
fulfilled the criteria for an arable county and not simply because it is designated 
by Whetham as having been one in 1914.14  Hampshire falls within the area 
considered to have been characterised by arable agriculture and this is 
confirmed by the statistics that show 63 percent of its farmland being taken up 
by arable crops in 1919; note has been made that the percentage of farmland 
used for arable cultivation in England, as a whole, was a little more than 47 in 
1919.  The mean average farm size in Hampshire corresponds with the expected 
pattern for predominantly arable counties insofar it was larger than the national 
average of 67.5 acres in 1919; Hampshire’s average was relatively modest at 
almost 71 acres but was still larger than the average farm size of the dairy 
counties considered, above.  The average farm sizes in other arable counties 
                                        
12 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (R.B. Forrester), Economic Series No.16; The Fluid Milk 
Market (London: HMSO, 1927), p.19. 
13 Table 3.1; Table 3.2; Table 4.1 including *Sources; Table 5.1 including *Sources. 
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were larger.  Arable counties with larger average farm sizes than Hampshire’s 
ranged from Norfolk, where arable covered just less than 75 percent of the total 
agricultural area and where the average farm size was close to 80 acres, to West 
Sussex, with an average farm size of 83.5 acres, to Essex, with 88.  Even larger 
average sizes were to be found.  The East Riding of Yorkshire had an average of 
95 acres and an arable acreage covering 70 percent of farmland whilst in West 
Suffolk, where farmland was 80 percent arable, farms averaged almost 100 
acres in size.  In the midlands but within the region depicted as arable, 
Huntingdon had an average farm size of 84.5 acres and arable crops covering 
63.5 percent of its farmland.15   
 Counties within the area renowned historically for arable production 
tended to have considerably more land in arable production in 1919 than those 
counties that were known for dairying.  The actuality is that the differential 
between the respective acreages in use for arable cultivation in arable and dairy 
areas was larger even than has been suggested.  The acreages pertaining to 
arable use in counties where arable farming predominated could be construed, in 
all probability, as being larger than the acreage shown by the Agricultural 
Statistics as being under arable crops in any one particular year because figures 
for the acreage of temporary grass could be added to those for arable crops in 
arable counties.  Temporary grassland was usually being used in this temporary 
way as leys, that is, as part of an arable rotation;16 this would, of course, 
increase the percentage of land that was generally in use as part of an arable 
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farm system in such counties, exacerbating the differential of the percentages of 
land used for arable purposes between arable and pastoral counties, especially 
dairy counties. 
 ‘Arable’ counties, defined as such because of the nature of their 
production in 1919 as much as by their location within a traditionally arable 
region, have been shown above to have had a greater average farm size than 
dairy counties at the beginning of the interwar period, but exceptions existed.  
Lincoln-Holland was in the arable zone but had an average farm size of only 45 
acres in 1919.  The historical development of the agriculture of Lincoln Holland 
was, indeed, singular.  The county’s agricultural layout was the result of specific 
historical and topographical conditions.  Drainage problems had delayed modern 
development of the county’s fenland but technological advance in the form of 
steam pumps meant that small, unproductive farms had been transformed 
deliberately in the mid-nineteenth century into small highly fertile, high rent 
arable farms alongside a few newly created large farms.17  Another reason for 
the unexpectedly low average farm size in Lincoln-Holland is the deliberate 
creation of large numbers of smallholdings of up to 50 acres in the county by the 
Ministry of Agriculture from 1919 onwards which, along with smallholding 
creation by the County Council, gave Lincoln-Holland the fifth largest total 
number of smallholdings of any county in England and Wales, despite its 
                                        
17 Beastall, T.W., The Agricultural Revolution in Lincolnshire (Lincoln: History of Lincolnshire 
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comparatively small total area and small total number of farms.18  Lincoln 
Holland’s location in the arable zone is, anyway, understandable, given that 78 
percent of its farmland was arable in 1919.  The delineation into arable and 
pastoral zones of England’s interwar agriculture is given credibility by the 
proportion of farmland given over to arable crops in Lincoln-Holland being the 
highest of all the counties examined.  Lincoln-Holland is exceptional for its low 
average farm size for an arable county but, exceptions aside, even average farm 
sizes of around 70 acres in some arable counties, such as Hampshire, which 
were at the lower end of the scale for such counties, were similar to those at the 
upper end of the scale for dairy counties.19   
 The existence in Lincoln-Holland of large numbers of small farms in a 
distinctly arable county demonstrates that generalizations about interwar 
agriculture should not be accepted without demur and this includes the 
generalizations about difficulties and success of broad farming types.  The 
historiography of interwar rural England to date has not conceived of success 
and failure as industry-wide possibilities but only as occurring uniquely within 
particular broad farming types; the investigation, from here onwards, will be into 
whether or not both success and failure were apparent within farming types and 
especially within arable and dairy farming.  The gross decrease of over 18 
percent in farm numbers that took place between the Wars certainly indicates 
widespread failure, the distribution of which across the industry needs 
                                        
18 NA/MAF/48/321, Holbeach Farm Settlement, Main Acquisition; NA/MAF/48/330, Sutton Bridge 
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elucidation, but failure may have occurred in ways that simple increases and 
decreases in farm numbers seen in conjunction with claims about the conditions 
affecting a particular farming type might not make immediately imaginable.  
Difficulties associated with one type of farming, notably the shrinkage by over a 
quarter of the arable acreage in England,20 might encourage the assumption 
simply that arable farms would have failed, gone out of business and 
disappeared from the statistics; such an understanding would suggest, 
consequently, that farms in the arable region would have disappeared in large 
numbers since it has been argued consistently that arable farming was the least 
likely type of farming to have prospered.  The difficulties amongst arable farmers 
coupled with the predominance of small farms amongst those that disappeared 
that has been demonstrated in the previous chapter might also lead to the 
simple assumption that a large majority of the farms that disappeared would 
have been small arable ones and that, consequently, disappearance would have 
taken place at a higher rate in the arable region.  The corollary would be that a 
certain pattern of stability or increase of farm numbers might be expected to be 
discovered in dairy counties in conjunction with, perhaps, changes in land use to 
accommodate new farms and even a fall in average farm size as large units were 
divided into the smaller farms associated with dairy farming at the time.  
 The following section will examine the renowned fresh milk producing 
counties of the West Riding and Lancashire, concentrating upon changes in size 
and numbers of farms alongside other indicators of agricultural performance and 
conditions in two counties which have been shown to conform to the 
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generalizations about pastoral counties in terms both of their location – northern 
- and average farm size - small.  The context will be the inconsistencies between 
the existing historiography, with its narrative of prosperity in dairy farming and 
difficulties in arable, and the statistics revealed so far in this thesis on extensive 
small farm disappearance that indicate the possibility of difficulties amongst dairy 
farmers.   
 
Prosperity in Interwar Dairy Farming and its Repercussions  
 
 The twenty-first century historiography of interwar rural England has 
indicated that prosperity was to be found in dairy farming.  The typical method 
used in the historiography to support claims made about the conditions in 
interwar English agriculture has been to look at contemporary commentaries, 
sometimes in conjunction with general statistics on levels of production at a 
national level.  The typical source of commentary used to demonstrate the 
advantages enjoyed by milk production in the interwar years has been the 
writings of the farmer and journalist, A.G. Street.  Street farmed in Wiltshire, a 
county in southern England but one which has generally been accepted as being 
in the pastoral zone and which was regarded by MAF in a 1927 report into 
agricultural conditions as being a dairy county.21  Brassley uses Street as an 
example of successful dairy farming.22  Street moved, in 1927, from an arable, 
‘four-course system allied to a Hampshire Down flock’, into milk production both 
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for local retail purposes and ‘dispatch by rail to London’.23  Street describes using 
the outdoor bail milking system that Martin sees as having been influential in 
dairy prosperity in the 1930s.24  Another frequently quoted commentary is British 
Agriculture, written in 1938 by Astor and Rowntree.  Wilt quotes Astor and 
Rowntree who stated in their book that milk was the ‘cornerstone’ of the 
agricultural industry by 1938 and saw the Milk Marketing Board (MMB), 
introduced in 1933, as being the basis of farmers’ success, even though they 
perceived it as acting against the interests of consumers and in need of 
nationalization.25  Wilt sees the MMB as having been a benefit to farmers by 
bringing high milk prices whilst Brassley, coincidentally, regards the MMB as 
having constituted a ‘success’, with Martin judging that it had brought stability to 
the milk industry.26   
 Some statistical evidence has been used to support claims of prosperity in 
interwar dairy farming made on the basis of contemporary commentary.  Astor 
and Rowntree had provided a statistical justification for their complimentary 
judgement on the importance of milk production, insofar as they stated that it 
was ‘accounting for over one quarter of the total agricultural output’ at the time 
of writing in 1938.27  Both Brassley and Martin refer to statistical evidence, using 
the increasing output of milk and numbers of milk cattle in the 1930s to 
challenge, in Martin’s words, ‘the conventional view that the decade was a period 
                                        
23 Street, Farmer’s Glory, pp.39, 249, 263, 281. 
24 Martin, Development, pp.6, 13, 35.  
25 Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture, p.251. 
26 Brassley, British Farming, pp.194-5; Wilt, A.F., Food for War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p.50; Brassley, ‘Output’, p.63; Martin, Development, pp.24-5.  
27 Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture, p.251. 
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of unremitting gloom for the agricultural sector’.28  Such evidence is to be found 
in the Agricultural Statistics; for example, the commentary included with the 
statistics for 1923 states, ‘For the third year in succession the dairy herd has 
been increased’, and, ‘There was a further increase in the number of cattle 
during the twelve months ending 4th June 1923.’29  The number of dairy cattle, 
as the commonly used indicator as to the health of the dairy industry, would be 
expected to have increased between 1919 and 1939; this is an expectation 
fulfilled on the national scale, according to the Agricultural Statistics which show 
cows in milk in England as a whole to have increased in number from 1,693,808 
to 1,977,224, a considerable increase equal to 17 percent.  The logical 
expectation would be that any prosperity in the dairy industry would have been 
likely to be enjoyed in counties located within the pastoral region that were 
renowned in 1919 for dairy farming and that such prosperity would be reflected 
in the statistical indicators for those counties.  The increases may have been the 
result, either, of expanding herd sizes, or of farmers turning to dairy farming, as 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters, but this chapter will examine the 
increases in dairy cattle in relation to two counties renowned for the production 
of milk on small farms: the West Riding and Lancashire.  The reputations 
enjoyed at the time by both the West Riding of Yorkshire and of Lancashire as 
dairy farming counties leads to the expectation that they would have enjoyed 
                                        
28 Brassley, British Farming, p.194; Martin, Development, pp.6, 13, 35.  
29 MAF, Agricultural Statistics: Report on the Acreage under Crops and the Number of Live Stock 
in England and Wales, 1923, Volume 58 (London: HMSO, 1923), p.23. 
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highly prosperous conditions given the considerable expansion of the dairy 
industry.30   
 Contemporary sources support the reputation of the West Riding and 
Lancashire as prominent milk producing counties.  R.B. Forrester wrote in one of 
MAF’s Economic Series in 1927 of six areas nationally that were seen to consume 
a large volume of milk, one being the West Riding which was seen to be 
‘drawing on local supplies’, with another, Lancashire, being one of the chief 
counties for the production and sale of milk.31  Both the counties and various 
locations within them are used frequently as examples of centres of milk 
production and distribution in these Economic Series.  The agricultural 
economist, P. Manning, wrote the contribution on Lancashire to the publication, 
Smallholdings Studies, in 1938, stating plainly, ‘Dairy farming in Lancashire has 
always been one of the chief elements in its agriculture.  It is now much the 
most important.’32  Forrester makes reference to Lancashire towns, such as 
Preston and Wigan, as well as to the fact that the Lancashire conurbation 
creates a market so large that some milk from the West Riding was even being 
sold over the Pennines in Lancashire; this implies the ability of the West Riding 
to produce large quantities, particularly as Forrester has already noted the 
considerable demands upon the supply from the West Riding of the county’s own 
cities of Leeds, Bradford and Sheffield.33  The West Riding town of Hebden 
                                        
30 Table 3.1; Table 4.1. 
31 MAF, Economic Series No.16, pp.11, 13. 
32 Manning, P., ‘An Economic Survey of Poultry and Dairy Holdings in Lancashire’, in 
Smallholdings Studies: Reports of Surveys Undertaken by some Agricultural Economists, ed. by 
Viscount Astor and Rowntree, B.S. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1938), pp.96-107, 
(p.104). 
33 MAF, Economic Series No.16, pp.13, 14. 
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Bridge is noted as a supplier of milk to industrial districts in a 1925 Economic 
Series pamphlet on cooperation in agricultural marketing whilst nearby Halifax is 
used in a 1933 pamphlet as an example of an area of high milk demand that was 
managing self-sufficiently.34  The West Riding’s Huddersfield Daily Examiner 
carried a feature in August 1933, ‘A Day’s Work on the Farm’, which states 
plainly, ‘All the farms round here are smallholdings and dairy farms.’35  The 
status of the two industrial Pennines counties as centres of dairy production is 
cemented by statistics that show that 12.5 percent of the total number of cows 
in milk in England were to be found in the combined herds of the West Riding 
and Lancashire in 1919.36  
Table 4.1 Acreage under Crops and Grass, Acreage of Arable Land, and 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle: Yorkshire West Riding 1919-1939* 
 
1919 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
    
Total Acreage of Crops and Grass 1149611 1027380 -122231 
Acreage Under Arable Cultivation 410916 293185 -117731 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle 94936 100484 5548 
    
*Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23).    
 
 The 17 percent national rise in numbers of milking cows and the 
insistence in recent work upon the existence of encouraging interwar conditions 
for farms in milk production might lead to the conclusion that the agricultural 
                                        
34 MAF, Economic Series No.38, p.28; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Economic Series 
No.5: Report on the Co-operative Purchase of Agricultural Requisites (London: HMSO, 1925), 
p.30.   
35 Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 8 August 1933. 
36 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, 
Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23).    
Chapter 4: Consequences of Arable Farming Difficulties 
192 
 
area in the West Riding and Lancashire might have expanded, but this is not 
borne out by statistics.  The West Riding actually saw shrinkage of the area 
under its crops and grass of more than 10.5 percent whilst Lancashire’s 
agriculture lost over 13 percent of its land; however, neither of these statistics is 
necessarily indicative of a decline in dairy farming in the two counties.  Evidence 
is available of land being sacrificed to increased intensity of dairy farming in 
parts of England between the Wars in a system whereby imported feedstuffs 
were given to milking cows.  The use of imported feedstuffs was widespread in 
the West Riding and was commented upon by G.C.A. Robertson who noted in 
1928 the large quantities bought in on small farms in the county37 whilst Fletcher 
concludes that it was the low prices of imported feed that contributed most 
significantly to any success to be found on farms on the uplands of East 
Lancashire.38  The increased intensity of dairy farming involved the 
abandonment of the most marginal land whilst some pasture became classified 
as ‘rough grazing’, to be used simply as a means of occasional supplementary 
feed39 and for exercising animals.40  The consequence was that the West Riding 
saw a 38 percent increase in its acreage of rough grazing and Lancashire 32 
percent.41   
 The national expansion of the dairy herd would suggest the possibility 
that new farms may have been created in the West Riding and Lancashire of the 
small sizes often associated with dairy farming and that numbers of farms of less 
                                        
37 Robertson, p.58. 
38 Fletcher, ‘Economic Development’, Summary [no pn. in Summary]. 
39 Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture, p.54. 
40 Martin, Development, pp.13-14. 
41 Table 3.2; Table 4.1. 
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than 50 acres might have increased.  An actual increase in numbers did take 
place in the category of the very smallest farms - of less than five acres - in 
Lancashire but this was due to the poultry keeping that was a success in the 
county during the interwar years; Rowell wrote on the poultry industry in 
Table 4.2 Acreage under Crops and Grass, Acreage of Arable Land, and 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle: Lancashire 1919-1939* 
 
1919 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
    
Total Acreage of Crops and Grass 780268 677164 -103104 
Acreage Under Arable Cultivation 296840 181474 -115366 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle 116457 128568 12111 
    
*Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23).    
 
Lancashire in 1933 in the MAF journal, Agriculture, noting, ‘The unit aimed at for 
a poultry holding is from three to five acres.’42  The expansion of poultry 
holdings has the potential to disguise any decreases in dairy farm numbers in 
the northern counties.43  The increase in Lancashire’s smallest holdings is 
accounted for by a rapid expansion of the poultry and egg industry in the 
county, made possible by the same cheap imported feed available to pastoral 
farmers, a success story replicated to some degree in the West Riding;44 
examples of schemes set up for smallholders to raise poultry on plots of as little 
as half an acre at locations such as Maghull in Lancashire and Castleford in the 
                                        
42 Rowell, C.W., ‘Small Poultry Holdings in Lancashire’, Agriculture: Journal of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, 40, (1933), 816-822, (p.817). 
43 Howkins, ‘Death and Rebirth?’, p.13. 
44 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Economic Series No.10; Report on Egg Marketing in 
England and Wales (London: HMSO, 1926), p.92. 
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West Riding are to be found in MAF documents.45  Any apparent increases or 
stability in farm numbers attributable to the creation of poultry holdings might 
erroneously be thought to reflect prosperity amongst small dairy farmers and 
increases in their numbers.   
 Imaginary increases in small dairy farm numbers such as those resulting 
actually from expansion of poultry farming might be thought to have involved, 
where possible, expansion onto land on the margins of the existing agricultural 
area but this inference is undermined by the shrinkage of the agricultural areas 
of the West Riding and Lancashire and by the expansion of rough grazing, 
mentioned above; however, this is not to say that new small dairy farms may 
not have been created anyway.  Farm creation would have been possible by 
means other than simple expansion of the total agricultural area, including by 
way of a similar operation of the fragmentation of large farms to the one 
undertaken by A.G. Street at the point that he turned to dairy farming, noted 
above.46  Fragmentation would have created the smaller units that were 
regarded as being most compatible with dairy farming.  One common way for 
farms to have been fragmented into multiple holdings was as part of the scheme 
for the resettlement of servicemen on County Council smallholdings after the 
First World War, some of which were advocated as becoming dairy farms, 
notably by landowner Christopher Turnor.47  The news journal, Land and Liberty, 
noted in January 1927 that arable farms used for growing potatoes during the 
                                        
45 NA/MAF/48/104. 
46 This chapter, above. 
47 NA/MAF/48/26, Departmental Committee appointed by the President of the Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries to consider the Settlement or Employment on the Land in England and 
Wales of Discharged Sailors and Soldiers; Introduction and Final Report, 1916; Minutes of 
Evidence. 
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War had been bought up at high prices after it for conversion to smallholdings48 
and potatoes had been commonly grown in West Lancashire on farms, such as 
on the Speke Estate.49  The acquisition of large farms for breaking up into 
smallholdings is typified by the purchase by the Ministry of Agriculture of the 
Guy’s Hospital Estate in Lincoln-Holland, whereby over 6,000 acres were bought 
which had formerly made up 20 farms, eight of which were over 300 acres in 
size and five of which were over 200 acres with only one under 50 acres.50  
Considerable numbers of smallholdings had been created in Lancashire and the 
West Riding in this way, all of which, it can be assumed, would still have been in 
existence in 1939 since there is no evidence of any national policy of dismantling 
or offloading them during the interwar years other than through sales to tenants 
which numbered less than 1,000 in total, nationally.51  The sales were driven by 
the ideology of the creation of petty private property that abounded in the 
Conservative Party52 and would, anyway, have left the owner-occupied holdings 
to contribute to total numbers of farms; in 1932, Lancashire had 428 
smallholdings and the West Riding, 548.53 
 Any new dairy farms, whether created as part of Government policy or 
otherwise, would have been able to be let ‘readily’, according to a MAF report 
into the extent of agricultural depression in 1927, whilst the opposite was true of 
arable farms, especially of ‘very large farms comprising a considerable area of 
                                        
48 Land and Liberty, January 1927. 
49 Mutch, A., ‘Paternalism and Class on the Speke Estate, 1870-1914’, in Rural Social Change and 
Conflicts since 1500, ed. by Charlesworth, A. (Hull: Conference of Regional and Local Historians, 
1982), pp.108-24, (p.112); Mutch, ‘Rural Society’, p.24.  
50 NA/MAF/48/330. 
51 NA/MAF/48/104. 
52 NA/D/4/8, Committee on Agricultural Credit, 1922. 
53 Smith, N.R., Land, pp.234-6. 
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arable land’.54  The same report stated, ‘There is demand for small farms 
everywhere’ and, ‘The demand for small farms is distinctly good’, and pointed to 
ongoing difficulties on the kind of arable farm that might be broken up to form 
smaller dairy holdings: ‘Arable farmers occupying over 300 acres are generally 
speaking, in the most difficult position and there is a noticeable tendency for 
such men to reduce their liabilities by taking smaller farms.’  Farms of over 300 
acres in size saw a net fall in England of fourteen percent between 1919 and 
1939, equal in proportion to the overall fall in farm numbers but much higher 
than figures for farms of 50 to 300 acres.  Declining numbers of the largest 
farms, when seen in the light of the desire of farmers for smaller farms, are 
consistent with the notion that farms were being created to fulfil demand, at 
least during the 1920s as detailed in the 1927 MAF report; a 1926 MAF report 
confirms the existence of this demand by demonstrating that purchase prices for 
small farms were relatively high, agricultural land being expected on average to 
command about 22 years’ purchase whilst, ‘Small farms, and accommodation 
land, for which a spirited competition is still usually found, will make 24-25 years 
purchase.’55  New small farms might well be dairy farms, a suggestion consistent 
with the consequent facility to buy the necessary livestock with money saved on 
rent or gained in equity from downsizing. 
 Prosperity in dairying in conjunction with the apparent fragmentation of 
large farms into smaller holdings well suited to dairying and thus to a growth in 
farm numbers might lead to the expectation that farm numbers in dairy counties 
                                        
54 NA/MAF/48/75. 
55 NA/MAF/48/74, Method of Arriving at the Capital Value of Agricultural Land, 1926. 
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would have contradicted the national trend for decreases and remained stable or 
even have increased, in spite of the overall falls in the counties’ agricultural 
acreage.  Even the national expansion of milk production might raise the 
expectation of stability or increase in farm numbers in the West Riding and 
Lancashire, especially as small farms had continued to be popular in the north in 
Table 4.3  Numbers of Farms in Large and Small Size Categories in Yorkshire West 
Riding 1919-1939* 
  
Number of Holdings 
 
Year 1919 1931 
Change 
1919-1931 
1939 
Change 
1931-1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
Farm Size 
       
1-5 acres 
 
4465 3747 -718 3016 -731 -1449 
5-20 acres 
 
7886 6518 -1368 5563 -955 -2323 
20-50 acres 
 
5189 4609 -580 4255 -354 -934 
1-50 acres 
 
17540 14874 -2666 12834 -2040 -4706 
        50 acres and above 
 
6530 6298 -232 6266 -32 -264 
        All Farms 
 
24070 21172 -2898 19100 -2072 -4970 
        * Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 
1931, Vol.66, Table 8 (pp.64-5); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9). 
the early and mid-1920s, according to MAF.56  The surprise is that farm numbers 
fell considerably in both northern dairy counties between 1919 and 1939.  The 
fall was higher in the West Riding which saw a net fall of over 20.5 percent, a 
figure considerably higher than the, already sizeable, national average net fall in 
farm numbers of 14 percent.  The net fall in the West Riding was actually higher 
also than the calculated national gross rate of fall of 18 percent.  Lancashire saw 
a net fall of almost 17 percent in farms of over five acres in size.   Falls in 
numbers of farms are surprising given the strength of the dairy industry in the 
                                        
56 NA/MAF/48/75. 
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West Riding and Lancashire.  The great dairying reputations and the extensive 
herds of the two counties might lead to the assumption that the two counties 
would have played a significant part in the expansion of the national dairy herd 
between the Wars and, indeed, falls in farm numbers were not matched by 
decreases in numbers of dairy cattle.  Both counties saw overall increases in the 
size of their dairy herds in the period between 1919 and 1939.  Increases in the 
numbers of milking cows occurred although neither county saw anything as 
dramatic as the 17 percent increase across England.  Lancashire’s percentage 
increase was 10 and actual numbers went up from 116,457 to 128,568, whilst 
the West Riding’s increases were remarkably small, in the circumstances, 
showing numbers of milking cows up from 94,936 to 100,484, an increase equal 
to only 6 percent.57   
Table 4.4  Numbers of Farms in Large and Small Size Categories in Lancashire 1919-
1939* 
  
Number of Holdings 
 
Year 1919 1931 
Change 
1919-1931 
1939 
Change 
1931-1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
Farm Size 
       
1-5 acres 
 
2519 2966 447 3190 224 671 
5-20 acres 
 
5306 4537 -769 4094 -443 -1212 
20-50 acres 
 
5382 4718 -664 4393 -325 -989 
1-50 acres 
 
13207 12221 -986 11677 -544 -1530 
        50 acres and above 
 
5210 4907 -303 4740 -167 -470 
        All Farms 
 
18417 17128 -1289 16417 -711 -2000 
        * Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 
1931, Vol.66, Table 8 (pp.64-5); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9). 
 
                                        
57 Table 4.1; Table 4.2 and *Sources; Table 4.3 and *Sources; Table 4.4 and *Sources. 
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 Falls in numbers of northern counties’ farms would appear to be 
inconsistent with increases in the numbers of milking cows in the West Riding 
and Lancashire, relatively small though the increases may have been in national 
terms, and with prosperity in dairy farming overall.  The explanation for farm 
disappearance lies, quite significantly and almost paradoxically, in the very 
expansion of dairy farming itself.  Winstanley has shown that opportunities had 
presented themselves for small farms to flourish and to supply fresh milk to local 
industrial populations in the late nineteenth century, including in Lancashire and 
the West Riding, and it might be expected that this would have continued in the 
interwar period.58  The interwar expansion of dairy farming in England which, it 
has been noted, is demonstrated by the 17 percent national increase in dairy 
cattle numbers, took place in very different conditions to those prevailing before 
the First World War, being accompanied by the entry of larger scale arable 
farmers into the dairy market.  A tendency for an interwar switch by farmers 
from arable to pastoral agriculture is confirmed by the Lincoln and Boston 
Guardian in January 1931 which carried an article entitled, ‘The Change to 
Grass’.  The newspaper made reference to ‘a writer in The Times who says that 
steadily England is being converted to grassland’, continuing, ‘Unless steps are 
taken to put wheat growing on a reasonably profitable basis, he says we must 
expect a more rapid drift from arable farming.’59  There is further evidence to 
demonstrate that the fall in the arable acreage in England was due to farms and 
farmland being switched into dairying, thereby increasing the competition for 
existing small dairy farmers.  Douet, Taylor and Chapman have all noted a 
                                        
58 Winstanley, p.175. 
59 Lincoln and Boston Guardian, 10 January 1931. 
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tendency for farmers to move from arable into dairy farming during the interwar 
period.60  An investigation of land values of 1926 had noted the development of 
conditions whereby conversion of farms from large arable holdings to dairy had 
been likely, stating, ‘Today large farms are almost unsaleable, whilst medium 
sized farms comprising a large proportion of arable land fetch only about 20 
years purchase.’61  Henry Willett was clearly acquainted with farmers turning to 
dairy farming; Willett had said in 1933 at the annual meeting of the British 
Friesian Society, ‘that “farmers were so accustomed to their bank balances being 
on the wrong side that they were more than surprised to find that any venture 
connected with farming (e.g. dairy farming) was able to pay its way”.’62 
 The reality appears to have been that farmers who had previously been 
dedicated to arable farming were entering the fresh milk market; this was 
occurring by as early as 1923 when The Dairy World and the British Dairy 
Farmer stated that ‘[i]n many districts arable farmers have been driven from 
their old habit of growing cereal crops by the extremely low prices during past 
years to dairy farming as the only way in which they could live.’63  Jolly’s 
judgement that the dairy herd had become by the early 1930s the ‘most 
important enterprise’ on many arable farms64 is one with which Fletcher 
concurs.65  Increased competition from arable farmers entering the milk market 
caused milk prices to fall and caused some farm businesses ultimately to fail 
leading to the disappearance of farms.  The development by arable farmers of 
                                        
60 Douet, pp.86, 190-5; Taylor, D., pp.62-3; Chapman, p.286. 
61 NA/MAF/48/74. 
62 Brackets in original. Stanford, pp.121-2. 
63 Dairy World and the British Dairy Farmer, 17 December 1923. 
64 Jolly, A.L., ‘Milk Producer-Retailers’ Profits’, Farm Economist, 1, (1933-5), 163-5, (p.163). 
65 Fletcher, ‘Economic Development’, p.219. 
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part or all of their business as milk production might be expected to have 
required the conversion of a portion of arable farms to grazing land.  The fall in 
the arable acreage experienced nationally would certainly be expected to have 
extended to dairy counties, despite these counties having had a smaller arable 
acreage than those in the arable region in the first place.  The arable acreage in 
the West Riding and Lancashire did indeed undergo a significant decline during 
the interwar period.  Lancashire, which had 38 percent of its agricultural area in 
arable in 1919, witnessed a fall of 115,366 acres or 39 percent in its arable 
acreage by 1939.  The arable decrease in the West Riding, where arable land 
made up 36 percent of farmland in 1919, was of 117,731 acres or 29 percent.  
The expectation might arise that evidence of the movement of arable farmers 
into dairy production would be provided by statistics showing an expansion in 
the acreage of grazing land to accompany the decrease in arable land nationally 
of 26 percent.  The decline in the arable acreage was not matched by substantial 
increase in grazing land in the northern dairy counties, however; in actuality, the 
West Riding’s permanent grass declined negligibly from 738,695 acres in 1919 to 
734,196 in 1939 whilst Lancashire saw only a small increase from 483,428 acres 
to 495,690 over the same period.66   
 The failure of the grazing acreage to expand despite the conversion of 
arable farms to dairy farming is explicable.  Grigg has noted that there may have 
taken place considerable erroneous categorization of the temporary grass 
associated with arable farming as ‘rough grazing’ in the interwar Agricultural 
                                        
66 Table 4.1; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23). 
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Statistics;67 there is little reason to suppose that such a process would not have 
extended to arable land that had been converted to grass for dairy cattle on 
farms formerly devoted to arable farming.  Arable farmers who took on a dairy 
herd and used some former arable land as grass but designated it as rough 
grazing would have been contributing to the actual contraction of the national or 
regional arable acreage; however, by failing to show the concurrent increase in 
grassland, they would not have demonstrated the true extent of increased 
pastoral farming and, furthermore, such behaviour would have artificially 
exaggerated the fall in the total acreage of crops and grass.  The expansion of 
rough grazing in Lancashire by 34,181 acres, or 32 percent, and the West Riding 
by 93,921, or 38 percent, compensated somewhat for the fall in the arable 
acreage noted in the foregoing paragraph and for the falls in acreages of crops 
and grass noted previously, the conversion of arable land taking place for use as 
grazing for dairy cattle but with some of the land being designated as rough 
grazing.  Some arable land may, indeed, have fallen genuinely into the category 
of ‘rough grazings’ because, as has been noted above, cheap imported feedstuffs 
were available as a substitute for fresh grass and hay and some land would 
become surplus to requirements as a result.68   
 A good indication of the survival and growth of large arable farms which 
were acquiring dairy herds and entering the milk market would be overall 
increases in average farm size; such increases occurred in both the West Riding 
and Lancashire between 1919 and 1939.  Indeed, the evidence seen and noted 
                                        
67 Grigg, ‘Farm Size’, p.182. 
68 This chapter, above; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23). 
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of the adoption of dairy systems by arable farmers suggests strongly that the 
disappearance of 26 percent of the arable acreage in England between the Wars 
should not generate automatically the assumption that falls in the arable acreage 
translate simply into arable farmers going out of business, especially in those 
northern counties scrutinised so far, here.  The pattern for the conversion of 
farms and land from arable to milk production had been occurring in the South 
Rossendale area, to the north of Bury in East Lancashire, during the late 
nineteenth century, according to Hamilton,69 and the reputation of Lancashire as 
a centre of milk production gives no reason to believe that this would not have 
continued in the interwar years.  Whilst the average size of farms of over five 
acres in extent in Lancashire increased by 2 acres, or just over 4 percent, from 
48.5 to 50.5 acres, average farm size in the West Riding increased between 
1919 and 1939 from just below 48 acres to almost 54, an increase of over 12.5 
percent.70  Large farm survival and growth is indicated by these increases in 
average farm size which were occurring despite the disappearance of substantial 
numbers of farms, as noted.  Arable farms had been, traditionally, larger than 
dairy farms in pastoral counties, just as they were in the arable region,71 so 
increases in farm size suggest that land from failing small farms was being used 
to enlarge farms formerly specialising in arable production.  The disappearance 
of significant numbers of farms appears to have resulted only in small amounts 
of land being removed per farm from the overall recorded acreage resulting in 
                                        
69 Hamilton, S., ‘The Historical Geography of South Rossendale, 1780-1900’ (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of Manchester, 1974), pp.180, 188. 
70 Table 3.2. 
71 Mutch, ‘Paternalism’, pp.113, 121; Chapman, p.197; Long, W.H., A Survey of the Agriculture of 
Yorkshire (County Agricultural Surveys, No.6) (London: Royal Agricultural Society of England, 
1969), p.63.  
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increases in average farm size which are suggestive of the survival of the larger 
arable farms but with the likelihood that they would have continued mainly as 
dairy holdings.  Guymer has commented upon the amalgamation of farms to 
create bigger holdings in East Lancashire’s Rossendale area between 1900 and 
1965 and upon the use of farm buildings for non-agricultural purposes, indicating 
that the assimilation of land from failed farms into expanding holdings was 
taking place.72  The decrease of the total acreage of crops and grass alongside 
the increase in the area of rough grazing in Lancashire and the West Riding 
suggests that some, but not all, of the land released from disappearing farms 
was being used to augment or maintain the acreage of existing arable farms as 
part of a switch to dairying; concurrently, some land was being reassigned as 
rough grazing, particularly in the West Riding.73   
 Rough grazing has not been included thus far in the calculation of 
average farm size but the possibility that some farmland was erroneously 
designated as rough grazing makes its inclusion in a calculation of average farm 
size of some relevance.  A figure for Lancashire’s average farm size acreage 
inclusive of rough grazing is somewhat speculative due to the high incidence of 
poultry farming and egg production on farms of fewer than five acres in size 
which would have required little land but indicates that farms grew quite 
significantly; calculations show that average size of farms of over five acres in 
size, inclusive of rough grazing, rose by 14 percent between 1919 and 1939, 
increasing from just over 55 acres to 63 acres.  The average size of West Riding 
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farms increased by 23.5 percent, expanding from 58 acres to 71.5 acres when 
calculations include rough grazing.  The statistical data observed that shows 
increases in average farm size at this point implies that small farms were more 
likely to fail than larger ones in the established dairy counties of the West Riding 
and Lancashire, whilst the evidence on expanding herd size and from general 
written histories and interwar contemporary sources, noted above, suggests that 
arable farmers in these counties would have been turning successfully to dairy 
farming on their larger acreages.74  
 Data on the actual sizes of disappearing farms can be analysed for 
confirmation of the tendency for small farms in northern dairy counties to 
disappear at a disproportionately high rate between 1919 and 1939.  Farms of 
fewer than 50 acres in extent in the West Riding saw a net fall in their numbers 
of 4,706, equal to 27 percent or over 1 in 4, whilst numbers in Lancashire of 
farms of between five and 50 acres can be seen to have fallen by 2201, meaning 
that 20.5 percent of them or 1 in 5 ceased to operate.  Large numbers of farms 
of less than 50 acres in extent were engaged in the production of milk in the two 
northern counties between the Wars.  J.J. Green commented in his Agriculture in 
Lancashire of 1929 of the farms in East Lancashire being ‘small and almost 
invariably developed for milk production’75 whilst MAF reports noted the small 
scale of dairy farms in the West Riding, commenting on the milk farms in the 
Calder Valley which were of an average size of 20 to 25 acres.76  Huxtable wrote 
of fresh milk production as ‘perhaps the most extensive single department of 
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farming in Yorkshire’ and that ‘small holdings’ on the fringes of towns were 
heavily concentrated,77 ‘small holdings’ being a term used to define farms of 
under 50 acres in size.78   
 The prevalence of small-scale producers in the two northern counties is 
demonstrated by the number of producer retailers in operation selling milk 
directly to customers; the small scale of farms of producer retailers is 
demonstrated by their constituting 40 percent of registered producers of the Milk 
Marketing Board in 1935 but producing only 17 percent of the milk for liquid 
consumption, with many farming as few as four cows.79  Fletcher notes that 200 
producer retailers were working in the Preston area, alone,80 and Forrester 
commented upon Wigan and Preston as centres of producer retailing of milk and 
upon a ‘feature’ of the West Riding being that ‘it is fed mainly by local supplies’ 
whilst a MAF report on markets and fairs noted that milk was ‘sold direct to 
consumers’ in the West Riding.81  The weekly newspaper, Milk Producer Retailer, 
demonstrated that its audience was made up substantially of small farmers in its 
edition of October 1935, writing of the ongoing political danger to ‘the small 
man’82 which included the ‘occupants of these small grass farms in the Pennines 
who have been in the past peaceful and content to carry on their small 
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businesses in the age-old way.’83  MAF documents from 1935 reveal that many 
producer retailers wishing to join the MMB were farming four cows or fewer and 
that some had been retailing less than a gallon of milk per day84 whilst Manning 
noted that the farms of eleven to 17.5 acres that he had visited in Lancashire in 
1938, ‘usually belong to the retail producer.’85  The comparison of the fates of 
the small farms characterised by the presence of milk producer retailers with 
larger farms is stark.  Lancashire farms of more than 50 acres in size witnessed 
losses that ran at 9 percent over the period from 1919 to 1939, a rate of loss of 
less than half that of the county’s small farms, whilst the comparison in the West 
Riding was even more striking with the rate of disappearance of farms sized at 
over 50 acres being only 4 percent, less than a sixth of that of the county’s small 
farms.86   
 The assumption can also be made that the actual numerical decline of 
small farms in the West Riding and Lancashire across the interwar period must 
have been higher than in much of the rest of the country since small farms were 
so prevalent in these two counties.  Note should be taken of the proportion of 
the total number of farms that was made up by farms of one to 50 acres in the 
two counties under observation.  The proportion of small farms making up the 
total of farms in England in 1919 was 64.5 whilst the same farm-size group 
made up 71.5 percent of farms in Lancashire and 73 percent in the West Riding; 
therefore, not only did a larger proportion of the small farms in existence in the 
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two counties disappear but small farms made up a larger proportion of the total 
number of disappearing farms in Lancashire and the West Riding than was the 
case in the country as a whole.  
 
The Milk Market in England, 1920 to 1933 
 
 The writers of the twenty-first century historiography have justified their 
claims that dairy farming was successful between the Wars by pointing to 
increases in output that took place in the dairy farming sector, as a whole, over 
the period; however, statistics on small farm failure in the West Riding and 
Lancashire show that success was by no means guaranteed for all farmers 
operating in the dairy field.  The mixed success in the dairying counties and the 
disproportionately high incidence of failure of small farms shown by statistics for 
England as a whole give rise to the suggestion that varying fortunes may have 
been experienced in dairy production elsewhere, a suggestion to which evidence 
on conditions in the milk market between 1920 and 1933  lend support.   
 The Grigg Commission, ordered in 1932 to investigate the potential 
reorganization of the milk market, had pointed to the intense competition in the 
market87 and evidence shows that dairy farmers were affected by falling prices.  
The increased dairy production that occurred during the 1920s was not being 
driven by an increase in consumption of fresh milk88 but by an increase in supply 
from farmers moving into the dairy industry to take advantage of the price of 
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milk which, though it remained high until 1929 when compared with other 
agricultural produce,89 had been falling gradually since 1922.90  The committee, 
established by MAF’s forerunner, the Board of Agriculture, to assess the 
possibility of settling discharged servicemen on the land after the First World 
War, was well aware of the potential for the expansion of milk production:  
Milk is one of the few articles of which the home producer has a practical 
monopoly, and it cannot be doubted that for some years past the supply 
has not kept pace with the demand.  At present there is an abnormal 
shortage owing to the lack of labour and transport difficulties, but even in 
normal times it is sometimes the case that cottagers and other residents 
in the rural districts find difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply of milk 
for their own needs, owing to the fact that all milk produced on the large 
farms is sent away to the towns.91  
 Farmers clearly understood the  potential for expanding their supply, one 
such being W.S. Abbott, a good example of a large-scale farmer who moved into 
dairying between the Wars in order to increase his lines of production on his 
farm of 580 acres between Peterborough and Stanford.  Abbott’s admission that 
he suffered a ‘slight recession in the early thirties’ that was associated with the 
introduction of dairying is indicative of the adverse conditions that were affecting 
all dairy farmers at this time but which would have affected specialist small milk 
producers much more badly than those large farmers who were supplementing 
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arable farming with dairy herds, such as Abbott.92  Indeed, the difficult 
conditions for small-scale farmers resulted from the entry into dairying of such 
large-scale farmers but this had a knock-on effect in the competition generated 
amongst small-scale farmers themselves and, in the nature of competition, a 
reactive effect on large-scale farmers.  The Reorganization Commission for Milk, 
charged with preparing the dairy industry for centralised distribution under the 
Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933, had recognised the general tendency amongst 
producer retailers to undercut one another in offering low prices to consumers, 
squeezing their own profit margins in the process.  The Home Farmer wrote of 
the rampant undercutting that had been practised before the advent of the Milk 
Marketing Board, of which it was the journal.93  Such undercutting would have 
driven down the prices other distributors and retailers could ask consumers to 
pay, squeezing their profits and, as a consequence, reducing the prices they 
would be prepared to pay to farmers for milk.94   
 No regulation of prices paid to farmers for milk existed after 1920 
although the NFU and the National Federation of Dairymen’s Associations 
negotiated recommended yearly prices between 1922 and 193295 through the 
Permanent Joint Milk Committee, with the NFU making great play of its role in 
protecting dairy farmers.96  The reality was that no recommendation made by 
the Committee was binding on either the farmer or the distributor97 and that 
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contracts made by distributors with milk farmers were often to buy milk at prices 
much lower than those recorded as having been the prevailing ones at the time98 
by reference to the Committee’s records, such as in the estimates of Astor and 
Rowntree.99  The Grigg Commission of 1932 recognised that producers were at 
the mercy of distributors when negotiating the prices they were to be paid, 
saying, ‘the financial position of many milk producers is at present so weak, and 
their dependence on the liquid market so complete, that they cannot afford the 
risk of failure to obtain a contract.’100  The expansion of numbers of dairy cattle 
in England shown in the Agricultural Statistics would appear to contradict 
evidence on falling prices and to suggest that prices were high enough to 
encourage the expansion of production but the reality would have been that 
falling prices meant that producers would have had to expand their production 
virtually continually merely to maintain their levels of financial return.  The 
consequences of the competition had been falls in prices which affected profit 
margins for small producers to the point from which, as the statistics for the 
interwar period show, they could no longer continue farming.   
 Problems for small farmers caused by falling prices during the 1920s 
became more obvious when they were exacerbated by the entry of new, large-
scale competitors after events in 1929.  Milk was used in two ways, either to be 
retailed for liquid consumption or to be manufactured into dairy products, such 
as butter and cheese.   The collapse of world cheese prices in 1929 began a fall 
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in prices for manufacturing milk which reached very low levels by 1931.101  
Large-scale producers in the process of expansion would have found themselves 
with surpluses of milk for which, according to the prices in their contracts which 
were agreed yearly on the basis of the previous year’s levels of production, they 
would previously have received the price negotiated for manufacturing milk 
which had been only slightly lower than for liquid milk before 1929.  The collapse 
in prices for manufacturing milk caused distributors to change the way of 
calculating the manufacturing price, to the detriment of the producers.102   
 The change in calculation methods resulted in falls in the prices paid for 
manufacturing milk.  The change encouraged many farmers operating in 
counties where both farms and dairy herds were large to abandon their 
contracts and to enter into the liquid milk market where prices were initially 
unaffected, sending milk to city railway terminals for sale for the liquid market, 
taking their chances with prices which fluctuated daily.103  Astor and Rowntree 
point to farmers in the western counties, such as Gloucestershire and Devon, 
entering into the liquid milk market in this way, sending their milk to London.104   
The report of the Reorganization Commission for Milk stated that producer 
retailers, whose numbers have been shown to be constituted disproportionately 
of small farmers, were tending to operate more on the fringes of the urban areas 
and less in the centre, when it was written in 1933; this suggests that the 
markets of the local producers were being squeezed by distributors selling milk 
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arriving from outside the immediate districts.105  Venn noted in 1923 that 
midlands farmers had been sacrificing their grain acreages to the production of 
fresh produce to convey to urban districts since the end of the nineteenth 
century and that latterly they had turned to supplying milk to these areas.106  By 
1930, virtually all the urban, industrial areas were being supplied with milk for 
the liquid market from counties other than those in which they were situated; 
London was supplied from as far away as Staffordshire.107  The nature of the 
problem affecting producer retailers was the same for small farmers who were 
not specifically direct retailers, as references to them from the time attest; the 
trade journal, Milk Producer Retailer, is replete with references to ‘small 
dairymen and producer retailers’, ‘the small man’ and ‘the ordinary small 
producer retailer’.108 
 Smaller farmers as well as producer retailers, a large proportion of whom 
it has been shown were small-scale farmers, had specialised in the production of 
milk for liquid consumption in local markets in which they had formerly enjoyed 
protection as a result of the perishability of their product.  Producer retailers, in 
particular, had commonly been supposed to have enjoyed significant benefits 
from having their own rounds compared to farmers who sold their milk 
wholesale, according to the agricultural economist A.L. Jolly, writing in the early 
1930s.  Jolly was sceptical about the general understanding that these benefits 
were substantial and saw the existence of such benefits to be somewhat limited, 
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if not illusory.  Jolly enumerated several factors that cut into the additional profit 
margin that he saw as being commonly supposed to pertain to the producer 
retailer, including the expense of delivery and of giving customers generous 
measures, the cost of equipment in the form of vans and bottles and the cost of 
labour paid for looking after and sterilising the equipment.  Other additional 
costs to the producer retailer were incurred through the need to maintain a ‘level 
delivery’, that is, to ensure an adequate milk supply for the delivery round; the 
purchase of concentrates in order to overfeed the cattle sometimes resulted in 
low price sales of surplus milk, but the buying of milk at higher prices from other 
farms to supply the milk round’s orders at times of a shortage of supply from the 
producer retailer’s own herd was also a common necessity.109 
 Producer retailers and other local farmers had already been feeling the 
competition from those larger scale farmers who had taken advantage of 
improved motor transport after the First World War to bring milk to local markets 
as well as from milk brought in to urban centres by rail.110  These markets would 
now have been awash with milk from the new sources of large-scale 
competition.  Prices fell between 1929 and 1933 as the surplus supply of milk to 
the liquid market increased so that, by 1932, there was, according to Whetham, 
‘chaos in the trade’.111   The only recourse for farmers appeared to be to vote in 
favour of a central agency for the organization of the production and distribution 
of milk which would result in the creation in 1933 of the Milk Marketing Board.    
The issue of a central agency only arose because of the self-inflicted suffering of 
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the large-scale farmers, the implications of which will be examined in the next 
chapter especially in terms of the numbers of small farmers and farms in 
existence.  However, it is important to recognise that small farmers would 
already have been suffering the piecemeal but enduring effects of the expansion 
of milk production in the 1920s and that the events between 1929 and 1933 
would simply have exaggerated them.   
 
Conclusion 
 Significant developments took place in the dairy industry between 1920 
and 1933 that support the conclusions which have been drawn from the 
examination so far in this thesis of the statistics on farm size, arable contraction 
and dairy expansion in the West Riding and Lancashire as well as for England as 
a whole.  Small dairy farms were suffering as a result of arable farmers 
developing dairy businesses and operating in their markets.  Small farm failure 
demonstrates that success was not universal for dairy farmers between the 
Wars. 
 A narrative of decline in arable farming between the First and Second 
World Wars which is a feature of the historiography from the second half of the 
twentieth century is accurate insofar as it has correctly identified a fall in the 
arable acreage across England and Wales as a whole.  The obvious assumption 
to be drawn from this would be that arable farmers would have suffered 
economic hardship and business failure as a result but this chapter has shown 
that this was not necessarily the case, as shown by patterns of agricultural 
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change in milk producing counties of the industrial north of England, such as the 
West Riding and Lancashire.  The reduction in the arable acreages of these 
counties was significant and was greater than the national average but was 
accompanied by an exaggerated rate of disappearance of the small farms that 
were traditionally known to be dairy farms in the industrial north.  Larger farms 
which were traditionally more likely to have included significant arable acreages 
did not suffer on any scale close to that of small farms, as demonstrated by their 
low rate of disappearance and by increases in average farm size.  The survival 
and relative prosperity of larger farms viewed in the light of the increases that 
took place in the numbers of dairy cattle in these dairy counties indicates a 
willingness on the part of arable farmers to enter into the market for the 
production of fresh milk.  The move by arable farmers into dairy farming has 
been shown to be supported by contemporary commentary.  Observations made 
in the twenty-first century historiography upon the interwar period support this 
interpretation insofar as they identify increases in dairy production but there is 
no recognition in this work of the decline of small dairy farmers in the north of 
England that resulted from this process; there has been, until now, no 
recognition of the tendency for arable farms to change substantially to dairy in 
the industrial north during the interwar period at all nor upon the exaggerated 
disappearance of small farmers.   
 The propensity for arable farms to move into dairying in pastoral counties 
appears to have had a highly detrimental effect upon the livelihoods of small 
dairy farmers, taking the experiences of the West Riding and Lancashire as 
examples, and it is no coincidence that, as a result of their earlier roles as arable 
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farms, these newer, more successful, additions to the market for dairy 
production would have been larger than the existing dairy farms.  The case may 
be that arable farms did not become successful dairy farms but this is unlikely, 
given the evidence presented here of the disappearance of arable land and of 
the growth of the average size of farm and of the numbers of dairy cattle, 
especially seen alongside the significant reductions in numbers of small farms.  
All the evidence from the West Riding and Lancashire points to the interwar 
switch from arable to dairy production resulting in the existence of dairy farms 
that were larger than had theretofore been the case.  Given that this farm 
creation coincided with a significant decline of the arable farming acreage and 
that farmers were looking to dairy farming for their salvation, the evidence 
suggests strongly that these farms had previously relied much more heavily on 
arable production.  The data presented leaves little doubt that the interwar 
period was one during which larger farms were establishing an economic 
advantage over smaller ones in the dairy industry; the evidence of the decline of 
small farms alongside the increasing proportions of larger farms in two counties 
established at the centre of fresh milk production is testament to this process. 
 The high rates of disappearance of small farms make it obvious that the 
victims of depressed interwar conditions for arable farmers in the pastoral region 
were, paradoxically, the small-scale traditional dairy farmers.  The 17 percent 
increase in numbers of dairy cattle in England between 1919 and 1939, taken at 
face value, suggests that some success could be enjoyed by dairy farmers in the 
interwar period.  Greater examination of the Agricultural Statistics in this chapter 
has shown that, whilst success was possible in dairy farming, so was failure, as 
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indicated by the diminishing numbers of small farms in dairy counties.  Success 
in northern counties, such as the West Riding and Lancashire, renowned for their 
milk production, was possible but was relatively limited, as shown by the below 
average increases in these counties’ dairy herds and the high numbers of farm 
disappearances.   
 It remains to be seen whether the pattern that has emerged in the West 
Riding and Lancashire was repeated elsewhere in the pastoral region, a pattern 
of disappearance of small dairy farms taking place alongside arable decline and 
increasing numbers of dairy cattle which indicates the movement of arable 
farmers into milk production.  The increase of 17 percent in the numbers of dairy 
cattle in England and the obvious difficulties experienced in arable farming also 
suggest that investigation is required into the possible existence of similar 
patterns in the arable zone.  The limited success of dairy farmers in Lancashire 
and the West Riding when viewed against statistics for England suggests that 
increasing prosperity was being enjoyed elsewhere in counties that must have 
been witnessing above average increases in dairy cattle numbers whilst the 
evidence presented here demonstrates that any success was likely to be on 
larger farms.  
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Chapter 5: The Extent of Distress amongst Small Farms in Interwar 
England 
Introduction 
 
 
A pattern has been found in the West Riding of Yorkshire and in Lancashire 
between the Wars whereby small farm disappearance coincided with the 
expansion of larger farms; it will be the task of Chapter Five to examine whether 
or not it was replicated elsewhere.  The inference can be made from the success 
of larger farms in these two northern counties which were renowned for their 
dairy production that increasing prosperity in dairy farming may have been 
enjoyed by larger farms elsewhere but still within the zone covering the north 
and west of England known traditionally for pastoral farming.   Prosperity may 
have been enjoyed in dairy production in the western counties of the pastoral 
zone, such as Gloucestershire and Devon, where farms were considerably larger 
on average than in the counties of the industrial north, and this will be gauged, 
initially, by changes in numbers of dairy cattle. 
 Levels of farm disappearance in the pastoral western counties and the 
Midlands between 1919 and 1939 will be assessed in order to determine whether 
small-scale farmers became the victims of over expansion of dairy production by 
larger farms in counties across England in the way that they appear to have 
become in the industrial northern counties.  Changes in the extent of the arable 
acreage will also be assessed in order to determine whether the apparent 
sacrifice of arable crops for dairy herds by larger farmers in the West Riding and 
Lancashire were replicated elsewhere.  Any disproportionately high 
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disappearance of small farms occurring simultaneously with arable shrinkage, 
dairy herd expansion and average farm size increases would tend to confirm the 
conclusion emerging from the West Riding and Lancashire that small dairy farms 
were suffering elsewhere as a result of an expansion of dairying activity by 
large-scale arable farmers.  Counties renowned traditionally for their grazing will 
also be examined using the same criteria as for the dairy counties.  
 The evidence from the northern dairy counties that arable farmers, who 
have been considered traditionally to have farmed large acreages, were turning 
to dairy farming leads to the possibility that success in milk production may also 
have been enjoyed in the arable zone of the south and east of England where, in 
general, farms were larger on average even than in the western counties of the 
pastoral zone and the midlands; this possibility will also be explored in this 
chapter.  Levels of small farm disappearance in the arable zone will also be 
assessed.  Concentrations of small farm disappearance in certain areas and not 
others may indicate that small farm failure was, perhaps, connected to factors 
other than or, at least, as well as the increasing competition in the dairy industry 
from large-scale farmers.  Small farm failure in all locations and across major 
farming types would indicate that it was the scale of farming itself that was the 
key factor in determining success or failure.  One additional possibility that is 
explored is that the creation of Government funded smallholdings after the First 
World War has distorted the statistics on small farm disappearance, causing 
underestimation of the numbers of existing farms that suffered and disappeared 
between the Wars and ameliorating the apparent effects of changes in the 
structure of English agriculture. 
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Prosperity and Distress in Dairy Farming in Pastoral England 
 
 Attention will be paid in the following section initially to pastoral counties 
where farms were generally larger than those so far encountered in the 
industrial counties of the West Riding and Lancashire.  The increases in dairy 
herd size in the two industrial counties that were found to have taken place in 
the previous chapter were relatively and surprisingly small given the propensity 
towards dairying demonstrated by the counties’ large numbers of dairy cattle in 
1919; a large part of the increases that made up the 17 percent expansion of 
the dairy cattle numbers in England between 1919 and 1939 must, therefore, 
have taken place elsewhere.1    
 The experience of Gloucestershire, situated in the rural, western region of 
the pastoral zone with an average farm size in 1919 of 70 acres and with many 
farms engaged in milk production, showed one fundamental difference to that of 
the northern, industrial dairy counties.  The number of milk cows in 
Gloucestershire was less than a third of Lancashire’s in 1919 but had increased 
by 1939 to be slightly over two-fifths of it, having grown from 39,901 to 52,822.  
The increase was of 32 percent and is of considerable significance because of 
the sharp contrast between its size and the much smaller increases of 6 percent 
and 10 percent in the West Riding and Lancashire respectively, counties which 
were known for the high volume of their milk production and their extensive 
local markets.2  Gloucestershire, in common with the West Riding and 
Lancashire, saw its arable acreage fall and its average farm size rise; the arable 
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acreage decreased by 38 percent whilst at the same time growth in average 
farm size was considerable at 15 percent, from 70 acres to over 80.  There was 
a fall in Gloucestershire’s total number of farms of 13 percent which was just 
less than the average for the whole of England shown in the Agricultural 
Statistics.3   
 The significance of the greater increase in herd size in Gloucestershire lies 
in its occurring where farm size was already more than a third greater than that 
of the West Riding and Lancashire in 1919, suggesting that larger farms in 
counties traditionally well known for dairying enjoyed advantages over smaller 
ones in similarly renowned dairying counties.  The significant fall in the arable 
acreage indicates that arable farmers and those with arable land recognised that 
larger farms possessed advantages over smaller ones in the production of fresh 
milk and then acted upon the realization by entering the market as producers.  
The landowner and agriculturalist Christopher Turnor had been adamant as early 
as 1916 that at least 25 acres were necessary for a smallholding that would 
support dairy cattle to be successful4 but the agricultural economist, C.S. Orwin, 
had been highly critical at the time of the recommendation by Turnor that 25 
acres was sufficient for the survival of a dairy holding.5  The suggestion that this 
would be something like the very minimum acreage necessary for survival is 
verified by Martin’s use of the observations of contemporary experts.  Martin 
shows that interwar herds with less than 40 or 50 cows were considered too 
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4 NA/MAF/48/26. 
5 Orwin, C.S., ‘The Small Holdings Craze’, Edinburgh Review, 223 456, (1916), 337-355. 
Chapter 5: Distress amongst Small Farms 
223 
 
small to be efficient in general6 and, taking the density of stocking in Lancashire 
of about 1 cow to every 4 acres of crops and grass in 19197 as an example, the 
indication is that successful dairy farms would have been the ones of larger and 
expanding size; these figure suggest that the more successful farms would 
require to be at least 160 acres in size.  
Table 5.1 Acreage under Crops and Grass, Acreage of Arable Land, and 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle: Gloucestershire 1919-1939* 
 
1919 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
    
Total Acreage of Crops and Grass 645193 606755 -38438 
Acreage Under Arable Cultivation 247504 154572 -92932 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle 39901 52822 12921 
    
*Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23). 
 
 Statistics consistently show that small farms were disadvantaged, as the 
20.5 percent fall in the numbers of farms of one to 50 acres in extent in 
Gloucestershire between 1919 and 1939 demonstrates, especially when 
contrasted with the trend of the county’s farms of above 50 acres which showed 
an actual increase in numbers over the interwar period of just over 1 percent.  
The advantages of larger farms are demonstrated simply enough by the 
increases of average size at a time when farms were disappearing at a 
significant rate.  Gloucestershire’s statistics are demonstrative of the accuracy of 
the assertion that interwar success was not spread evenly across the dairy 
                                        
6 Martin, Development, p.14. 
7 Fletcher, ‘Economic Development’ p.198. 
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industry and that, in the main, success appears to have been enjoyed more on 
large farms than small.8 
Table 5.2  Numbers of Farms in Large and Small Size Categories in Gloucestershire 
1919-1939* 
  
Number of Holdings 
 
Year 1919 1931 
Change 
1919-1931 
1939 
Change 
1931-1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
Farm Size 
       
1-5 acres 
 
2461 2117 -344 1828 -289 -633 
5-20 acres 
 
2251 2048 -203 1688 -360 -563 
20-50 acres 
 
1379 1559 180 1336 -223 -43 
1-50 acres 
 
6091 5724 -367 4852 -872 -1239 
        50 acres and above 
 
3148 3175 27 3186 11 38 
        All Farms 
 
9239 8899 -340 8038 -861 -1201 
        * Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 
1931, Vol.66, Table 8 (pp.64-5); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9). 
 
 Brassley has noted that Devon, although well known for its dairying, saw 
alterations in the structure of its production.  Production for the fresh milk 
market rather than for the traditional manufacture of butter began to take place 
in South Devon whilst the north of the county was converting from a livestock 
fattening area to one of dairy farming.9  Devon’s experience is illustrative of the 
move into dairy farming that was occurring in many parts of England.  The 
choice to move from arable to milk production has already been noted here as 
having its exemplar in A.G. Street in Wiltshire but it was one that has been 
shown to have taken place elsewhere.  The East Midlands farmer, W.S. Abbott, 
later president of the Agricultural economics Society, had clearly had to decrease 
                                        
8 Table 5.2. 
9 Brassley, British Farming, p.194. 
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the amount of arable on his 580 acre farm when he switched to dairying, using 
permanent grass and hay grown on the farm to feed the dairy cattle which he 
introduced in the early 1930s.10  The successful production of fresh milk by 
farmers in counties previously not well known for it has been identified as having 
been common between the Wars and resulted partly from rapidly developing 
road transport allowing for the supply of fresh milk to markets at greater 
distances from farms than previously.11  
Table 5.3 Acreage under Crops and Grass, Acreage of Arable Land, and 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle: Leicestershire 1919-1939* 
 
1919 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
    
Total Acreage of Crops and Grass 470903 445738 -25165 
Acreage Under Arable Cultivation 131023 67618 -63405 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle 35778 42120 6342 
    
*Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23).    
  
 New opportunities were taken in dairy farming in counties such as those 
straddling the line between the traditional arable and pastoral regions; Taylor 
has mentioned Warwickshire and Leicestershire, two counties well known for 
their grazing and with large numbers of sheep and beef cattle, as areas of 
growing milk production in the decade following the First World War.12  Both 
Leicestershire and Warwickshire saw increases in dairy cattle numbers that were 
above the national average across both decades of the interwar period; 
                                        
10 Abbott, p.407. 
11 Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture, p.274; Fletcher, ‘Economic Development’, 
p.220.  
12 Taylor, D., pp.62-3. 
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Leicestershire’s increase was of 18 percent between 1919 and 1939 and 
Warwickshire’s was 21 percent.  The assertion that arable farmers and larger 
farmers in general were benefiting from expanding their dairy farming is 
supported by data from these two Midlands counties in which dairy cattle 
numbers had increased.  The arable acreage almost halved in Leicestershire and 
in Warwickshire it fell by 43 percent whilst average farm size increased 
substantially in both counties from sizes that were just above the 1919 average 
for England of just over 67 acres to being, relatively, well above the 1939 figure 
of 72.5 acres; Leicestershire’s average farm had increased by over 21 percent to 
83 acres by 1939 whilst Warwickshire’s expanded to almost 81 acres, an 
increase of 14.5 percent.  Falls of 22 percent in farm numbers in Leicestershire 
and of 18.5 percent in Warwickshire occurred alongside the increases in average 
farm size, indicating that small farms were disappearing in the Midlands over the 
interwar years at a disproportionately fast rate.13   
 A similar pattern to that found in the Midlands is to be found in the 
grazing county of Westmorland which, though deeply embedded in the north of 
the pastoral zone, had little in the way of a traditional dairy industry in 1919 but 
large numbers of sheep.  Westmorland saw its dairy herd expand by 17 percent 
by 1939 and its arable acreage contract by 42 percent.  Westmorland’s arable 
contraction is all the more significant because, although arable covered an area 
of only 21 percent in 1919, its contraction was coincident with an expansion of 
rough grazing of 18.5 percent in a county where the total acreage of rough 
                                        
13 Table 3.2; Table 5.3; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 
(pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
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grazing was so extensive that it exceeded the county’s total area of crops and 
grass by 1939.  Such a coincidence is of the type that, it has been noted, Grigg 
saw happening as a result of reclassification by farmers of some of their arable 
land and which, it can be seen, occurred as arable production was sacrificed for 
dairy whilst former arable land was used as occasional, or even regular, grazing 
but defined as rough grazing.  Westmorland’s arable contraction and increased 
rough grazing allied to expanding dairy cattle numbers again indicate the move 
of arable farmers into dairying and that this was at the expense of small farms is 
demonstrated by the increase in the average size of farm in Westmorland of 
28.5 percent, resulting in an average size of farm, inclusive of rough grazing, of 
175 acres.  It can be seen that farms in grazing areas were considerably larger 
than dairy farms, despite falling within the pastoral zone where farms were 
reputedly smaller than in the arable zone; even ignoring rough grazing, 
Westmorland farms each covered 81 acres on average in 1939.14   
 Farms in the North Riding of Yorkshire, renowned like Westmorland for its 
grazing and home to over 800,000 sheep by 1939, were of only a slightly smaller 
size at 79.5 acres on average without taking rough grazing into account.  The 
county followed a similar, if even more marked, pattern of small farm 
disappearance as that in other grazing counties in the pastoral zone, showing 
falls in total farm numbers and increases in average farm size.  Average farm 
size, inclusive of rough grazing, had increased considerably by 21 percent 
between 1919 and 1939 and the net percentage of farms of up to 50 acres in 
                                        
14 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
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size that had disappeared was remarkably high at 27.5 percent.  Chapman has 
commented upon the expansion of dairy farming in parts of this county which is 
close to the line between the arable and pastoral zones, and numbers of dairy 
cattle increased by 11 percent.15  The 11 percent figure is somewhat below the 
national average but it is significant insofar as it accompanies small farm 
disappearance as well as increases in the size and number of larger farms.  
Farms of between 50 and 300 acres, in contrast to the disappearing small farms, 
saw no change in their numbers between 1920 and 1939 and actual increases in 
numbers of larger farms can be seen in some sub-categories; farms of 100 to 
150 acres increased by 2.5 percent and farms of 50 to 100 acres marginally 
increased in number.16 
Table 5.4 
Numbers of Farms in Large and Small Size Categories in Yorkshire North Riding 
1919-1939* 
  
Number of Holdings 
 
Year 1919 1931 
Change 
1919-1931 
1939 
Change 
1931-1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
Farm Size 
       
1-5 acres 
 
2053 1506 -547 1293 -213 -760 
5-20 acres 
 
3057 2432 -625 2060 -372 -997 
20-50 acres 
 
1978 1916 -62 1781 -135 -197 
1-50 acres 
 
7088 5854 -1234 5134 -720 -1954 
        50 acres and above 
 
5154 5094 -60 5091 -3 -63 
        All Farms 
 
12242 10948 -1294 10225 -723 -2017 
        * Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 
1931, Vol.66, Table 8 (pp.64-5); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9).  
 
                                        
15 Chapman, p.140. 
16 Table 5.4; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); 
MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
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 The statistical evidence presented here from counties across the pastoral 
north and west of England for the years 1919 to 1939 is consistent with that 
seen for the West Riding and Lancashire.  Counties that were already renowned 
for livestock production, both dairy and fatstock, exhibited the same tendencies 
as seen in the counties straddling the Pennines which were of falls in the arable 
area and increases in the numbers of dairy cattle.  The increases in dairy cattle 
were accompanied by disproportionately large decreases in numbers of the small 
farms that were traditionally associated with milk production.  Small farms can 
no longer be seen to have enjoyed advantages of production and location for 
dairying in the pastoral region of England that they had before the First World 
War and the evidence certainly casts doubt on any notion of the advantages 
enjoyed by the traditional family dairy farm by as late as the 1950s.17  Increasing 
average farm size alongside larger farms witnessing minimal falls in their 
numbers and, in some cases, small increases, are, highly suggestive of 
successful diversification by large-scale farmers in the pastoral region.  Large-
scale farmers decreased their reliance on arable farming and turned to dairying 
as a means of survival across the pastoral region with the increased competition 
they brought to the milk industry causing severe problems for small farmers, not 
just in the counties in which the large farms were situated but in locations at 
considerable distances.  Large-scale farms that were not necessarily in the 
immediate vicinity of the markets to which they sent their milk increased the 
competition for small-scale producers in local markets and this must be seen as 
contributing to the disappearance of small farms in counties, such as Lancashire, 
                                        
17 Winstanley, p.193. 
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where there was high demand.  Grazing counties, such as Westmorland and the 
North Riding, saw farm size increases and arable acreage shrinkage that were 
due to increased numbers of animals for fattening but also partly due to the 
increases in dairy animals that were increasing the pressure on small, specialist 
dairy producers.  
 
Dairy Farming in Arable England between the Wars 
 
 The extensive falls in the North Riding in numbers of small farms are part 
of a pattern affecting the other counties in the pastoral region of England 
examined in this study.  The corollary, seen in the North Riding as well as the 
other counties, is the better fortune enjoyed by larger farms in terms of the 
numbers surviving; furthermore, as in those other counties, this situation was 
accompanied by a decrease in the arable acreage in the North Riding.  The fall of 
23 percent in the arable acreage in the North Riding that took place between 
1919 and 1939 is one that is less extensive than in the other grazing counties 
addressed here and this appears to be especially anomalous given that arable 
land covered a greater area in 1919 in the North Riding, at 42 percent, than in 
those other counties.  The effects of the arable depression, that has been a 
mainstay of the historiography of interwar agriculture since its inception, would 
be expected to be more serious as the proportion of a county’s arable acreage 
increased; that is to say that more substantial falls in the arable acreage might 
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be expected to have taken place compared with counties with smaller arable 
areas.18   
 A memorandum of 13 March 1930 from a committee set up to enquire 
into the extent of depression in agriculture found depression to be limited in its 
severity except in arable areas characterised by cereal growing, noting, ‘It is 
practically certain that the situation on the corn-growing lands of the eastern 
counties and parts of Hampshire [...] is worse today than at any time since the 
Armistice.’19  Wilt has commented upon the significance of the acreage of wheat 
grown in the north east of England20 in which the North Riding is located and so 
it is surprising to find the fall in the county’s arable acreage to be, though 
significant, proportionally smaller than in the grazing counties examined where 
the arable acreage was more restricted in 1919; Westmorland, for example, has 
been seen to have experienced a 42 percent fall in its arable acreage between 
1919 and 1939.21  
 An examination of statistics shows that, in general, the small size of fall in 
the arable acreage of the North Riding, relative to the grazing counties, is 
matched in counties considered to be cereal growers within the arable zone 
itself, contrasting thereby with the expectation that arises from extensive arable 
falls elsewhere and from the opinion given by the MAF report of 1930, above.  
The East Riding of Yorkshire which had arable coverage of 70 percent of its 
                                        
18 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
19 NA/MAF/38/18. 
20 Wilt, p.25. 
21 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
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farmland in 1919 saw only a 13 percent fall in that coverage whilst East Suffolk 
saw a 15 percent fall, West Suffolk 12 percent and Norfolk 11 percent; these 
were counties dominated by arable agriculture with 74, 80 and 75 percent 
respectively of their crops and grass dedicated to it.  Essex ‘s reduction of arable 
land was more marked but, at 27 percent, exceeded the North Riding’s by four 
percent and was considerably lower than the falls in the grazing counties of 
Leicestershire, Warwickshire and Westmorland and in the dairy counties of 
Gloucestershire and Lancashire, being lower even than the West Riding’s 29 
percent shrinkage.  Essex’s arable coverage was a little lower than in the other 
eastern counties mentioned here, at 67 percent, but was much greater than that 
of the pastoral counties; thus, Essex seems to fit the general though not 
absolute pattern that can be seen here wherein the lower the proportion of land 
a county had dedicated to arable production the higher was the relative extent 
of the loss of its arable land.  Hampshire fails to fit the pattern whereby the 
smaller a specific county’s arable acreage was in 1919 the greater was the fall in 
that acreage by 1939.  Hampshire witnessed a 37 percent fall in its arable 
acreage but its arable acreage was, predictably for a county in the arable region, 
quite high at 62.5 percent of its crops and grass in 1919, falling to 45 percent.  
West Sussex, which falls comfortably on the arable side of the line dividing 
arable from pastoral production and was known as an arable county22 but which 
of all the arable counties examined here had the lowest arable acreage at 52 
percent, saw a quite considerable 45 percent fall in that acreage.  West Sussex’s 
                                        
22 Whetham, Agrarian History, p.2. 
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fall in combination with Hampshire’s figures undermines the pattern of arable 
counties witnessing lower falls in their arable acreages than pastoral counties.23 
 The data suggests that a deteriorating situation for arable farming in 
general was not necessarily at its worst in those areas where arable farming was 
at its most extensive but the most striking statistic details the growth in numbers 
of dairy cattle in the cereal counties. Counties renowned for their arable 
production, such as Sussex and Norfolk were seeing moves by farmers into dairy 
farming in the 1920s,24 with the cereal counties commented upon in the 1923 
Agricultural Statistics: ‘It was mainly in the east of the country that there were 
larger herds than in 1922.’25  Douet has found that farmers of all sizes in Norfolk 
were prepared to take on dairy herds during the 1920s, including smallholders 
and arable farmers but also the large-scale mixed farmers who were able to 
incorporate a milk herd into their four-course rotation.26  Percentage increases in 
dairy cattle across the arable region between 1919 and 1939 were at least as 
high as the national average increase of 17 percent and were in most cases 
considerably higher.  Huntingdon and the East Riding of Yorkshire both matched 
the national average increase whilst the increases in Norfolk and West Suffolk 
were large at 29 and 30 percent but were dwarfed by increases in Essex of 37 
percent, in Hampshire of 39 percent, in East Suffolk of 43 percent and in West 
Sussex of 45 percent.   Areas of extensive arable farming, therefore, also looked 
to dairying as another means of maintaining farm profitability, both where it 
                                        
23 Table 5.6; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); 
MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
24 Taylor, D., pp.62-3. 
25 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1923, Vol.58, p.13. 
26 Douet, pp.86, 190-5.  
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would appear to have been strictly necessary, such as in Hampshire and West 
Sussex where arable acreages saw considerable falls, or elsewhere in counties 
where arable acreages fell by considerably less and, thus, possibly as a means 
merely of increasing the possible options for future survival or prosperity.27   
Table 5.5 Acreage under Crops and Grass, Acreage of Arable Land, and 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle in East Suffolk 1919-1939* 
 
1919 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
    
Total Acreage of Crops and Grass 454433 427666 -26767 
Acreage Under Arable Cultivation 334146 285344 -48802 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle 16438 23472 7034 
    
*Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23).    
 
Table 5.6 Acreage under Crops and Grass, Acreage of Arable Land, and 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle in Hampshire 1919-1939* 
 
1919 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
    
Total Acreage of Crops and Grass 592383 522482 -69901 
Acreage Under Arable Cultivation 371281 235060 -136221 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle 35696 49609 13913 
    
*Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23).    
 
 Any notion that average farm size might fall in arable counties as dairy 
farming expanded there, in line with the traditional pattern of dairy farming 
taking place on smaller farms than arable, is confounded by analysis of data 
                                        
27 Table 5.5; Table 5.7 and *Sources; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-
9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 
(pp.38-9). 
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from the Agricultural Statistics.  Average farm size actually increased in arable 
counties in the south of England between 1919 and 1939.  A conspicuous 
example of the expansion of the milk industry on large farms in this region could 
be found on the north-western boundary of Hampshire with Wiltshire.  This was 
the location of A.J. Hosier’s controversial experiment with large-scale milk 
production whereby 300 cattle were kept and milked outdoors all year round on 
1000 acres, the herd increasing as the operation expanded to 2,500 acres in 
extent.28  Average farm size increased in Hampshire and in West Sussex, 
counties which saw increases of 7.5 percent and almost 3 percent, respectively.  
Eastern England saw increases in average farm size which ranged from 
moderate increases of 1 acre in Norfolk and 2.5 acres in Essex, bringing average 
size to over 80 and 90 acres, respectively, to an increase of over 11 acres in the 
East Riding of Yorkshire where average farm size in 1939 was over 106 acres.  
West Suffolk’s average farm had been nudging 100 acres in size in 1919 but was 
almost 108 by 1939.  The density of stocking and a doubling in numbers of 
poultry in East Suffolk between 1921 and 193929 along with increases in 
numbers of farms of one to five acres suggest that poultry holdings were being 
created in the county between the Wars, reducing the overall average farm size; 
however, leaving out the farms of this smallest size category and taking into 
account the possibility of the erroneous designation of grazing land as rough 
grazing, estimates show that the county saw a small rise in average farm size 
from around 109.5 acres to 110.5 acres.   Greater than all the increases so far 
                                        
28 Whetham, Agrarian History, pp.190-1. 
29 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Economic Series, No.11; Marketing of Poultry in England 
and Wales (London: HMSO, 1927), p.143. 
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mentioned, excluding rough grazing, was that of the midlands county of 
Huntingdon, which saw the average size of its farms expand from under 85 
acres to over 100, an increase of almost 18.5 percent.  Lincoln-Holland 
witnessed an increase of 9.5 percent in its average farm size.30  
 The assumption that the deteriorating conditions for arable farming 
detailed in the historiography would lead to the disappearance of arable farmers 
has been shown to be true only in the technical sense but it did not mean the 
actual disappearance of these farmers because arable farmers turned to dairy 
farming for salvation; however, increasing average farm size in the arable 
counties is suggestive of farm disappearance and falls in farm numbers in the 
arable region were, indeed, noticeable.  A considerable net fall31 took place in 
the number of farms in Hampshire; 1,500 of the 6,854 farms enumerated in 
1919, a number equal to 18 percent of the total, had disappeared by 1939.  The 
proportion of farms disappearing in Hampshire is slightly smaller than that for 
West Sussex which saw an 18.5 percent decrease in farm numbers between 
1919 and 1939, from 3,277 to 2,699.  Farm numbers in the cereal counties 
examined fell, with the exception of East Suffolk where they fluctuated but, due 
to the creation of poultry holdings of one to five acres, were virtually the same in 
number in 1939 as in 1919.  Numbers in Essex, the East Riding and West Suffolk 
fell by fourteen, 13.5 and thirteen percent, respectively.  Norfolk’s fall of nine 
                                        
30 Table 3.2; Table 5.5; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 
(pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
31 Figures on farm disappearance for counties are available in the Agricultural Statistics published 
annually from 1919 to 1939 and do not include increases and falls in farm numbers caused by 
the creation of statutory smallholdings. MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 
(pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1931, Vol.66, Table 8 (pp.64-5); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
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percent is lower than in much of East Anglia because of the enthusiasm with 
which the State and County Council created smallholdings in the county.  
Lincoln-Holland has already been noted as a county with a quarter of its farms 
being State subsidised smallholdings in 1932 but, even so, it had a farm 
disappearance rate of 10.5 percent between 1919 and 1939.  Huntingdon’s 
farms saw a 21.5 percent fall in numbers.  The pattern in the pastoral region 
where farm disappearance was taking place simultaneously with the combination 
of increases in average farm size, reduction of arable acreages and increases in 
numbers of dairy cattle can be seen to have been repeated in the arable region.  
The pattern is indicative of the move of arable farmers into dairy farming and 
demonstrates the existence of another source of competition for those 
traditionally engaged in the fresh milk market.32 
 Small farmers have been shown to have experienced particularly difficult 
conditions in both dairy and livestock grazing areas.  Farmers in traditional dairy 
areas in the interwar period were in greater competition than before amongst 
themselves in the fresh milk market as well as with farmers in traditional grazing 
areas, but were also feeling competition from farms showing increases in dairy 
cattle numbers in the region considered to be dominated by arable production.  
Difficulties in arable farming saw many occupants of statutory smallholdings in 
Norfolk turning to dairy farming33 and were likely to have initiated a change into 
dairy farming amongst small arable farmers, in general; however, there is no 
intuitive reason to suggest that they would have fared any better than small-
                                        
32 Ibid. 
33 Douet, p.86.  
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scale farmers elsewhere and this is borne out by statistics.  The cereal counties 
of Norfolk and Lincoln-Holland saw 12 percent and 11.5 percent respective falls 
in their farms of below 50 acres in size between 1919 and 1939 in spite of the 
extensive existence of statutory smallholdings within their borders.  Figures for 
another cereal county, West Suffolk, reflect what might have been the case for 
small farm numbers in Norfolk and Lincoln-Holland had those two counties not 
been privileged by the significant subsidy represented by smallholdings.  West 
Suffolk showed a fall in numbers of just over 17 percent which was distributed 
relatively evenly between farms of one to five acres, five to 20 acres and 20 to 
50 acres in size.  Conditions were extremely serious elsewhere in the arable 
region for small farms, the disappearance of 22.5 percent of Hampshire’s farms 
of one to 50 acres in size being representative.34   
 Larger farms fared considerably better in the arable region with farms of 
over 50 acres in size in Norfolk showing only a 2.5 percent rate of 
disappearance; Norfolk’s farms of 50 to 150 acres actually saw their numbers 
increase, as did the North Riding which, though a grazing county, had a 
relatively extensive arable acreage compared to other grazing counties.  
Hampshire saw a rate of increase of over 4.5 percent in its farms in the 100 to 
150 acre size category.  The disappearance of large farms in the counties of the 
arable region did not necessarily find its origins directly in economic problems of 
large-scale farmers but often in the sale of land for the creation of statutory 
                                        
34 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9); Table 5.9. 
Chapter 5: Distress amongst Small Farms 
239 
 
smallholdings in the two or three years immediately after the First World War as, 
for example, at Sutton Bridge in Lincoln-Holland.35  Falls in numbers of farms of  
Table 5.7 Numbers of Farms in Large and Small Size Categories in Norfolk 1919-
1939* 
  
Number of Holdings 
 
Year 1919 1931 
Change 
1919-1931 
1939 
Change 
1931-1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
Farm Size 
       
1-5 acres 
 
3200 3049 -151 2549 -500 -651 
5-20 acres 
 
3288 3290 2 2901 -389 -387 
20-50 acres 
 
2367 2440 73 2346 -94 -21 
1-50 acres 
 
8855 8779 -76 7796 -983 -1059 
        50 acres and 
above 
 
4441 4468 27 4328 -140 -113 
        All Farms 
 
13296 13247 -49 12124 -1123 -1172 
        * Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 
1931, Vol.66, Table 8 (pp.64-5); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9).  
 
above 150 acres in extent in Norfolk can be explained partially by the willingness 
of landowners to sell large areas of land to the County Council for division into 
the smallholdings that became prevalent in the county.36  The demands of David 
Lloyd George for an investigation into what he considered to be the exceptionally 
high prices paid to landowners for the sale of their land for smallholding creation 
is indicative of the willingness with which sales were made just after the War at 
a time when prosperity abounded in agriculture and prices for land had soared.37  
Sales of large farms for the creation of smallholdings just after the First World 
War would explain the trend in numbers of West Suffolk’s farms of over 300 
acres in size; 28 of 251, or just over 7 percent, of these large farms disappeared 
                                        
35 NA/MAF48/330. 
36 Douet, p.84. 
37 NA/MAF/48/74. 
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in the year 1919 to 1920 leaving 233 farms, the same number as existed 19 
years later in 1939.   At least part of the loss of 6 percent of farms of above 50 
acres in Lincoln-Holland is ascribable to similar reasons as those accounting for 
the diminution of Norfolk’s large farms, Lincoln Holland being the location of 
many smallholdings including the State ‘colonies’ at Holbeach and Sutton 
Bridge.38  Hampshire saw its statutory smallholdings numbering 631 in 1932, 
which, like Lincoln-Holland and Norfolk, would account for the loss of some of 
the 6 percent of the large farms that had disappeared in the county between 
1919 and 1939.  West Suffolk lost 7.5 percent of its farms of over 50 acres but, 
again, this is partially attributable to over 10 percent of its farms in 1932 being 
statutory smallholdings, many of which would have been created from land from 
the farms of over 50 acres acquired by the State.39   
 It seems that even the numbers of losses of large farms cannot be seen 
as, necessarily, a result of difficult agricultural conditions and would have been, 
in many cases, exaggerated when consideration is given to the reason for the 
disappearance of many larger farms being their landowners’ desire to sell them 
at inflated prices for the creation of smallholdings.  Even taking into account the 
breaking-up of large farms to create smallholdings, no county examined here 
from within the arable region saw its farms of 50 acres and above disappearing 
at a rate even close to that of its small farms.  Lincoln-Holland actually saw a 5 
percent increase in its farms of over 300 acres in extent.  Any comparison of 
rates of disappearance of large and small farms should take into account that 
                                        
38 Table 5.4 and *Sources; Table 5.7; Table 5.9; NA/MAF/48/336, Sutton Bridge and Holbeach 
Farm Settlements, Annual Reports, 1924-39.   
39 MAF, Economic Series, No.11. 
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the rate of decrease in numbers of small farms between 1919 and 1939 is the 
net percentage rate, rather than the gross rate, and does not take into account 
the numbers of small farms created during the interwar period.  The net rates of 
small farm disappearance in England and its counties, high though they are, 
remain an underestimate of total decreases so that the disparity between the 
fortunes of the small and large farms was even greater than these statistics 
make them appear.40   
 
The Effects of Dairy Expansion on Small Milk Producers  
 
 A similar pattern of agricultural change has emerged in counties across 
England in the interwar years to that seen in the northern pastoral counties of 
the West Riding and Lancashire where milk production for the liquid market was 
a mainstay of the agriculture.  The benefits of a 17 percent expansion of the 
dairy herd in England between 1919 and 1939 might be thought most likely to 
have accrued to the small farms traditionally associated with dairying in the West 
Riding and Lancashire; Chapter Four has shown that, in actuality, it was the 
larger farms in the Pennine counties associated more commonly with arable 
farming and grazing which achieved the greater gains, when measured by their 
survival rates over the interwar period.  The decrease of the arable acreage in 
the West Riding and Lancashire that was coincident with the growth of the dairy 
herds and the decline of the small dairy farms indicates that arable farms were 
                                        
40 Table 3.3; Table 5.9; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 
(pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9); 
Smith, N.R., Land, pp.234-6. 
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turning to dairying at the expense of traditional, small dairy farms.  Arable farms 
tended traditionally to be larger and the growth in average size of the two 
counties’ farms and the much higher survival rates of these counties’ large farms 
is highly suggestive of a turn by large farmers to milk production.   This pattern 
of large farm survival and small farm disappearance is apparent in an 
exaggerated form across all the counties examined here as representative of 
agriculture in England.  Expansion of dairying has been shown to have taken 
place to a much greater extent in other parts of the pastoral region beyond the 
Pennines counties as well as and especially in the traditionally arable area of the 
south and east of England.  The statistics examined here make it clear that milk 
production would have been a possible route to prosperity for many large-scale 
farmers in counties dominated by large farms across both the arable and 
pastoral regions of England who had developed and expanded production during 
the 1920s and 1930s.    
 Expansion of dairy farming might reasonably be expected to have 
occurred in the traditional dairy counties, as represented in Chapter Four by the 
West Riding and Lancashire where Taylor observed that it was surprisingly 
limited, at least during the 1920s.41  Increases in the dairy herds in the two 
counties took place at a higher rate than Taylor indicated when the whole of the 
interwar period is taken into account but were still relatively small, being below 
the average for England.  The failure of the small farms traditionally known to 
specialise in fresh milk production in the northern industrial counties, 
demonstrated by their disappearance in large numbers from the Agricultural 
                                        
41 Taylor, D., p.62. 
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Statistics, has already been seen to have been simultaneous with the decrease 
of arable farming in the area and with the increase of average farm size.  The 
resulting suggestion that the many small dairy farms suffered at the hands of a 
turn to milk production on the less numerous large arable farms within the 
Pennine counties has already been supported by contemporary interwar 
commentary but the statistics examined in the current chapter suggest that 
competition for small Pennine farmers also came from counties less traditionally 
known as dairy producers.  The same pattern of increasing dairy production, 
small farm failure, arable decline, increasing farm size and higher rates of large 
farm survival have been shown to have existed across almost the whole of 
interwar England.   
 Rates of growth of dairy herds in the arable region of England and in the 
pastoral region outside of the West Riding and Lancashire greatly surpassed 
those of the two Pennine counties whilst arable and pastoral counties alike saw 
disproportionately high rates of disappearance of their small farms.  The small 
farms that supplied liquid milk to large urban centres, like those in the West 
Riding and Lancashire, were, thus, coming under pressure from expanding 
production within their own counties and localities.  However, the expansion of 
dairy production elsewhere in the pastoral region as well as, and especially, in 
the arable region, facilitated by the rapid development of road transport after 
the First World War,42 make it clear that it was not only from within their own 
counties that the small traditional dairy farms found their markets coming under 
attack but also from large farms from much further afield; for example, the West 
                                        
42 Ibid. 
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Riding received milk from Derbyshire whilst Liverpool and Manchester were 
supplied from as far afield as Staffordshire.  Captain Cleveland Fyfe of the NFU 
was certain of the detrimental effects upon traditional milk producers of arable 
farms turning to milk production in the period between the First World War and 
November 1934; these farms were generally large in size and were located in 
what were considered the corn growing counties of the arable region of England.  
Cleveland Fyfe made the following statement in evidence to the Royal 
Commission set up to investigate the effects of annual tithe payments by 
farmers and landowners to tithe holders: 
In my view there is no doubt that the decline in the arable areas directly 
affected the milk market.  People went out of corn production and into 
milk production, and the result was disastrous.43  
The Lincoln and Boston Guardian confirms that farmers in the arable areas 
dominated by large farms had been cutting their cereal production, writing in 
1931,  
Corn growing […] has not paid […] for the last 3 years at least.  Such is 
the state of affairs that has driven so many farmers, even in the arable 
stronghold of the Eastern counties, to reduce their ploughland 
commitments to the minimum.44  
 The fate of the small dairy farmers of the north who were to be found 
clustered around their local urban markets was shared by any small farmers 
                                        
43 Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge, Minutes of Evidence, p.121. 
44 Lincoln and Boston Guardian, 10 January 1931. 
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whose function had been the supply of liquid milk to urban markets.  The 
traditional understanding of the dairy farm as, generally, a small-scale 
undertaking is further undermined by developments in the pastoral region 
outside of the industrial north as well as in the arable regions.  Small farms in 
the arable and pastoral areas may well have been trying to take advantage of 
dairy farming but substantial falls in their numbers suggest that they were not 
succeeding despite substantial increases in numbers of dairy cattle within those 
counties.   Evidence of disproportionately high disappearance of small farms in 
all counties makes it clear that traditional dairy farms were being put under 
increased commercial pressure in all areas from new sources of their product in 
the shape of large farms in both the arable and pastoral regions.  Mr. S.O. 
Ratcliff of the NFU gave the following reply at the Royal Commission on Tithe 
Rentcharge hearings when prompted to confirm by the chairman of the 
proceedings that, ‘What you mean is that the result of the fall in the price of 
corn was that cornland went out of cultivation and became land that was 
producing milk.’: 
I am only saying that the trend is that a person who has been put out of 
production of a particular thing switches over to another and ruins the 
other man in that particular branch, and so it goes on, and the general 
effect is that where a particular branch is paying at the time, it loses its 
position as a result of the other man being put out of  business because 
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any general switch over to any particular commodity damages that 
commodity.45 
The realisation of Ratcliff’s statement was seen in the failure of the small farms 
in all areas that once might have been able to find prosperity in fresh milk 
production.  An investigation by MAF into the possibility of providing 
smallholdings for the unemployed in 1932 was extremely pessimistic regarding 
the opportunities for small farms to enter the milk market in Cumberland, stating 
baldly, ‘Dairy farming has reached saturation point.’46 
 The changes taking place in the structure of milk production in the West 
Riding and Lancashire in the interwar years are indicative of what has been 
shown to have been happening across England with the salient factor in all the 
counties examined here being the disproportionately high numbers of failures of 
small farms when compared with farms of over 50 acres in extent.  The 
conclusion that arises is simply that large arable farms in these counties escaped 
from the suffering that might have been expected as a result of difficult 
economic conditions for the sale of arable produce by developing their dairy 
production and, in the process, driving small farms out of business.  The 
identification of farmers in the western counties, such as Gloucestershire and 
Devon, and the midlands counties, some of which have been examined here, 
whose milk was sent by rail to London and other urban centres is indicative of 
the general tendency for large-scale farmers to enter into the liquid milk market 
                                        
45 Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge, Minutes of Evidence, pp.120-1. 
46 NA/MAF/48/94. 
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formerly the domain of small producers.47  Farms in the western counties were 
of a size close to the national average in 1919 and so cannot be said to have 
been small whilst farms in the midlands counties of Leicestershire, Warwickshire 
and Huntingdon averaged 83, 80 and 100 acres, respectively, and were, thus, 
comparatively large.48   
 The current chapter has shown that the kind of advantages from the 
growth in milk production enjoyed by large Pennine farms over small ones were, 
in turn, enjoyed by large farms in counties associated more commonly with 
arable farming and grazing whilst small farms shared only the problems.  The 
national expansion of dairy farming took place on farms of greater than 50 acres 
in size in all the counties examined and that it coincided with the abandonment 
of arable farming on large areas of land in all counties is as much testament to a 
belief in the potential profits available in the milk market as to the difficulties 
current in the interwar period in arable farming.  The statement from MAF’s 
departmental committee on the rural settlement of discharged servicemen from 
1916 that said, ‘We believe that small dairy holdings devoted mainly to the 
production of milk might be increased in number almost indefinitely’, 
demonstrates that large-scale farmers were correct in identifying a profitable 
opportunity to be gained in converting to dairying at that early date;49 evidence 
on the expansion of the dairy industry shows that many had followed their 
instinct for profitability.  The geographical spread of the counties examined here 
                                        
47 Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture, p.273; Venn, 1923, Foundations, pp.319-20.   
48 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9). 
49 Ibid.; NA/MAF/48/26.  
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shows that the difficulties experienced by small farms as a result of the 
expansion of the dairying operations of large farms extended to virtually all parts 
of England.  The suggestion that prosperity could be found in the dairy industry 
in the interwar years is not one that can be seen from the point of view of the 
small farmer, whose holdings made up 64.5 percent of England’s farms in 1919; 
this is made especially obvious when consideration is taken that at least 18 
percent of small-scale farmers and their farms, existent in 1919, were no longer 
in business in 1939.50 
 The evidence provided demonstrates that the expansion of the dairy 
industry was simultaneous with difficult conditions and high rates of 
disappearance of small farms in all counties, suggesting that small farms had, 
increasingly, little to gain in any location either from continuing to operate as 
dairy producers as the interwar years progressed or from switching to dairy from 
other farming types in any kind of attempt to survive.  Indeed, high rates of 
disappearance of small farms suggest that small farms found it considerably 
more difficult to participate in the expansion of dairying in England over the 
interwar years than large ones.  Evidence shows that farms supplying the liquid 
milk markets had, traditionally, been smaller operations, such as those run as 
producer retailing businesses, and the evidence showing falls in numbers of 
small farms in both of the industrial counties of the Pennines where such farms 
were known to proliferate is compelling.   
                                        
50 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Tables 3 (pp.20-9) and 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, 
Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Tables 2 (pp.10-23) and 11 (pp.38-9); Smith, N.R., Land, 
pp.234-6. 
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 The definitive statistical evidence of the difficulties faced by small farms 
trying to compete in the market for fresh milk comes from Lincoln-Holland where 
small farms made up a large majority of total agricultural holdings; farms of less 
than 50 acres in extent made up 78.5 percent of total holdings in 1919, a figure 
which had risen to 81.5 percent by 1923.  Specific local landscape conditions 
which delayed drainage of the Fenland until the mid-nineteenth century had 
resulted in the deliberate development of an agriculture of overwhelmingly small 
farms in Lincoln-Holland by the twentieth century on some of the most fertile 
agricultural land in England.51  Average farm size in Lincoln-Holland was only 45 
acres in 1919.52  The coincidence of fertile land and small acreages appeared to 
have created a resilience amongst Lincoln-Holland’s small farmers which had 
been much admired during the ‘Great Depression’ of the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century,53 leading to the assumption amongst many commentators at 
the time that the future of British agriculture lay in the hands of small farmers;54 
William Henry Wheeler had written extensively on the Fenland, commenting 
favourably on smallholdings in Lincoln Holland in 1896, stating, ‘the increase of 
these holdings appears to be a national gain.’55  It has already been noted that 
Lincoln-Holland was the location for the establishment of at least two large 
                                        
51 Beastall, pp.67-73; Grigg, Agricultural Revolution, pp.170-1, 197; NA/MAF 48/330; Parker, A., 
and Pye, D., The Fenland (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1976), p.181. 
52 Table 3.2; Table 5.8; Table 5.9. 
53 Thirsk, J., English Peasant Farming; The Agrarian History of Lincolnshire from Tudor to Recent 
Times (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p.317. 
54 Bone, pp.653-61. 
55 Wheeler, W.H., A History of the Fens of South Lincolnshire (Boston: J.M. Newcomb, 1896; 
repr. Spalding: Paul Watkins, 1990), p.422. 
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estates of smallholdings by MAF in 1919 and this was a result of its reputation 
for small farm success.56    
 Dairy farming in Lincoln-Holland was no salvation for farmers. Lincoln-
Holland is the only county examined here to see a fall in numbers of dairy cattle 
between 1919 and 1939; the fall was a substantial one of 22 percent.   The 
county’s reputation for successful farming on limited acreages counted for little 
and small farms of the type associated with dairy farming suffered very badly 
during the interwar years; farms of one to 50 acres in size decreased at a net 
rate of 11.5 percent between 1919 and 1939.  These farms of one to fifty acres 
in size saw a rate of decrease of 21 percent between 1923 and 1939, a high rate 
of decrease despite the creation of smallholdings by MAF and the County Council 
which caused an increase in total numbers of small farms between 1919 and 
1923.57  The reputation of Lincoln-Holland as a location for prosperous small 
farms was cemented by the establishment in 1919 by the Ministry of Agriculture 
of two large ‘colonies’ of smallholdings in the county, one of 75 holdings at 
Holbeach and the other including 114 smallholdings at Sutton Bridge.58  The 
Sutton Bridge settlement included the creation of holdings of up to 50 acres, 
with, for example, four existing farms being broken up in 1925 into 17 individual 
smallholdings that ranged from 32 to 44 acres in extent.  The decrease of 21 
percent of farms of less than 50 acres between 1923 and 1939 is a figure that 
represents something between the net and gross rates of decrease for the 
                                        
56 NA/MAF/48/320, Holbeach Farm Settlement, Main Acquisition, 1916-1920; NA/MAF 48/330. 
57 Table 5.8; Table 5.9; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1923, Vol.58, Tables 2 (pp.24-34) and 5 
(pp.42-3). 
58 NA/MAF/48/336; NA/MAF/48/320. 
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county across the interwar period.  The decrease in dairy cattle numbers in 
Lincoln-Holland of over a fifth occurring simultaneously with the disappearance 
of large numbers of the small-scale holdings of the kind associated traditionally 
with successful milk production leaves little doubt that small dairy farms were 
suffering.59   
Table 5.8 Acreage under Crops and Grass, Acreage of Arable Land, and 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle in Lincoln-Holland 1919-1939* 
 
1919 1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
    
Total Acreage of Crops and Grass 242376 237938 -4438 
Acreage Under Arable Cultivation 189000 193151 4151 
Numbers of Dairy Cattle 7178 5598 -1580 
    
*Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural 
Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23).    
 
 The smaller of the small farms in Lincoln Holland were particularly hard 
hit.  Farms of between five and 20 acres disappeared at a rate of 18.5 percent 
between 1919 and 1939 but at a rate of 29 percent between 1923 and 1939 
whilst farms of one to five acres saw 26.5 percent of their numbers disappear 
between 1923 and 1939;60 once again, these are figures that still fail to 
represent entirely the potential level of disappearance of small farms because 
they do not take into account the full extent of the creation of smallholdings by 
MAF and the County Council between 1923 and 1939 and so are not based on 
the total number of small farms that would have been in existence over the 
course of the interwar period.  Many of these disappearing farms of between one 
                                        
59 Table 5.8; table 5.9. 
60 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 3 (pp.20-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1923, 
Vol.58, Table 5 (pp.42-3); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 2 (pp.10-23). 
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and 20 acres in size would have been the dairy holdings formerly home to the 
dairy cattle whose numbers fell by 22 percent.  The 1916 report of the First 
World War Government committee upon whose recommendation the settling of 
discharged servicemen on newly created smallholdings after the War would take 
place had identified dairy holdings as a particularly good opportunity for 
smallholders, stating,  
In many parts of the country small grass holdings are the most successful 
type of small holding, and we should like to see a large increase in the 
number of holdings of this kind.61   
The creation of dairy smallholdings certainly took place, as the following 
statement from the Annual Report of 1936-37 for the Sutton Bridge and 
Holbeach Estates of smallholdings shows, stating, ‘the cow-keepers are those 
who register and sell milk, and a few who rear calves.’62  A quarter of the 
smallholders in Norfolk, the county immediately east of Lincoln-Holland, had 
turned to dairy when they found that arable farming did not pay during the 
1920s.63  Any doubt as to whether the farms affected so badly by the economic 
conditions for dairying in Lincoln-Holland over the interwar period included small 
farms is removed by reference to the same report for 1936-7 which refers to 
smallholdings of less than 50 acres in extent and contains the simple statement, 
                                        
61 NA/MAF/48/26.  
62 NA/MAF/48/336.  
63 Douet, p.86. 
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‘Dairying.  It is regrettable to record that fewer tenants keep cows than 
hitherto.’64   
Table 5.9 Numbers of Farms in Large and Small Size Categories in Lincoln-Holland 
1919-1939* 
  
Number of Holdings 
 
Year 1919 1931 
Change 
1919-1931 
1939 
Change 
1931-1939 
Change 
1919-1939 
Farm Size 
       
1-5 acres 
 
1426 1384 -42 1184 -200 -242 
5-20 acres 
 
1643 1624 -19 1337 -287 -306 
20-50 acres 
 
1171 1323 152 1236 -87 65 
1-50 acres 
 
4240 4331 91 3757 -574 -483 
        50 acres and above 
 
1149 1081 -68 1077 -4 -72 
        All Farms 
 
5389 5412 23 4834 -578 -555 
        * Sources: MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol.54, Table 10 (pp.38-9); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 
1931, Vol.66, Table 8 (pp.64-5); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9).  
 
 Little doubt can exist that attempts were made by small farmers in 
counties best known for their arable production to enter into the production of 
milk during the interwar years but evidence presented here of extensive small 
farm disappearance in these counties suggests that these were in many cases 
unsuccessful.  Lincoln-Holland can be seen as an exaggerated paradigm of the 
conditions affecting small farmers in the arable region as a whole.  Neither the 
average farm size nor the size structure of the farms of Lincoln-Holland was 
typical of counties in the arable area.  There existed a much larger proportion of 
small farms in Lincoln Holland than elsewhere in the arable region; the 
simultaneous falls in numbers of small farms and in numbers of dairy cattle can 
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be seen as a good indication of the kind of difficulties experienced generally by 
small farmers undertaking dairying in England. 
 The evidence presented here has shown that a large proportion of the 
small farm operations in Lincoln-Holland disappeared between the Wars, as did a 
substantial proportion of dairy cattle.  Evidence has also shown that there was a 
reduction of cattle on smallholdings.  Altogether, this evidence demonstrates the 
difficulties of making profit from milk production on small farms in Lincoln-
Holland.  The conditions in Lincoln-Holland are indicative of the conditions for 
small farms in all counties with the exception that there took place in Lincoln-
Holland no decrease in the arable acreage that indicates the turn to dairy of 
large farmers in other counties examined, above; thus, it is clear that it was the 
general conditions in the national milk market that were undermining the small 
dairy farms in Lincoln-Holland and which must have been undermining small 
farmers elsewhere, as has been posited.  Small farms in milk production in other 
counties simply felt the competition from local as well as from national sources. 
 
Significant Factors in the Survival of Interwar Farms: Size and Subsidy 
 
 One of the major assertions made in this thesis has been that small dairy 
farms suffered in all areas of England in the interwar years from the growth of 
competition from large farms that had moved into milk production.  Competition 
was felt both locally and from production from outside the counties in which 
small farms were situated.  Contemporary commentary has supported this 
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assertion but such commentary has, in turn, been corroborated by statistical 
evidence showing increases in dairy cattle and falls in the arable acreage of all 
the counties which have been examined.  The one exception to this pattern has 
been seen to be Lincoln-Holland where the arable proportion of farmland 
actually increased by 2 percent between 1919 and 1939 from taking up 79 
percent of the county’s agricultural area to 81 percent whilst dairy cattle 
numbers fell.  The increase in the arable acreage suggests that, on the basis of 
evidence on the simultaneous arable decreases and dairy increases that took 
place everywhere else in England, there existed arable conditions offering 
sufficient returns to farmers that they felt it unnecessary to enter into dairy 
production; indeed, the 22 percent fall in dairy cattle numbers indicates that milk 
production in Lincolnshire was particularly unrewarding.  However, the high 
percentage rates of the disappearance of small farms in Lincoln-Holland where 
farms of one to 50 acres in size decreased at a net rate of 11.5 percent between 
1919 and 1939 and 21 percent between 1923 and 1939 suggest that some 
disappearance of small arable farms would have taken place.  Added weight is 
given to this suggestion by the statistics which show that, although the 
proportion of the county’s agricultural area under arable production increased, a 
small fall took place in the actual arable area between 1919 and 1939 of 4,151 
acres; the increased proportion of arable land in the total area of crops and 
grass in 1939 compared to 1919 was caused by a greater decrease in the 
amount of grassland than in arable land in Lincoln-Holland between the two 
World Wars but this should not obscure the real fall in the arable acreage.65 
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 One of the contentions made in Chapter Four is that arable farming 
tended to take place on larger farms in general than did pastoral and, in 
particular, dairy farming.  The specific historical development of Lincoln-Holland 
meant that certain types of arable farming had flourished on farms of less than 
50 acres in size, however.  Variations of arable farming were common, in 
particular, on the large number of smallholdings created in the county since 
effective legislation for statutory smallholdings, introduced in 1907, was 
extended by the Smallholdings and Allotments Act of 1916 and the Land 
Settlement (Facilities) Act in 1919;66 creation of smallholdings was responsible 
for the 504 new farms of one to fifty acres appearing in the Agricultural Statistics 
for 1923 compared to 1919, and this figure will probably be an under-estimate of 
farm creation since it will not make apparent any simultaneous disappearance of 
any farms in those four years.  Lincoln-Holland had the fifth highest total of 
statutory smallholdings in England and Wales with 1,376 in 1932, despite being 
a comparatively small county division of only 267,801 acres in 1919; 
Gloucestershire, in comparison, covered 803,297 acres in 1919 and Hampshire’s 
acreage was 955,068.   Lincoln-Holland’s total number of farms was 5,412 in 
1931 meaning that about a quarter of its farms in that year would have been 
smallholdings.67  The 21 percent fall in the numbers of farms of between one 
and 50 acres between 1923 and 1939 is indicative of difficulties, not only 
amongst small dairy farms but on the smallholdings that were used to grow all 
                                        
66 Orwin, ‘Craze’, p.337; NA/MAF/48/322, Holbeach Farm Settlement Rent Increases, 1920-22; 
MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1923, Vol.58, Tables 2 (pp.24-34) and 5 (pp.42-3); Lockwood, p.444. 
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manner of crops, including traditional arable field crops, such as potatoes and 
cereals, as well as market garden crops, strawberries and sugar beet.68 
 Considerable doubts had existed even before the end of the First World 
War as to the advisability of creating new arable smallholdings of less than 50 
acres in extent.  F.E.N. Rogers, the Smallholdings Commissioner, was asked at 
the hearings of MAF’s departmental committee into the rural resettlement of 
discharged servicemen in 1916 whether he thought smallholdings and market 
gardening were likely to be any more profitable in the future than to date and 
gave the answer, ‘No, I do not think one could say that.  I do not think there is 
anything that justifies one in saying that.’69  Documents detailing the operations 
of the smallholdings on the estates at Holbeach and Sutton Bridge established by 
MAF just after the First World War demonstrate that the difficult conditions faced 
by smallholders between the Wars were justifying Rogers’ pessimistic 
pronouncement.  The troubles for small arable, mixed and market gardening 
farmers are indicated by the high incidence of rent arrears at Sutton Bridge, 
which were 30 percent on 1 January 1924, and at Holbeach, which amounted to 
46 percent of total rent on that date.  Difficulties were apparent by as early as 
January 1922 when R.A.V. Spencer, the director of the estates, had written to 
Mr. Howes at MAF to say, 
From what was said by the Committee together with knowledge acquired 
in the administration of the Estate, it would appear that some of the 
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tenants are in a very low state regarding funds.  The effects of this will 
doubtless be shown in the next year’s cropping.70 
 The appearance is that there was little prosperity to be found from any 
type of farming on smallholdings.  Arable farming was typical on the 
smallholdings estates of Holbeach and Sutton Bridge, according to the annual 
reports.  The most common crop was potatoes which took up 45 percent of land 
in 1934, but even these had been difficult to be made to pay at the market rate 
in 1923.71  Other crops commented upon regularly included sugar beet and 
cereals and there was widespread growing of market-garden field crops, such as 
strawberries, bulbs and tree fruit.  Some, limited, reference is made in the 
annual reports during the 1920s to livestock, including horses, pigs and poultry 
in 1928-9, with the occasional reference made to calves, but the type of farming 
that was undertaken on smallholdings and small farms appears to have made 
little difference in the struggle to survive.72  Estimations made by MAF in 1935 
revealed that smallholders would receive only 8 shillings more per week than a 
man with a family on unemployment allowance, less if the smallholder had four 
or more children, and that a weekly return of £2 15 shillings per week was 
impossible to realise on many smallholdings.73  Professor Wibberley was 
damning of the whole smallholding movement and in particular the rural 
resettlement programme by as early as 1922, writing,  
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Hundreds of war-worn men invested their small capital in small holdings 
[sic] [...] As for the soldier small holder, there are plenty of them eking 
out an existence selling bootlaces in the Strand.74 
The difficulties of all types of small farming in Lincoln-Holland are revealed 
further in the references to dairy farming that have been seen above75 but which 
are scanty reflecting the decline in small farm numbers and the reality of the 
conditions associated with dairy farming for small farmers that have been 
discovered in this thesis.76 
 The examination of farm numbers in Lincoln-Holland for the years 1919 to 
1939 that reveals significant decreases of farms of one to 50 acres in size might 
be considered to be somewhat misleading.  Disaggregation of this farm size 
category reveals a surprise: farms in the 20 to 50 acre category actually 
increased by 5.5 percent meaning that the fall in farm numbers, equal to 11.5 
percent between 1919 and 1939 and 21 percent between 1923 and 1939, was 
constituted only of farms of one to 20 acres.  A tendency for difficulties to have 
been more apparent on the smaller holdings is apparent from scrutiny of MAF 
documents concerning the Holbeach and Sutton Bridge smallholdings.  Rent 
arrears were more extensive and persisted for longer on the Holbeach Estate 
where smallholdings averaged around ten acres than on the Sutton Bridge Estate 
where farms of up to 50 acres were common; the Michaelmas, 1930 rent audit 
shows, for example, that rent arrears at Holbeach were 15.3 percent of total 
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75 This chapter, above. 
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rents whilst at Sutton Bridge they were 2.4 percent.77  Concerns amongst 
smallholders that farms of fewer than 20 acres were insufficient to provide a 
living had arisen by as early as 1920 with a report stating that smallholders on 
10 acres, as was common at Holbeach, ‘have had a bad year’ and it was stated 
that at least 20 acres with capital and horses were necessary for survival, as 
demonstrated by the virtually endemic inability of the smallholders to meet the 
rents;78 references from 1924 onwards to vacant holdings and the ‘many 
requests from sitting tenants for parts of them’ confirm the continuing difficulties 
of working on acreages in the smallest size categories examined here.79  
Documents from MAF indicate that there was at least a 15 percent failure rate in 
smallholdings between 1918 and 1926.80 
 The total fall in the numbers of one to fifty acre farms apparently arising 
completely from farms of one to 20 acres in Lincoln Holland is the more 
significant for being viewed alongside the increase of the 20 to 50 acre farms 
because it suggests, at first sight, that the size threshold at which farms were 
rendered more likely to fail was very low.  Success amongst small farmers in 
Lincoln-Holland was more evidently possible where farms were larger, on 
average; one tenant, Cheesewright, on the Holbeach ‘Colony’ had made this 
plain to the estate’s director in detailing the higher rents paid elsewhere for good 
quality land: 
                                        
77 NA/MAF/48/322; NA/MAF/48/336. 
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Cheesewright informed me that his brother was paying £5 per acre for 
some land 1½  miles from the Colony, which did not appear to me to be 
any better than our land.  He gave as a reason that his brother was 
farming 50 acres and could consequently afford to do so.81 
The example of one successful smallholder on a 50 acre holding, J. Hunt, is cited 
by the director of the Holbeach Estate in a collection of annual reports: 
J. Hunt, who lived at Holbeach Bank, had been a persistent applicant for a 
holding but was unwilling to take one of the 10 acre holdings on the 
Holbeach Estate.  He was at that time in occupation of about 7 acres of 
bare land [...]  He obtained a 50-acre holding created at Ladyday 1927 
and no tenant has pleased me more for the way in which he has rapidly 
improved and helped develop the holding; his farming is excellent, his 
homestead well ordered and trim, privet planted round his garden, lawn 
laid, fruit trees planted.  Extra stock and implement building neatly 
erected; he keeps three horses (good) and always has from 40 to 60 pigs; 
his wife makes a special effort with poultry and these make a handsome 
contribution to the profits derived from the holding.82 
The examples of Hunt and Cheesewright certainly suggest that the larger small 
farms in Lincoln-Holland were able to prosper in the interwar years and point 
towards the necessity of some disaggregation of the categories of small farms 
for other counties from within and outside the arable zone.  Such an 
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investigation may prove worthwhile in demonstrating the existence of a more 
general tendency towards interwar success amongst the larger of the small 
farms.  
 The greater success of the 20 to 50 acre farms in the arable county of 
Lincoln-Holland is replicated to some degree in Devon.83  Brassley’s observation 
of growth of the dairy herd in Devon,84 whilst supportive of the assertion that 
interwar success was not spread evenly across the dairy industry, would also 
appear to undermine the argument that small farms suffered disproportionately 
badly in all areas; in Devon, there was only a small fall in total farm numbers 
between 1919 and 1939 equal to just less than 2 percent, with farms of over 50 
acres increasing in number by 1.5 percent.  The apparent buoyancy of 
agriculture in Devon was even noticed by the Daily Mail, which had been 
stressing the existence of a depression in agriculture during the summer of 
1927, but still managed to conclude that dairy farmers near Plymouth could 
‘perhaps get along under present conditions’.85  
 Devon’s farms of between one and 50 acres in size declined at a rate of 
4.5 percent which was considerably lower than that of many other counties 
examined here.  Farms of between 20 and 50 acres actually showed an increase 
in numbers in Devon leading to the conclusion that the relatively high rate of 
survival of farms of this size might have been common to many counties in 
England and to arable farms as well as dairy farms, given the evidence seen 
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from Lincoln-Holland.  The initial assumption might be that 20 acres may have 
marked the point above which farms were able to survive given the particular, 
albeit, changing economic conditions in agriculture in England across the 
interwar period.  However, the notion that small farms were any more 
economically resilient in the county is highly questionable.  The rate of decline of 
4.5 percent of farms of one to 50 acres in Devon would have been considerably 
higher but for the provision of 858 smallholdings heavily subsidised by the State 
and County Council.86   
 Lord Ernle had commented in 1936 on the trend for small farm 
disappearance in the preceding 60 years and had noted in passing that 
maintenance of numbers of 20 to 50 acre farms was attributable to the creation 
of statutory smallholdings.87  Documentary evidence reveals the considerable 
extent to which smallholdings, created by MAF and by County Councils as the 
policy of the State, were subsidised.  Information sent out to County Councils in 
1920 detailed how much money might be lost annually by individual Councils on 
each holding and refunded by the Government through MAF, the figure for a 
holding between 25 acres and 50 acres in size being £64; Councils were making 
an annual loss on existing smallholdings of £1 19 6d per acre in 1920 which 
would also be incurred on new resettlement schemes, costing approximately 
£200,000 nationally in 1919-20 and rising to £790,000 by 1925-6.88  The 
following extract from a circular letter of 28 August 1919 to County Councils and 
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Councils of County Boroughs in England and Wales from MAF’s predecessor, the 
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, makes it clear that such losses were to be 
expected and were, thus, part of policy:  
Detailed instructions will be issued in due course as to the procedure of 
the payment by the Board as to any losses incurred up to the 31st March 
last on the whole of the smallholdings transactions of a Council to that 
date, and also as to the payment of annual losses at the end of this and 
subsequent years up to 31st March 1926.89 
Large sums of money were made available for the purchase of land to be used 
for smallholdings and to cover initial losses made on schemes for their creation.  
A letter from the Treasury to the Minister of Agriculture of 20 October 1920 
demonstrates in financial terms the enthusiasm with which smallholdings were 
regarded within certain sections of the coalition Government of the day: 
Their Lordships approve further of the proposal that the total amount to 
be made available for County Councils etc. in England and Wales under 
the Land Settlement (Facilities) Act, 1919, should be increased from 
£16,000,000 to £20,000,000 on the terms and conditions proposed by the 
Committee.90 
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A substantial portion of this expenditure was expected to be unrecoverable, 
according to Smith: ‘Government expected to write off up to £8,000,000 or 40 
percent of the authorised £20,000,000 capital outlay.’91 
 Owner occupation of smallholdings as a result of purchase by tenants was 
especially favoured by certain traditionalist rural sections of the Conservative 
Party and was, consequently, singled out for subsidy; the following comment 
dated 16 April 1925 is from the Minister of Agriculture, E.F.L. Wood, upon the 
conclusions drawn by the Assistant Secretary in the Ministry, H.L. French, in 
notes outlining the obstacles presented by the arrangements for providing loans 
to aspiring owners of smallholdings, as they stood at the time: 
Very especially do I agree with his comments upon the present “small 
ownership” policy as embodied in the Acts of 1908 and 1919 and the 
unattractiveness it presents to the would-be small cultivator in the 
absence of any real sense of proprietorship, such as is so powerful in 
promoting industry and thrift in many continental countries.  Upon such 
small ownership schemes the Government must be prepared to lose 33%, 
at any rate until the cost of building and equipment has fallen 
considerably below its present level [sic].92  
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Owner-occupation was still being considered a possibility in the mid-1930s, with 
losses on loans provided by the coalition Government to set up each 
smallholding to be sold expected to run at between £478 and £678.93   
 Smallholdings were subsidised by various other means, including rent 
abatements and the provision of experts to advise tenants on agricultural 
matters.94  H.L. French was noting in a memo of 10 January 1931 that it would 
be advisable not to let heavily subsidised smallholders, drawn, in a ‘novel 
experiment’, from the urban unemployed, to be left to ‘sink or swim’.95  By 1935, 
£20,750,000 had been spent on land acquisition and capital expenditure for 
smallholdings under the Smallholdings and Allotments Act 1908 and the Land 
Settlement (Facilities) Act 1919.96  Venn calculated in 1934 in his Presidential 
Address to the Agricultural Economics Society that the losses made over time on 
loans created by the Government to establish smallholdings would run for 70 
years: ‘The overall average annual payment will be £565,000, approximately 
equal to £34 per holding.’97  £34 per year was a considerable sum of money, 
especially when it is considered in the light of agricultural workers going on 
strike in Norfolk in 1923 over whether they were to be paid £1 5 shillings per 
week, or £65 per year.98 
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   The disappearance of farms of one to 50 acres in size across the 
interwar period has already been shown in this thesis to have been made to 
appear less significant by the addition of numbers of smallholdings created by 
the State to the yearly totals of such farms but it would appear that the category 
of farms of 20 to 50 acres is the one that will have been most affected.  Figures 
calculated from Smith show that the average size of the 10,574 smallholdings 
created in England and Wales between 1919 and 1920 was 22.5 acres and that 
the average of the 1,650 provided between 1932 and 1937 was 20 acres.99   The 
calculations make it clear that a large proportion of the smallholdings created in 
the interwar years would have contributed to the total numbers of holdings in 
the category of 20 to 50 acre farms which, in Lincoln-Holland and Devon, seem 
to have been able to prosper in the interwar years.  Documents from MAF reveal 
that the smallholdings created in Devon between 1918 and 1920 averaged just 
over 25 acres each.100  Small farms were not immune to failure in Devon, despite 
heavy subsidies for smallholdings; the county’s farms of one to five acres and of 
five to 20 acres still declined at significant rates, these being 18.5 percent and 
10.5 percent respectively.  The conclusion must be made that the rate of 
disappearance of smallholdings and, especially, of small farms of 20 to 50 acres 
as shown in the Agricultural Statistics between 1919 and 1939 and, especially, 
between 1923 and 1939 would have been noticeably higher without subsidy.101   
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 The conclusion that interwar numbers of farms of 20 to 50 acres were 
maintained through subsidy is supported by evidence from counties within the 
arable zone and pastoral zone other than Lincoln-Holland and Devon, 
respectively.  A marked coincidence existed between large numbers of state-
subsidised smallholdings and proportionally low falls in numbers of farms in the 
20 to 50 acre size category.  The arable county of Norfolk was home to 2,067 
smallholdings in 1932 making it the county with the second highest total number 
of statutory smallholdings in the country with only the Isle of Ely, with 2,145, 
having more.102  Norfolk showed little change in numbers of holdings of 20 to 50 
acres but substantial disappearance of farms of between one and 20 acres, 
suggesting that smallholding subsidies were disguising the difficult conditions 
that have been seen in much of England in this study that actually extended to 
small farms in parts of the arable region.103   
 The pattern seen in Lincoln-Holland, Devon and Norfolk is repeated 
elsewhere.  Devon’s small farm numbers have been seen to have benefited from 
smallholdings supported by subsidy but it was not the only county in the pastoral 
area which had large numbers of statutory smallholdings.  Farms of 20 to 50 
acres in Gloucestershire, where 900 smallholdings had been created by the 
State,104 declined at a significantly lower rate than farms of one to 20 acres.  
These statistics suggest strongly that smallholdings of 20 to 50 acres subsidised 
by the State compensated numerically for the failure of existing farms in this size 
category in the western dairy counties.  This suggestion is reinforced by statistics 
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that show that low levels of smallholding creation in the north of England existed 
where failure of 20 to 50 acre farms was high.  Lancashire’s 20 to 50 acre farms 
fell by 19 percent between 1919 and 1939 and only 63 farms had been created 
there between 1918 and 1920 whilst the North Riding saw only 39 smallholdings 
created between 1918 and 1920 but saw an 11 percent fall in numbers of 20 to 
50 acre farms.  Figures for the West Riding show that the creation of 196 
subsidised smallholdings between 1918 and 1920 would have increased the 
numbers of small farms by only 1 percent and, despite these additions averaging 
over 20 acres in size, farms of 20 to 50 acres fell by 18 percent.105    
 The ways in which economic conditions were affecting agriculture and 
creating small farm failure in the northern dairy counties were replicated by 
those in the western dairy counties and in the eastern arable counties but with 
the apparent failure of farms outside of the northern counties being ameliorated 
by the survival of smallholdings on the basis of State subsidy.  The apparent 
success of farms of 20 to 50 acres in Lincoln-Holland is tempered by the 
realization of the county having had the fifth highest total of statutory 
smallholdings in England in 1932 at 1,376.  Its farms of between 20 and 50 
acres increased by 5.5 percent between 1919 and 1939 but its total number of 
farms was only 5,412 in 1931 meaning that around a quarter of its farms would 
have been established using State subsidy with many of the subsidised farms 
falling into the 20 to 50 acre size category.  Farms of between five and 20 acres 
in Lincoln-Holland fell at a rate of 29 percent between 1923 and 1939 and these 
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falls, along with falls of farms of one to five acres of 26.5 percent, demonstrate 
that if subsidy was working at all for the smallest farms, large numbers of 
existing farmers working without subsidy must have fallen victim to the difficult 
conditions of interwar agriculture.  Farmers farming without subsidy must also 
have failed in the 20 to 50 acre category since the increase of 10 percent of 
these farms between 1919 and 1931 was followed by a 4 percent fall by 1939.106 
 The subsidies examined, above, were intended specifically for the creation 
of smallholdings.  They could only work in the interwar years to stabilise the 
numbers of small farms that appeared in the Agricultural Statistics for locations 
where they actually were used relatively extensively to finance the creation of 
smallholdings, such as Lincoln-Holland, Norfolk, Devon and Gloucestershire.  The 
average size of the smallholdings that were created being 20 acres and above 
indicates that a good proportion of them would have been contributing to the 
category representing the larger small farms, that of farms of between 20 and 
50 acres in size; it is the numbers in this category for the counties mentioned 
that showed the least tendency to fall when compared to the other counties 
examined in this study and, in the cases of Lincoln-Holland and Devon, numbers 
actually rose.  The effectiveness of subsidies in maintaining larger small farm 
numbers in these counties is demonstrated by the contrast between the 
successes mentioned and the falls in numbers of larger small farms that took 
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place where relatively few smallholdings were created, such as in the North 
Riding, West Riding and Lancashire.   
 Evidence suggests that numbers of the larger small farms could be 
maintained in some counties during the interwar years by the creation of 
smallholdings irrespective of the type of farming that was being undertaken in 
any area where smallholdings were numerous, whether this was the arable 
region home to Lincoln-Holland and Norfolk or the pastoral region in which dairy 
farming was common and expanding, as was the case in Devon and Gloucester.  
Such stable or increasing farm numbers in this 20 to 50 acre category caused by 
the increasing smallholding numbers are likely to have been compensating for 
the disappearance of established farms in all farming types, if evidence of falls in 
farm numbers in this category in other counties is considered.  Evidence on 
falling cattle numbers from Lincoln-Holland indicates that existing small dairy 
farms may have been failing, just as they can be seen to have been in the 
Pennine counties, whereas the maintenance of the arable area indicates that 
subsidised smallholdings may have compensated numerically for the 
disappearance of existing small arable farms; it is almost certainly the case that 
some part of the fall in farms of one to 20 acres was made up of dairy farms in 
Lincoln-Holland and elsewhere.  The likely explanation for the comparatively 
reduced disappearance of 20 to 50 acre dairy farms in the western counties of 
Devon and Gloucestershire is that, again, smallholding creation compensated 
numerically for the disappearance of existing farms.  Subsidy allowed larger 
smallholdings to compete to some extent with the larger farms that were 
encroaching on the milk market, both in western England and in the eastern 
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arable counties where dairy herds increased even where arable reductions were 
comparatively low.107  
 Smallholdings, once established, could not disappear from the Agricultural 
Statistics because they were over-subscribed, as Smith makes clear: ‘The 
number of post-War applicants provided with holdings is larger than the number 
of holdings provided since some left the holdings and others took their places.’108  
Thus, it is clear that the small farms disappearing from the Agricultural Statistics 
during the interwar period had been an established part of English agriculture.  
Note should also be taken that since 24,319 smallholders had occupied 16,700 
holdings created between the First World War and March 31 1926, there were 
7,619 small farmers who had disappeared who, since they were not in 
themselves, farm holdings, would never register in the Agricultural Statistics but 
ought to be recognised as, possibly, having failed as small farmers.109 
 Smallholdings subsidies were not nearly as effective in reducing the 
appearance of the severity of falls in numbers of farms of less than 20 acres in 
extent in any of the counties examined in this study as they were for farms of 20 
to 50 acres; falls in the size of the population of this category may have been 
made to look less severe by the creation of smallholdings but not sufficiently so 
as to make a 25 percent fall in their numbers in England look like anything less 
than serious agricultural failure.  Clearly there was a level below which subsidy 
could not provide adequate numbers of smallholders to maintain numbers to 
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replace the numbers of small farmers going out of business.  It is important to 
recognise that the size level below which farms were likely to struggle was 
around fifty acres because, despite the effects of subsidised smallholdings in 
diluting the disappearance of the 20 to 50 acre holdings, the numbers in England 
of these larger small farms did still suffer overall a 10.5 percent reduction.110 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Whetham’s characterization of pastoral agriculture in England as 
extending further southwards and eastwards at times of agricultural hardship 
can be seen to have some very basic merit in terms of interwar farming but, in 
actuality, to misinterpret the situation through considerable understatement.111   
The expansion of milk production took place in all the counties examined in this 
thesis which are drawn from all over England, demonstrated by increases in 
numbers of dairy cattle of extents varying from 6 percent to 45 percent.  Taylor 
had commented in 1987 upon the increases in dairying in most areas in the 
1920s but had failed to observe the impact of the increases in terms of the farm 
size structure of agriculture, concentrating mainly on the changing geography of 
milk production.  Accompanying the ubiquitous expansion of milk production was 
a pervasive change in the farm size structure; small farms, traditionally 
associated with dairy production, disappeared at disproportionately high rates in 
all counties. 
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 The assertion that dairy farming was a panacea for farmers in the 
interwar period was challenged in Chapter Four of this work.  Evidence has been 
presented in this chapter which supports that challenge.  Growth in output in the 
dairy industry did not guarantee survival, let alone success, for many farmers 
but especially for those on small-scale farms.  The opportunities for profiting 
from milk production traditionally associated with small farms were no longer 
easily available.  Falls in numbers of small-scale farms between 1919 and 1939 
demonstrate that, increasingly, such farms became less able to compete in the 
market for fresh milk because of falling prices caused by larger scale farmers 
turning to the dairy market in greater numbers as a means either of remaining in 
business or of increasing profits.  The result, seen in Pennine counties and 
detailed in Chapter Four, was a pattern of shrinkage of arable acreages and 
increase in cattle numbers and this has been seen in this chapter to have 
occurred elsewhere across England but on an exaggerated scale.  The same 
pattern is seen in counties in the pastoral regions of the North, West and 
Midlands as well as in the traditionally arable area of the South and East but with 
relatively larger increases taking place in dairy cattle numbers than those seen in 
the Pennine counties.  The entry into milk production of large-scale farmers who 
had formerly been uninterested in dairy farming was experienced across 
England.  Local markets for fresh milk, virtually monopolised previously by the 
small-scale milk producers traditionally associated with dairy farming, were 
invaded by local large-scale farmers and by farmers from further afield causing 
increasing difficulties for the small-scale farmers and leading, ultimately, to their 
failure and the disappearance of many of their farms.  Small farm numbers fell in 
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all the counties examined.  The nature of the changes discovered here begins to 
cast light on the evidence given earlier in this thesis of the contradiction between 
the disproportionately high incidence of the interwar disappearance of small 
farms and the relative prosperity of the dairy farming upon which much of it had 
traditionally been undertaken.  Small farms were being driven out of business 
because the type of farming in which many of them specialised was increasingly 
being dominated by big producers. 
 The difficulties of small dairy farmers in Lincoln-Holland where cattle 
numbers fell by 22 percent can act as a barometer for small dairy farmers as a 
whole, as it can for the experience of small farmers engaged in arable farming.  
Lincoln-Holland is the only county to have been examined, here, to have 
witnessed an increase in the proportion of its interwar arable acreage suggesting 
that there was little pressure from within the county on small farmers in dairy 
production from large farmers looking for an alternative to arable farming.  Small 
farms likely to be involved in dairy farming still fell by 11.5 percent in Lincoln-
Holland between 1919 and 1939, a figure that would have been higher but for 
the introduction of significant numbers of State subsidised smallholders that 
helped maintain small farm numbers.  Smallholding creation merely makes small 
farm disappearance appear to have been a less serious problem than its actuality 
and a lack of attention to it has had a serious effect in disguising the difficulties 
of farmers on the larger small farms of 20 to 50 acres in the arable region as 
well as in the Western pastoral counties of Devon and Gloucestershire.   
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 The existence of subsidised smallholdings obscures the fact that the 
significant falls actually taking place in small farm numbers were very likely to 
have been either of farmers who had been established in farming before the 
introduction of entitlement to the State aid granted to smallholders or of farmers 
who had, simply, been established without it.  The replacement of established 
farmers in the Agricultural Statistics by smallholders has had the effect of 
minimising problems that existed for farmers within the dairy industry and this 
has contributed to allowing this branch of agriculture to be represented as an 
interwar success.  Dairy farming on small farms was becoming increasingly 
difficult and it is hard to believe that unsubsidised dairy farms of less than 50 
acres were truly, economically viable in England by the end of the interwar 
period or would have remained so without the intervention of the State managed 
cultivation of all available land made necessary by the Second World War.112   
 Little reason exists to suspect that the increase of two percent in the 
proportion of farmland under arable in Lincoln-Holland was of any joy to small 
farmers, given both the difficulties that high levels of small farm disappearance 
make it clear that small farmers were facing and the evidence on difficulties 
encountered on non-dairy smallholdings.  Documentary evidence examined 
above implies that for arable farmers to have had any kind of success, they 
would have had to be farming in excess of 50 acres since it is only at 50 acres 
that smallholdings, and thus, farms in general, appear to have been viable; even 
so, such farms appear only to have prospered with the benefit of State subsidy.  
                                        
112 Short, ‘Social Impact’, p.172.  
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 Farms of above 50 acres do, indeed, appear to have prospered, at least in 
terms relative to the fortunes of small farms.  Average farm size increased across 
both the pastoral and arable regions of England and rates of failure were well 
below those of small farms.  Much of any decrease in numbers of the largest of 
the large farms of above 150 acres can be seen to be significantly due to break-
up of large holdings for the creation of smallholdings; thus, it can be seen that 
the creation of smallholdings can lead to underestimation of the decline of small 
farms and overestimation of the same for large farms.  Little has been said of 
the categories of farms of 50 to 150 acres which fall into the ‘large’ farm 
category but can be referred to as ‘medium’ size because they cover the average 
sizes of farm in 1919 in all of the counties examined, here, outside of the 
Pennine counties and Lincoln-Holland.  These farms generally maintained their 
numbers because they rarely appear to have been bought by County Councils for 
smallholding creation because they did not cover an adequate area and were 
popular amongst farmers.113    
 The difficulties of small farmers and smallholders in both arable and dairy 
farming were not experienced to anything like the same extent on these medium 
sized large farms and their numbers fluctuated slightly across the interwar period 
in England but were virtually the same in 1939 as they had been in 1919; given 
falls in overall numbers of farms, this means that they actually constituted a 
larger percentage of total farms and covered a greater percentage of the 
agricultural area in the latter year.  Even the largest farms, despite their 
popularity for splitting-up into smallholdings, covered a greater proportion of the 
                                        
113 NA/MAF/48/75. 
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agricultural acreage in 1939 than in 1919.  The amount of land covered by farms 
of various sizes is notoriously difficult to ascertain but figures calculated from 
Venn and from Astor show that the proportion of agricultural land on farms of 
one to 50 acres had fallen from 16.5 percent to 12 percent between 1921 and 
1938 whilst farms of over fifty acres occupied the other 88 percent, up from 
83.5.114  These figures simply reinforce the conclusion that the size below which 
farms became difficult to be made to pay was 50 acres. 
 Mention should be given to the very largest category of farms in Lincoln-
Holland, those of over 300 acres, within which numbers rose by 5 percent 
between 1919 and 1939 alongside an increase in the proportional arable acreage 
which took place despite falls elsewhere.  This was in a county from the east of 
England that was renowned for the arable production that was reputedly the 
province of large farms and which has been used by twentieth century historians 
to create a narrative of interwar agricultural depression.115  West Suffolk was 
another arable county that saw no fall in the numbers of farms of over 300 
acres, numbers being the same in 1939 as they had been in 1920.116  Increases 
of these large farms were occurring in the eastern region that specialised in 
cereal growing but there is incongruousness between these figures and the 
historiography, just as there is with much other contemporary evidence; for 
example, a memorandum from the MAF Special Committee on Agricultural Policy 
from 1930 states, 
                                        
114 Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture, p.359; Venn, 1923, Foundations, p.63.   
115 Chapter 1, above. 
116 MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1920, Vol.55, Table 10 (pp.42-3); MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 
1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9). 
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If there is any justification for the use of such words as “calamity” or 
“collapse” as a picture of the immediate future, such description should 
most certainly not be applied to the agricultural industry as a whole but 
can only be intended as representing the prospects of farmers and men 
dependent on the cultivation of certain areas in East Anglia and possibly 
three or four other well-defined districts in the south of England.117 
The twenty-first century historiography of the interwar years has stressed that 
the 1930s saw improvements in the conditions in agriculture but has failed to 
recognise that the benefits were felt only by larger scale farmers.118  The causes 
of such incongruousness and absences in matters pertaining to large-scale farms 
are the subject of the final chapter of this thesis. 
                                        
117 NA/MAF/38/18.  
118 Chapter 1, above. 
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Chapter 6: The Unequal Effects of State Support upon Large and Small 
Farms 
Introduction 
 
Attention has been paid in Chapter Five of this study to the Government 
subsidies that were used to create smallholdings which had the effect of shoring 
up small farm numbers during the interwar years, thereby reducing the 
appearance of failure amongst small farms and, as a result, of all farms.  The 
temporary reduction in the rates of failure of small farms simply demonstrates 
the increasing difficulties of surviving on farms of less than 50 acres in extent. 
Recognition is necessary that the money spent was not intended as a subsidy to 
existing small farm business owners but was designed actually to expand the 
numbers of the owners of such businesses, that is, small-scale farmers.  By 
introducing new cultivators into agriculture, creation of smallholdings could only 
create further competition in agriculture and cannot, therefore, be seen as 
support for the industry; however, a number of pieces of legislation were 
introduced by Governments that were intended to benefit the practitioners of 
British agriculture across the interwar years and it is the contention of this 
chapter that the major instruments of support were designed in such a way that 
they were of far greater benefit to large-scale farmers than to small-scale ones.  
Thus, small farm numbers were artificially inflated but aid to existing small farms 
was not to be found. 
 The two branches of agriculture upon which legislation had the most 
effect were the arable farmers who grew wheat and the large-scale farmers in 
Chapter 6: The Unequal Effects of State Support 
281 
 
the dairy industry; the significant legislation affecting them was passed in 1932 
and 1933, respectively.  Further legislation to subsidise and protect agriculture 
was also passed in the 1930s so that it can be argued that, despite some 
piecemeal legislation that may have given some indirect support to agriculture in 
the 1920s, English farmers moved from being in a position of free trade in the 
1920s to one of being substantially supported in the 1930s.1  The influence of 
this change on farms of contrasting scale and the assertion that large-scale 
farmers were its greater beneficiaries will be assessed by comparing trends in 
movements of the numbers of farms in differing size categories in the two 
decades.  Documentary evidence relating to the effects of the measures used to 
support agriculture will also be assessed. 
 The chapter will conclude with a demonstration of the extent to which the 
issues of concern to small farms were ignored as a result of the exaggeration of 
a single issue that was directly of relevance only to those farmers who were, in 
general, on holdings of 50 acres or more in size: the employment of agricultural 
workers.  Farmers and landowners, as well as other interest groups that formed 
a rural hegemonic bloc, demonised workers and exaggerated farmers’ economic 
difficulties which they claimed emanated from the level of wages that they were 
forced by the State to pay to workers and by the mediation of the State in 
relationships between farmers and their employees.  The result was that 
Government policies that were supposedly designed to ameliorate general 
agricultural difficulties were, actually, provided as a form of compensation to 
large-scale farmers who benefited at the expense of small farms. 
                                        
1 Orwin, English Farming, pp.88-91. 
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Contrasts in Fortune between 1919 and 1931 and between 1931 and 
1939 
 
 Considerable contrast in the percentages of farms disappearing in England 
might be expected to be found between the twelve year period of 1919 to 1931 
and the eight years from 1931 to 1939.  These periods are not equal in length 
and this must be taken into consideration when comparisons are made between 
the two, but the rationale for the separation of the interwar period into these 
two unequal shorter periods can be found in the differences of approach taken 
by British Governments during each period and, thus, in the anticipated findings.  
The year of 1931 saw the Government’s approach to agriculture change and the 
first Marketing Act was introduced which facilitated economic protection but, 
more importantly, embodied the acceptability of the concept of protection in 
legislation so that the possibility of protection became a reality beyond simply 
being an item of endless discussion.2  Most importantly, the period from 1919 to 
1931 was one in which the State intervened very little to support agriculture in a 
direct fashion whereas the period after 1931 was one in which support for the 
industry was introduced in some way for all products and became the enduring 
norm, rather than the exception.3  The difference in the length of the two 
periods will be highlighted during discussion of the analysis, where necessary. 
 Direct support for agriculture had continued after the First World War in 
the shape of the Corn Production Act of 1917 and its successor, the Agriculture 
Act of 1920, but these had been swiftly curtailed in 1921 in what has become 
                                        
2 Smith, M.J., Agricultural Support, pp.57-8. 
3 Winter, pp.83-99. 
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known as the ‘Great Betrayal’ of British agriculture.4  Support given to agriculture 
from then until the 1930s was restricted and targeted at specific groups.  Some 
support was given from the Beet Sugar Subsidy Act of 1925 to arable farmers 
who found themselves located on suitable growing land.5  The Agricultural 
Credits Act of 1923 was intended to equip farmers who had recently purchased 
farms with short-term credit whilst the Agricultural Credits Act of 1928 was to 
provide reasonably cheap mortgages to farmers through the newly established 
and lightly subsidised agricultural Mortgage Corporation.6  The tax of local rates 
on agricultural land, halved once in 1895, had been halved again in 1923 and 
completely removed in 1929.7 
 The Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933 allowed for the 
restriction of imports and home produce and led, notably, to the creation of 
Marketing Boards for hops, milk, potatoes and bacon.8  The Milk Marketing 
Board, formed in 1933, was the most important immediate result of the 
Marketing Acts if only because milk, having the largest gross output of any single 
agricultural product throughout the 1930s,9 had become the most important 
product to British agriculture.10  Other legislation had been or was, consequently, 
enacted to support farmers.  The Wheat Act of 1932 which offered subsidies to 
                                        
4 Whetham, ‘”Great Betrayal’”, pp.36-49. 
5 Whetham, Agrarian History, pp.165-9. 
6 NA/MAF/53/64; Farmer, Stock Breeder and Agricultural Gazette, 20 May 1929. 
7 NA/MAF/48/555, Agricultural Rates Bill and Act, 1929; Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British 
Agriculture, p.379; Lord Ernle, p.418. 
8 Orwin, English Farming, p.91. 
9 Total livestock and wool together had a greater output than milk but they formed a 
combination of products and, anyway, the gap was small by 1939.  Whetham, Agrarian History, 
p.260. 
10 Howkins, Death of Rural England, p.54; Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture, 
p.251. 
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producers was, when considering the ideological and economic implications of a 
subsidy to large-scale but comparatively inefficient producers, the most 
significant piece of legislation but it was only a part of the support given to 
farmers.  Agriculture had been assisted by the placing of low tariffs on imports of 
flowers, fruit, vegetables, barley, oats, eggs and dairy products under the 1931 
Horticultural Products (Emergency Duties) Act.  Import restrictions on meat were 
introduced in 1932 and subsidies were established for beef in 1934 under the 
Cattle Act and established for the long-term in 1936.  The Agriculture Acts of 
1937 and 1939 subsidised fertilizers and offered minimum price guarantees for 
oats and barley.11   
 Chapters Four and Five of this study have demonstrated that the move 
into dairy production of large-scale farms across England had increased 
competition in the milk market, driving down prices with serious implications for 
small-scale farmers, many of whom went out of business and disappeared from 
the industry along with their holdings; increases between 1919 and 1939 in 
average farm size in counties across England and a shrinkage of the acreage 
under crops and grass12 indicate that disappearing holdings ceased to function 
as individual farms and that the land either was amalgamated into other farms 
or reverted to waste where it was not appropriated as building land.13  Increased 
competition and lower prices affected small farmers located, not only in the 
                                        
11 NA/MAF/48/558, Mr. D. Lloyd George’s “New Deal” Proposals Regarding Agriculture 1935; 
Martin, Development, pp.23-8; Rooth, T., British Protectionism and the International Economy: 
Overseas Commercial Policy in the 1930s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
pp.212-38; Brown, Agriculture, pp.112-122; Rooth, T., ‘Trade Agreements and the Evolution of 
British Agricultural Policy in the 1930s’, Agricultural History Review, 33 2, (1985), 173-90, 
(p.174); Orwin, English Farming, p.91. 
12 Table 3.1; Table 3.2. 
13 Howkins, Death of Rural England, pp.56, 64. 
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traditional dairy counties, but also in the grazing counties in the pastoral region 
and in the arable region where milk production has also been shown to have 
increased.  The previously profitable dairy industry was in disarray by 193314 and 
it was at this point that milk producers voted to use the powers granted to 
agricultural producers under the Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1933 to set up 
the Milk Marketing Board (MMB) in an attempt to regulate production and 
stabilise prices.15 
 The preceding two chapters have produced evidence to show that the 
many small farms in England that disappeared between 1919 and 1939 did so as 
a result of large-scale farmers entering into milk production during the 1920s.  
The act of creation of the MMB in 1933 might be thought, logically, to have been 
action taken as a result of the distress amongst small-scale farmers that is 
demonstrated by the significant falls in numbers of small farms across all of 
these regions.  Any benefits to be derived by small farmers from the MMB would 
expect to be manifested in a falling rate of small farm disappearance.  Other 
support given to farmers during the 1930s may have been of assistance to small-
scale farmers, including the Cattle Act for livestock farmers; however, the Wheat 
Act of 1932 was the other major piece of legislation that might be expected to 
have had benefits that extended to small-scale farmers, if only because of the 
significant numbers of them existent in the arable region of England better 
known for its large farms.  Cereal growers have attracted considerable attention 
in the written history of the interwar years, particularly with regard to the 
                                        
14 Whetham, Agrarian History, p.250. 
15 Baker, pp.71-3. 
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circumstances of the withdrawal of subsidy of cereal production in 1921.16  The 
major reason why small farmers might be expected to have benefited to some 
extent from payments to wheat farming in the interwar years is that they 
constituted very close to two-thirds of the total number of farmers so that they, 
themselves, might reasonably have expected to benefit from payments that 
constituted 80 percent of the total State money devoted to interwar subsidy of 
agriculture.17 
     The expectation that State aid to farmers would have had some 
influence in reducing the rate at which farms disappeared from the Agricultural 
Statistics in the 1930s compared to the 1920s as the aid grew in abundance 
during the 1930s is confounded.  The decline in net farm numbers continued and 
actually increased so that, between 1931 and 1939, almost 8.5 percent of farms 
disappeared whereas just over 6 percent had disappeared between 1919 and 
1931.18  However, it should be taken into account that interwar creation of 
smallholdings is not represented in these figures, as noted in Chapter Three.19  
Smallholding creation had some effect in maintaining small farm numbers in the 
1920s so that gross decline of small farms was, in reality, about 14.5 percent 
which is much closer to the net decline of the 1930s of just under 12.5 percent 
which is, in itself, a slight underestimate since some smallholdings were also 
created in the 1930s.20 
                                        
16 Penning-Rowsell, pp.176-94; Moore, pp.155-68; Cooper, ‘Another Look’, pp.81-104; Whetham, 
‘“Great Betrayal”’, pp.36-49. 
17 Self and Storing, p.19. 
18 Figure 6.1. 
19 Chapter 3, above. 
20 Figure 6.1. 
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21 
 The taking into account of smallholding creation results in the rate of 
disappearance of all farms between 1919 and 1931 rising to 9 percent whilst the 
figure for 1931 to 1939 increases to a little above 9 percent.  Recognition should, 
however, be made that the earlier period analysed here is a third longer than the 
latter so the rate of disappearance in the earlier period in terms of farms 
disappearing per year is considerably lower than that of the period 1931 to 1939.  
This indicates in terms purely of numbers of failing farms of all sizes that there 
                                        
21 The figures for 'Numbers Shown in Agricultural Statistics' originate in the Agricultural Statistics, 
as cited here. In order that the estimated ‘gross’ total of farms in existence between 1919 and 
1931 can be represented here, 'Numbers Including Smallholdings' for 1919 is a composite figure 
made up of the total number of holdings shown in Agricultural Statistics for 1919 and the 
number of smallholdings created between 1919 and 1931. 'Numbers Including Smallholdings' for 
1931 is the gross total number of holdings in existence between 1931 and 1939, made up of the 
total holdings shown in Agricultural Statistics  for 1931 added to the number of smallholdings 
created from 1932 to 1939. 'Numbers Including Smallholdings' for 1939 includes all smallholdings 
in existence in 1939 (see Chapter 3 for further explanation). Figures exclude data for Monmouth. 
MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1919, Vol. 54, Table 10, pp.38-9; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1931, 
Vol.66, Table 8, pp.64-5; MAF, Agricultural Statistics, 1939, Vol.74, Table 11 (pp.38-9); Smith, 
N.R., Land, p.234. 
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was no benefit to farms, overall, in the 1930s from increased State aid to 
agriculture; in fact, the period of State aid saw relatively greater decline in total 
numbers of farms as well as of small farms.22 
 Chapter Three has shown that a quite dramatic contrast existed between 
the fortunes of small farms and large farms in England in terms of their chances 
of survival between 1919 and 1939.  Farms of over 50 acres in size decreased in 
numbers at a relatively low rate of just over 3 percent whilst the net rate of fall 
in small farms of one to 50 acres was of 20 percent, the gross rate being at least 
25.5.23  There is a striking contrast to be found between the fortunes of the two 
groups of farms of over and under 50 acres when the years 1919 to 1931 are 
contrasted with those between 1931 and 1939.   
 The statistics make it clear that small farms in England actually saw their 
numbers fall at a higher rate during the period when Government had put in 
place measures intended to support and protect home agriculture than in the 
preceding twelve years.  The larger farms saw the percentage decrease in their 
numbers fall in the latter years from a figure that was already comparatively low 
at just under 3 percent to under 1.5; the opposite was true for farms of one to 
50 acres, however, which saw the 8.5 percent net decrease in their numbers 
between 1919 and 1931 increase to 12.5 percent between 1931 and 1939.  The 
net rate at which small farms disappeared during the period of Government 
support was higher than the period without support by a considerable margin 
and was almost 1.5 times as great: 3 small farms disappeared in the eight years 
                                        
22 Figure 6.1; Smith, N.R., Land, pp.234-6. 
23 Table 3.3; Chapter 3, above. 
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between 1931 and 1939 for every 2 that had disappeared in the twelve years 
from 1919 to 1931.24  These figures do not suggest in any way that small farms 
felt the benefits of the increased Government protection and support that were 
introduced in the 1930s.  The following section will examine the contribution to 
English agriculture of the Milk Marketing Board in terms of its relative effects on 
numbers of small and large farms.   
 
The Effect of the Milk Marketing Board on Interwar Agriculture 
 
 The creation of the MMB in 1933 took place at the culmination of a period 
of problems for dairy farmers which resulted from prices of milk beginning to fall 
from 1929 onwards; in particular, farmers in more remote locations had found 
that the prices they were receiving for the milk that they were accustomed to 
selling for manufacturing purposes had fallen, forcing them to send their milk by 
train to risk the daily liquid milk prices in urban ‘accommodation’ markets.25  
Evidence presented here has shown that the interwar years saw serious numbers 
of failures of small farms and it has been demonstrated in this chapter that a 
large number of these failures took place during the period between 1931 and 
1939.   
 Taylor has cited one author, M. Messer, who wrote in a slightly 
contradictory manner in 1937 that there had appeared to be very little sign of 
hardship affecting dairy farmers in 1931, even though he notes that producer 
                                        
24 Table 3.3; Figure 6.1. 
25 Chapter 4, above. 
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retailers had been experiencing difficulties collecting the money they were 
owed.26  The inconsistency between the evidence presented here and Messer’s 
narrative is explicable by the suggestion that the full effects of problems in the 
dairy industry had not yet become apparent at the particular point in 1931 to 
which he was referring, particularly when Whetham’s figures on the timing of 
price falls are taken into consideration; these show that the serious fall in prices 
only really began in the year between June 1930 and May 1931,27  well into the 
period between 1929 to 1933, with the problems they were causing not 
becoming noteworthy until sometime later, after the point in time which Messer 
was observing, a common occurrence in agriculture.28  Messer is slightly 
contradictory in suggesting that, despite the lack of obvious problems for dairy 
farmers, producer retailers had begun to have problems maintaining their 
income streams in 1931.29  This suggestion is however consistent with the 
subsequent disappearance of considerable numbers of small farms from the 
Agricultural Statistics that has been shown to have occurred between 1931 and 
1939 because it has been shown that many small farmers ranked amongst 
producer retailers.30  The obvious conclusion that must be drawn from this is 
that a considerable portion of the disappearance of small dairy farmers that has 
been demonstrated to have taken place did so after 1931 and under the aegis of 
the MMB and, thus, that the MMB which is praised, though sometimes 
                                        
26 Taylor, D., p.62. 
27 Whetham, Agrarian History, p.251. 
28 Shirlaw, D.W.G., An Agricultural Geography of Great Britain (Oxford: Pergamon, 1966), p.9. 
29 Taylor, D., p.62. 
30 Chapter 4, above. 
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grudgingly,31 for the job it did in stabilising the milk industry, did not work very 
well in the interests of small-scale farmers.  
 The MMB was established as a result of the difficulties experienced by 
farmers for whom the sale of milk for manufacturing purposes had been usual 
before the falls in prices for such milk occurred as a result of the collapse in 
world cheese and butter prices in 1929; Whetham’s figures demonstrate that 
these problems really began in earnest in 1930 to 1931.32   Messer noted that 
there were signs of problems in 1931 in the county of Dorset which borders 
Devon in Western England, where dairy farms were on the large side when 
compared to the northern dairy farms; Dorset farmers were known for selling 
milk for manufacture into butter until a move into the liquid milk market was 
precipitated by the collapsing prices.33  Producers of milk for manufacturing 
tended to be the larger dairy farms which were further from urban centres and 
more remote so that the possibility of taking advantage of local liquid milk 
markets was rare; Mansfield has located the Marches as another of the remoter 
areas of the pastoral region in which larger dairy farms became accustomed to 
selling manufacturing milk in the 1920s, sending milk to be processed in cheese 
factories in Shropshire which had a great cheese tradition but poor urban links.34  
The struggles of such larger-farm suppliers of manufacturing milk accords with 
their farmers turning to the Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933 in order to create 
the MMB as a means of their own salvation. 
                                        
31 Viscount Astor and Rowntree, p.275.  
32 Whetham, Agrarian History, p.251. 
33 Taylor, D., p.62. 
34 Mansfield, English Farmworkers, p.22. 
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 The MMB was intended to eliminate fluctuations in prices in the milk 
market.  The dramatic falls in the price paid for manufacturing milk from 1929 to 
1933 to the ‘ruinously low’ 5d per gallon,35 had they been allowed to persist 
without the intervention of the Board, would have continued in their effect on 
the liquid milk market as producers of manufacturing milk continued to switch to 
it in desperation, increasing supply in a market of static demand, driving down 
prices.  The MMB was voted for by farmers and its personnel were elected by 
farmers.  It was given control over levels of milk production and no farmer could 
sell milk without a licence from the Board.  The Board was guaranteed to be paid 
a certain price by Government for all the milk that was produced, based on 
prices in the open market for both liquid and manufacturing milk, and an 
average of these two prices was then paid to the producer and was known as 
the ‘wholesale’ or ‘effective guaranteed’ price.36  It is, thus, clear that farmers 
formerly producing for the manufacturing market, who tended to be large scale, 
would see the prices paid to them rise.37  The opposite is true for the producers 
of retail milk, as the first Reorganization Commission for Milk had made clear in 
1933: ‘Producers who sell milk for liquid consumption will, under our scheme, be 
contributing to raise the price of milk sold for manufacture’;38 the larger amongst 
the retailers might have been glad of the stability that was brought to milk prices 
by the Board.  Some producers had been, according to the trade journal of the 
MMB, Home Farmer, on the point of withdrawing milk from the market 
altogether in protest at the low prices offered to them in 1932 and were referred 
                                        
35 Baker, p.91. 
36 Ibid., p.136. 
37 Viscount Astor and Rowntree, British Agriculture, p.275. 
38 MAF, Economic Series No.38, p.107. 
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to as ‘desperate strikers’.39  They had been receiving diminishing prices that 
fluctuated daily from 1929 onwards and had found themselves with little or no 
control over the prices paid for their milk, especially if they had switched from 
selling milk for manufacturing to despatching it to the urban accommodation 
markets for liquid consumption.40  
   Small farmers were, thus, guaranteed a market for their milk by the MMB 
but it is highly questionable whether those working at small-scale would have 
been receiving a price for the small amount they produced that was sufficient to 
allow them to survive, based as it was on an average price for all milk, and this 
is shown to have been the case by the significant numbers of small farmers who 
went out of business during the period 1931 to 1939.  A number of the smaller 
farmers who made up the bulk of producer retailers were acknowledged in 1938 
as having been affected quite badly.41  There was little scope for expanding 
production for these small farmers because production over and above levels 
agreed with Government at the beginning of the year simply resulted in the 
reduction of the price paid to the producers.42  Such dilution would not 
necessarily have deterred large-scale producers because they benefited from 
economies of scale so that a small price fall on a large increase of output would 
increase their profits; however, the knock-on effect of big producers behaving in 
this way would be to reduce the prices paid to all producers, including the small-
scale ones that could afford price falls least.  Lowered prices and increased 
                                        
39 Home Farmer, July 1935. 
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contributions to the MMB would have had the kind of repercussions that are 
reflected in the falls in numbers of small farms in the dairy counties and 
elsewhere across England where farmers had turned to dairy, as detailed in 
Chapters Four and Five.43  Farms of between one and 50 acres in the 
increasingly dairy county of Gloucestershire saw a fall of 6 percent in their 
numbers between 1919 and 1931 increase to one of over 15 percent between 
1931 and 1939 whilst the West Riding’s farms of one to 50 acres fell at 13.5 
percent from 1931 to 1939 at the same time that farms of over 50 acres saw 
only a 0.5 percent reduction in their numbers;44 that the responsibility for such 
falls and disparities lay at least partly with the work of the MMB are reiterated by 
the statement of the second Reorganization Commission for Milk of 1936 that ‘all 
producers have not benefited equally’, an understatement, as far as small 
farmers were concerned.45  
 The producer retailers, whose status as generally small farmers was 
confirmed by one farmer at the MMB’s 1939 annual general meeting (AGM) 
having to state that addressing them all as ‘small men’ meant that any larger 
producer retailers tended to be overlooked, were undoubtedly one sector of 
producers who felt that they had suffered from the setting up of the MMB.46  The 
Reorganization Commission provided ammunition for their weapons of 
complaint: 
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While there must be considerable variation in the amount of advantage 
gained by individual producer retailers from the scheme, on the whole 
they must have gained less than other classes of producers.47 
 Producer retailers felt particularly unhappy about the fact that they were 
expected to pay two levies, one to keep prices level across the country as a 
whole and another to equalise prices within the regional ‘pools’, an arrangement 
which would effectively increase the prices paid to large-scale producers of milk 
for manufacturing.48  The domination of producer retailer ranks by farmers of 
small-scale holdings is demonstrated by the following statement from the journal 
publication Milk Producer Retailer, which simultaneously reflects the 
dissatisfaction felt with the workings of the MMB in respect of the levies: ‘The 
levies payable by producer retailers often rose to an amount greatly in excess of 
the total rent payable for their farms.’49  The journal carried the views of T.H. 
Morgan, Vice-President of the National Federation of Milk Producer Retailers 
(NFMPR), who was indignant about the role of the MMB in representing large-
scale farmers: 
To all appearances the MMB, whether we like it or not, has come to stay, 
and, no doubt, great credit is due to the Board for the successful way in 
which they have endeavoured to assist the Wholesale Producers in 
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marketing their milk; but surely we, as Producer Retailers, should not be 
asked to foot the bill for their experiments.50 
 The problems of the producer retailers in their relationship with the MMB 
and the wholesale producers who were dominated by large-scale farmers had 
become so apparent by 1939 that the Home Farmer, the very journal of the 
MMB, itself, sought to acknowledge them: 
There are many points where the activities of the Board on behalf of the 
wholesalers can prejudice the best interests of Producer Retailers.  This 
point of view has now been accepted by the Milk Marketing Board.51    
The journal revealed that serious misgivings about effects of the Board on 
producer retailers and small farmers had been aired at the MMB’s AGM in 1939.  
Larger, ‘wholesale’ producers were entering the scheme and increasing 
production, with their numbers having risen from 84,400 in 1934-5 to 95,500 by 
1939, increasing the amount and overall value of milk produced but, thereby, 
reducing prices paid to farmers.52  The difficulties of small farmers in acquiring 
the capital to undertake the necessary expansion or improvements in their 
businesses in order merely to maintain their level of income are clear.  One 
smallholder, Mrs. Campbell, highlighted the ‘tremendous amount of money’ she 
would need in order to expand her business to allow her to sell milk from 
tuberculin tested cows which attracted a premium price under the MMB’s 
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regulations.53  Fletcher confirms the position voiced by Campbell, showing that 
to change to producing tuberculin tested and pasteurised milk, even after the 
Second World War, was too costly for small Lancashire farmers, especially 
producer retailers.54  The Milk Producer Retailer argued vehemently against 
pasteurization and the prohibitive costs to small farmers of equipping their 
farms, justifying their opposition in articles on its dubious advantages and 
provenance, such as, ‘Pasteurization Doesn’t Work and Why’, and suggesting the 
existence of a cheaper alternatives in, ‘Exclusive Interview with Discoverer of 
New Antiseptic.’55  Mr. D.T. Davies stated at the AGM that numbers of producer 
retailers had fallen by 50 percent since the inception of the MMB and that ‘the 
Producer Retailers were being slowly but surely squeezed out of business’; 
Davies was echoed by Mr. Richardson of Blackpool who was paraphrased as 
saying, ‘He thought the Producer Retailer was passing through the process of 
elimination owing to the unfair methods of the Board.’56   
 Statistics show that, along with the West Riding, both Lancashire and the 
North Riding saw high rates of disappearance of small farms between 1931 and 
1939 which were 8.5 and 12.5, respectively, which are similar to rates of decline 
in the 1920s when the difference in the length of the time periods under 
consideration is taken into account.57  In contrast, rates of disappearance of 
large farms fell in both counties with the rate in the North Riding being less than 
0.1 percent in the latter period.  The two counties saw average increases in their 
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dairy cattle of well below those for England as a whole, suggesting that the small 
farmers may have been exposed to less local competition than was felt in other 
counties across England.  Counties that saw large increases in dairy herds in the 
interwar years and were becoming known as counties with substantial dairy 
interests during the 1920s58 saw their small farms declining rapidly after 1931.  
Devon’s small farms fell by 9 percent in numbers between 1931 and 1939, 
having increased by 4.5 between 1919 and 1931; in the same periods, 
Hampshire saw an increase in small farm failure rates from 8.5 percent to over 
15, West Suffolk of 5 percent to 11 and Norfolk of less than 1 percent to 11, 
whilst Lincoln-Holland saw an increase of 2 percent in the earlier period become 
a fall of 13.5 between 1931 and 1939.59   
 Dissatisfaction with the MMB was not confined to complaints at the AGM.  
The kind of factionalism existent within the dominant class recognised by Marx60 
is exemplified by the encouragement to farmers from Lord Beaverbrook, the 
proprietor of the Daily Express and advocate of imperial preference in trade, to 
vote in a poll to revoke the establishment of the MMB and to return the milk 
industry to unregulated trading conditions.  Only 19 percent of producers voted 
to revoke the Milk Marketing Scheme as run by the MMB but it is clear that those 
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who rejected it were small-scale producers given that they only commanded 
control over 13.5 percent of total output.61 
 The result of the revocation poll is an indication of how the Marketing Act 
of 1931 allowed the MMB to be established as an organization that was not 
representative of the interests of small-scale farmers.  The agricultural economist 
F.J. Prewett outlined the way in which such a marketing scheme as that run by 
the MMB could be brought into existence.  Prewett noted that ‘unless two thirds 
of the registered producers voting on the poll, controlling two thirds of the 
product of those voting, support it, the scheme fails.  In any case, should less 
than half the producers (including those exempted) vote, the scheme again 
fails.’62  Thus, it can be seen that it was not necessary to gain even a majority of 
the support of the producers to implement a marketing scheme, merely to avoid 
substantial opposition, because only half of registered producers needed to 
actually participate in the poll to make it legitimate and only two thirds of that 
half – one third of all eligible producers - needed to vote in favour.  On the other 
hand, it was dependent on support from large scale producers in order to make 
up the ‘two-thirds of product’ stipulation; a few large scale producers voting 
amongst the third voting in favour of it could see it implemented whilst a large 
number of small producers voting against it could still be undermined in their 
desire to implement it because they may not control sufficient of the production 
necessary to see it rejected.  Large scale producers would have had to have 
seen some benefit to themselves in order to support a scheme and so, in effect, 
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they would be determining the future prices of the particular product in question, 
even for small producers, because they were the ones who would determine 
whether or not a scheme which would fix prices would come into existence.  In 
the case of milk, small-scale producers who, because of market advantage due 
to location and specific local marketing conditions, might otherwise have 
benefited from higher prices were forced to accept the prices offered to them by 
the MMB.  The structure of the MMB meant that it served further the interests of 
large-scale farmers since every extra ten cows in a herd conferred upon their 
owner an extra vote on all matters concerned with the setting-up, 
administration, amendment and possible revocation of the Scheme.63  
 Holderness recognises that the MMB and other Marketing Boards were 
producer controlled institutions that were firmly under the control of the 
agricultural interest and that this, in principle, meant the NFU and the Country 
Landowners’ Association (CLA).  Furthermore, these associations were, in turn, 
both dominated by large-scale farmers and landowners: ‘Neither association 
became demotic; the leaders of both were still customarily men of property, 
education and social weight, presiding over a more or less common stock of 
members’.64  Cloke and Goodwin regard Gramsci’s theory of a ‘hegemonic bloc’ 
of allied class forces as pertinent to changing rural politics65 and it is appropriate 
to use it to describe a post First World War ‘alliance’ between large scale farmers 
and large landowners.  Woods indicates that rural political power remained elitist 
                                        
63 Baker, pp.22-3. 
64 Holderness, ‘Farmers’, p.112. 
65 Cloke, P., and Goodwin, M., ‘Conceptualizing Countryside Change: from Post-Fordism to Rural 
Structured Coherence’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 17 3, (1992), 321-
36, (p.325). 
Chapter 6: The Unequal Effects of State Support 
301 
 
in the interwar years, attainable only through the social capital accessible 
through membership of elite social and professional networks, such as those of 
farmers and landowners.66  Brassley supports this, invoking Howkins, Thompson, 
Cannadine and Newby in support of his argument that after the First World War 
the reallocation of land from landlords to farmers incurred a coincidental and 
partial transferral of power and deference.67  The importance of the kind of 
networks and associations referred to by Woods and Brassley is recognised by 
Bourdieu in his appraisal of the concept of social capital which he regards as 
social resources which stem from and can be employed in relation to social 
connections and the membership of certain social groups which, in this case, had 
certain elitist economic functions.68  Bourdieu stresses the material basis of 
power but recognizes the importance and interdependence of different forms of 
capital - economic, social and cultural - to the elitist social and professional 
networks to which Woods refers. 
 The possession of significant social capital by large-scale farmers and 
landowners, premised upon the ownership of economic capital, resulted in their 
attaining positions of power, such as leadership and occupation of other 
positions of power in the NFU or CLA.  Such power facilitated the creation of the 
policies of these associations that would work in the economic interests of the 
groups from which they, as leaders, were drawn: owners of capital for 
agricultural use and of land, otherwise referred to as large-scale farmers and 
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landowners.  Smith indicates that the beginnings of a ‘policy community’, 
wherein the representatives of social and economic pressure groups, such as the 
CLA and in this case, especially, the NFU are relied upon by Government to 
inform its policy, are discernible in the interwar years although it was not until 
after the Second World War that the agricultural policy community’s existence 
became obvious.69  By means of such a policy community, policy is implemented 
by Government but formulated in the interests of those with considerable 
economic and social capital who lead and influence the pressure groups.   
 The presidency of the MMB from its beginning with Thomas Baxter is an 
example of the conduits by which the policies of large-scale farmers became 
enshrined in Government policy; Baxter was an NFU stalwart, head of various of 
the Union’s committees and a substantial mixed farmer of at least 300 acres in 
Cheshire; Baker has written that, ‘the farmers of the day were not without 
friends in high places, and the plight of the industry directed the Government to 
seek remedial measures.’70  Smaller farmers, such as the producer retailers, if 
they were not aware that their needs would not be met particularly well, could 
not blame it on the Milk Producer Retailer, the publication of the newly formed 
National Federation of Milk Producer Retailers (NFMPR), which spelled it out for 
them in October 1935: ‘There was no organisation in existence to represent the 
producer retailers’ cause, the attitude of the NFU being largely based on the 
interests of the wholesale producers.’71 Cox Lowe and Winter show that 
membership of the NFU increased in dairy areas after the introduction of the 
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MMB and, hence, once agreements with distributors had broken down, 
suggesting that the big dairy and ex-arable dairy farmers were influential in 
lobbying amongst farmers for the MMB.72  The smallest producer retailers would 
have suffered under the MMB through the imposition of their levy payments, as 
was made clear by Harold Pears, Chairman of the NFMPR:  
The measure of independence which the PR has always hitherto felt has 
now been dangerously assailed.  He is now no longer master of his own 
business.  He has been bound up in a Milk Marketing Scheme, which is 
the law, and must be carried out.73 
The long-term decline of the producer retailer is testament to the paucity of 
influence that the NFMPR was able to wield in comparison to that of the large-
scale farmers.  Davies and Richardson had certainly been correct in the long-
term at the 1939 AGM of the MMB in their dismal predictions for the future of 
the producer retailer:74 having numbered up to 50,000 in the early days of the 
MMB, there were only 6,000 left in 1973.75   
 The linking of prices to production levels by the MMB meant that the 
smallest farmers were unlikely ever to be able to earn a decent living from milk 
production because increases of production led to falls in prices.  The result was 
that small farmers struggled and disappeared; this could be argued to be a form 
of concentration of the industry of milk production induced by the action of the 
State, but no reason exists to suggest that such concentration would not have 
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taken place had the milk market been left to carry on through open competition 
in 1933.  Concentration and monopolistic tendencies are, if not inevitable 
certainly common in free market capitalism76 and were identified in British 
agriculture in 1964.77  Falls in numbers of small farmers that had been occurring 
before 1933, though disguised in some places by the creation of smallholdings, 
indicate that concentration was taking place much earlier.  Astor and Rowntree 
argued in 1938 that such a process should be left to work in the case of the 
distribution of milk since this would bring down the price to the consumer and, 
therefore, were effectively condemning the many small farmers involved in 
producer retailing to annihilation, although they stopped short of suggesting that 
production by farmers should be completely unregulated.78  The small producers 
seem to have been doomed whether they continued in free competition or under 
the auspices of a body funded by the State but under the control of large-scale 
producers.  The words of T.H. Morgan, Vice-Chairman of the NFMPR in 1935, 
would seem to have been prophetic:  
I picture in my mind a Federation 70,000 strong… to hold the balance of 
power between the Producers and the Distributors.  For make no mistake 
about it, there are to-day strong and powerful organizations, political and 
otherwise, that are pledged to cripple the small man.79 
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The Differential Effects of the Wheat Act on Large and Small Farms 
 
 The MMB has already been shown to have been dominated by the 
interests of large farmers, to the detriment of small milk producers.  A similar 
situation occurred in the creation of legislation with regard to the interests of 
large-scale arable farmers which were reflected in the agricultural policies that 
developed in the 1930s.  The Agriculture Act of 1937 extended subsidies to oats 
and barley, and, even earlier, the 1925 subsidies granted to sugar beet growers 
were a direct aid to arable farmers, sugar beet offering a complementary or 
alternative crop to wheat.  The Wheat Act of 1932 was of particular benefit, 
offering guaranteed prices to farmers for wheat produced for sale with any 
difference between the guaranteed price and the lower market price being paid 
by Government, and it was enacted after the development of a characterization 
of large-scale arable farmers as being peculiarly badly affected by agricultural 
conditions since the First World War.80  The development of this picture and the 
concurrent marginalization of small farmers will be examined here.  
 The marginalization of small farms and their occupants by issues relating 
to large arable farms in the interwar years becomes apparent in the ways in 
which agriculture and the countryside were represented by commentators in the 
popular press.  In 1927, the Daily Mail ran a campaign focusing on the difficulties 
faced by farmers, the content of which demonstrates the popular understanding 
of farmers as substantial landowners suffering economic difficulties.  The Daily 
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Mail carried quotes from farmers, almost all of whom farmed large arable 
acreages, including farms of 1000 acres, 1100 acres, and 600 acres, and, 
significantly, included a quote from the landowner Sir Cuthbert Quilter, Bart., 
owner of 10,000 acres and farmer of 3,000; the smallest farm to be commented 
upon was still substantial, at 340 acres.81  The paper’s correspondent added, on 
10 June, ‘I was told that demand for farms with a fairly large proportion of 
arable is very limited.  Farms are being offered at auctions and there is scarcely 
a bid for them.’ 
   The depression that followed the Wall Street Crash of 1929 is accepted as 
having adversely affected farmers by 1931,82 but it was represented as 
particularly serious for large-scale farmers in the Eastern counties where large 
arable farms were common.  The Lincolnshire, Boston and Spalding Free Press 
ran an article in September 1931 entitled ‘Protection for Agriculture’ which 
represented the views of Mr. Frank Dennis, of Frampton Hall, Boston who fought 
the Holland Division in the 1929 by-election as an independent agricultural 
candidate.  Dennis wanted to draw the attention of the Division’s electors to the 
‘letter, addressed by Lord Beaverbrook to the “Daily Express”, published on the 
12th inst. addressed to farmers and labourers’ which stated that,   
Agriculture at last is within measurable distance of getting that justice 
which has been denied it in the past by all political parties […] a full and 
complete programme.  No half measures will do […] the farmer has a lot 
of ground to make up to cover past losses […] To dwell upon the success 
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of an individual or two gained in past years, or to pay any serious 
attention to the reports of big scale farming successfully coping with the 
hard times, as recently reported in the press – the deductions from which 
by the ordinary reader are entirely fallacious – as just grounds for an 
increase of wages is only throwing dust in the eyes of the workers.  […] 
there is no money in the industry: it is indeed on the verge of bankruptcy 
and many engaged in it are already bankrupt.83   
No mention is made of the small farms existing in Lincoln-Holland, the county in 
which the newspaper was published, possibly because the large numbers of 
smallholdings created in the county during the years after the First World War 
had disguised their problems.  Larger farms had suffered falls in numbers 
between the First World War and 1927 in the arable region but some of this was 
due to the breakup of farms of over 150 acres to create smallholdings and small 
farms; West Suffolk, Norfolk, Lincoln-Holland and Hampshire all saw falls in 
numbers of their farms of over 300 acres during the period when smallholdings 
creation was at its zenith and these were all counties characterised by 
considerable numbers of smallholdings.84  W.H. Blakeston, county secretary of 
the NFU in the East Riding, where farms averaged over 106 acres in size by 
1939, had told the Daily Mail of ‘the breaking up of large estates in East 
Yorkshire’85 but, even so, falls in large farm numbers were by no means seen 
everywhere in the arable counties.  West Suffolk saw its farms of 100 to 150 
acres increase between 1919 and 1931 by 3.5 percent whilst farms of 20 to 50 
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acres fell by 10 percent.  Farms measuring more than 50 acres in size in Norfolk 
increased in number by 0.5 percent whilst the farms of 50 to 100 acres 
increased their numbers by 9.5 percent between 1919 and 1931.86 
 The Wheat Act was the result of the reciprocal relationship that had 
developed between the influential landowners and farmers perpetuated in the 
interwar period to the benefit of the arable farming section of the agricultural 
community.  Sales of landed estates after the First World War are often blamed 
upon the financial difficulties of the aristocracy and gentry but those who held on 
to land often went into farming on large acreages in their own right87 and 
exercised considerable influence on Government agricultural policy in the 
interwar years on behalf of large-scale farmers, whose ranks they now shared 
and with whom they shared a direct economic interest.  The Minister of 
Agriculture, Edward Wood, in 1925 made this relationship obvious in a letter he 
wrote to his Parliamentary Secretary, the landowner Viscount Bledisloe, in which 
he stated that he was a ‘Conservative’ who ‘believes in the debt that the country 
owes to landowners’.88   
 Guttsman’s identification of the extent to which politicians from an 
aristocratic background still dominated the Cabinet in 1935 and held ministerial 
positions in ministries ‘which pursued traditional policies’, such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture, suggests that the agricultural interest acting through social capital 
operating within the hegemonic bloc of farmers and aristocratic landowners may 
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well have been considerable within Governments throughout the interwar 
years;89 such a suggestion is supported by the opinion of the president of the 
Agricultural Economics Society in 1956 who believed that data from the Farm 
Management Survey had been used during the interwar years for ‘political 
purposes’.90  This suggestion is further strengthened by Guttsman’s assertion 
that those in power would tend to select people of similar class and education 
with whom to work,91 thereby, in this case, creating a Government body 
sympathetic to those with whom they shared social capital; this assertion is in 
concord with Bourdieu’s research that suggests that the social class background 
and the cultural and conditioned behavioural factors that make up the habitus of 
the individual, that is, the totality of his or her social practices, are highly 
influential in the attainment of social position.92  Woods points out the 
landowning background of the incumbents of various important and influential 
local political offices in Somerset, including the lieutenancy, the chair of the 
county council, and the aldermanic bench, and discerns the emergence of a new 
political class in the countryside, one that included farmers.93   
 Landowners still maintained much control over rural society following the 
War, merely adopting a less personal approach in the rural community itself, but 
they were now sharing this control as part of a broadened elite that included 
larger scale farmers who had assumed the role of the custodians of the 
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countryside.94  Haxey had detailed at length the influence of the landowning 
aristocracy in the House of Commons in 1939.95  Moore articulates the position 
that the landowning and farming interest held in the Conservative Party that 
dominated British politics in the interwar period:  
In the Conservative Party, the voices of the agrarian chieftains – the 
knights of the shires, the landowning peers, and the farmers – have 
always been regarded with the utmost respect and endowed with great 
authority in the conduct of affairs.96 
Newby et al. suggest that the power of large-scale arable farmers to see policy 
constructed in their favour is demonstrated by the disproportionate value of the 
interwar financial support to agriculture that they received, given that 80 percent 
was directed towards them.97  The significance of the strength of the relationship 
between arable farmers, landowners and Government for any type of smaller 
scale farmer is demonstrated by the dwindling interest as the 1920s proceeded 
in the various campaigns for the establishment of smallholdings.98  Even the 
traditionalists in the Conservative Party had, by 1926, abandoned interest in the 
formation of a new English small farm ‘yeomanry’ which has been shown to have 
been firmly on the political agenda immediately following the war.99  
 The political influence of arable farming can also be seen in the promise 
made by the Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin that, were the Conservatives to be 
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re-elected in 1923, arable farmers would receive an annual subsidy of £1 per 
acre.  The lack of consideration of such a promise for the interests of small 
farmers is exemplified by the response of the journal, The Dairy World and the 
British Dairy Farmer, which would have been of interest to farmers of that 83 
percent of holdings of less than 50 acres in size which Addison recognised 
several years later were still reliant to a considerable degree on dairying:100 ‘it 
has been argued that […] the average dairy farmer does not stand to benefit by 
any subsidy in respect of arable land, for the reason that he has so little of it.’101 
 The influence of the large-scale arable farming interest in the formation of 
Government policy and in the formation of the general perception of agriculture 
as an arable undertaking should be obvious from examination of the NFU Record 
of March 1921 which carries an article headlined, ‘The Wheat Prices Victory’.  
The journal quotes an extensive array of newspapers that had congratulated the 
NFU on its work in securing extended Government price guarantees for wheat 
and oats under the 1920 Agriculture Act, including The Times, Birmingham Daily 
Post, Yorkshire Herald, East Anglian Daily Times, The Field, Staffordshire 
Advertiser, Hull Daily Mail, British Times and Mirror and Scarborough Post.102  
The same influence may not be immediately obvious when reference is made to 
the events of 1921 when Government price guarantees to farmers for wheat and 
oats were withdrawn at short notice rather than the four years promised.  The 
so-called ‘Great Betrayal’ of agriculture was applicable only to arable farmers; 
however, it must be recognised that, at the time, the NFU had been relatively 
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happy to forego the guarantees in exchange for the abolition of the Agricultural 
Wages Board (AWB) which had fixed a minimum wage in agriculture.103  The 
AWB was, of course, only of significance to farmers of acreages generally above 
50 where it was necessary to employ agricultural labourers and especially to 
arable farmers who employed a much higher ratio of men to any given area than 
most other types of farming.104  Further disadvantages to small farmers had 
existed in the regulations of the Corn Production Act and Agriculture Act, as the 
following extract from a letter to the agricultural publication, Mark Lane Express 
makes clear: 
Again, take the corn production claims for 1921, what do we find?  The 
Govt. refuses to pay for fractions of an acre; therefore, the small farmer 
with one-and-a-half acres of oats has one third of the claim struck out.  
What would happen if the Govt. blue pencilled one third of the amount 
due to the large farmer, say, with a claim for 90 acres of oats?105   
 The notion of the repeal of Part One of the Corn Production Act as the 
‘Great Betrayal’ of agriculture grew throughout the interwar years in agricultural 
circles, and this was in spite of its lack of significance to small-scale farmers and 
of the fact that arable farmers were compensated with £19,000,000 as a salve in 
the year following the withdrawal of support.106  The compensation itself was 
regarded as tainted; H.M. Conacher, an agricultural economist working in the 
Civil Service commented in reply to a paper given by J.A. Venn in 1934 on State 
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support for agriculture, ‘The amount paid on the repeal of the Corn Production 
Act is surely the result of the most inglorious breach of promise case ever settled 
out of court.’  Venn agrees throughout this article, but observes pithily that ‘from 
few of the beneficiaries themselves have audible comments been recorded’, 
implying the existence of a certain resentment amongst agriculturalists that had 
been festering since 1921.107  The restoration of the minimum wage in 
agriculture in 1924 was resented by arable farmers, according to one farmer, 
G.F. Ryder, replying to Venn’s paper, but he also stated that he thought that the 
Sugar Beet (Subsidies) Act of 1925 had been implemented as compensation to 
arable farmers for the results of the wage legislation.108  
 C.S. Orwin, the agricultural economist, former farmer and former land 
agent to the arable landowner, Christopher Turnor, wrote in 1930 of the 
‘tumbling down’ of the countryside, of the farmers who ‘may throw in their 
hands’ and of the ‘potential rural unemployment’ that would, of course, only 
derive from and affect those farmers with the significant capital necessary to 
employ labour, notably arable farmers.109  The dire circumstances in which 
arable farmers were represented as having found themselves by the 1930s is 
reflected in the legislation that was passed that was in their favour.  The Wheat 
Act of 1932 was introduced to give guaranteed prices to farmers who sold wheat 
off the farm.  The average size of farms in the arable counties has already been 
shown to have been large and it was these counties that were to benefit by far 
the most, as Astor and Rowntree recognised in 1938:  
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Certain criticisms of the Act were raised during the first period of 
operation (1931-7), when it was pointed out that most of the benefit 
accrued to a restricted area in the eastern and southern parts of Britain 
where wheat growing is concentrated, an area which was already 
receiving most of the sugar-beet subsidy.110 
Further advantages gained by the cereal farmers were that, not only were they 
represented on the Wheat Commission, set up to administer the Act, but also, 
because of the formation of the Commission, the subsidy they were paid was not 
exposed to annual scrutiny in the House of Commons.111  Conacher’s opinion of 
the Wheat Act was that it was an extension of the compensation to arable 
farmers as a result of the Repeal of the Corn Production Act and it is indicative of 
the influence upon the agricultural agenda of arable and, thus, on the whole, 
large-scale farmers: ‘The Wheat Quota payments must also represent conscience 
money.’112  Little doubt can exist of the overall attitude to large and small-scale 
farmers and the differential treatment they received within the political 
establishment once consideration is made of the following extract from the 
Minority Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture which had recommended 
in 1919 the extension of the price guarantees to cereal farmers: 
The corn grower is to be protected, but the producer of meat is to take 
his chance in the open market.  The large farmer deriving his income 
mainly from cereals will have a claim on the Treasury should the market 
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price fall below the level of the guaranteed price.  The small farmer, 
making his living by the production of butter, eggs, cheese, bacon, etc., 
commodities that were in the past affected quite as much as corn by 
foreign competition, must overcome his fears and fight his own battle.113 
 The acreage under cereals had fallen from seven million to five million 
between 1913 and 1939 but the acreage under wheat increased between 1931 
and 1939 by half-a-million, demonstrating the incentive that cereal farmers 
received from the Wheat Act.114  The relative effects of the conditions in 
agriculture and the effects of policies on farms of differing sizes from 1931 to 
1939 can be seen in the Agricultural Statistics.  Farms of one to 50 acres in 
England continued to decrease in numbers with a fall of at least 12.5 percent 
whilst farms of over 50 acres fell by less than 1.5 percent, as noted above.115  
Norfolk saw falls of over 11 percent in farms of less than 50 acres and of larger 
farms of only 3 percent; farms of one to 20 acres disappeared at a rate of 14 
percent.116  West Suffolk’s farms of over 50 acres saw a 4 percent fall in number 
but a reversal of fortunes of farms of over 300 acres which had fallen by 9.5 
percent between 1919 and 1931 but increased by over 2.5 percent between 
1931 and 1939, whilst the under 50 acre category lost over 11 percent, including 
14.5 percent of farms of one to 20 acres in size.  The fall in numbers of farms of 
over 50 acres in Lincoln-Holland reduced from 6 percent to less than 0.5 percent 
with an opposite and more marked trend shown by one to 50 acre farms which 
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saw 2 percent increases turned to losses of 13.5.117  The eastern wheat-
producing counties, which had been reported as suffering the worst of the 
agricultural depression in 1930, had seen the numbers of foreclosures by the 
banks on farmers fall from 48 in 1932 to 18 in 1934, according to documents 
from MAF which contain the following extract from a memorandum: 
From the point of view of farm incomes the Wheat Act has probably been 
the chief measure of farm relief of recent years and it seems therefore 
that we may draw the inference from the above figures that the relief was 
provided under the Wheat Act in those parts of the country where the 
financial situation was most serious.118 
 The absence of benefits for small farmers from the Wheat Act is apparent 
from the opinions of the agricultural experts of the day.  The report of the 
committee engaged to investigate the future settlement of discharged 
servicemen on smallholdings had concluded that, even by 1916, farms of up to 
50 acres of the mixed arable and grassland type where cereals and roots were 
grown for cash and as feed for the farm’s livestock were uncompetitive and ‘do 
not provide a living’, with the ‘slavish copying’ of large farm methods being 
unsustainable on such farms.119  Venn stated that corn was ‘essentially the 
product of large farms’ and that ‘wheat is not a small farm crop.’120  The 
agricultural economist, R. McG. Carslaw showed at the hearings of the 
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committee examining tithe rentcharge that he had calculated the differential 
effects of the guaranteed prices for large and small farmers:  
I feel confident that with the removal of the Wheat Deficiency Payments 
the net income of the farmers would be reduced by quite possibly three-
quarters. [...] the system of organisation is itself related to the size of the 
farm, and on the smaller farms wheat is a relatively less important 
commodity than it is on the larger farms.121 
 Note should be made, in relation to the interwar support to wheat 
commanding 80 percent of interwar Government aid to agriculture, of the 
paucity of the support going to those branches of farming common amongst 
small farmers.  The value of the output of the wheat crop,122 produced 
substantially on large farms, was £10 million in 1938-9 whilst the output of milk 
and of the combination of livestock and wool, both of which were produced more 
prevalently in the pastoral region where small farms were common and average 
farm size was relatively small,123 were £64.6 million and £68.8 million 
respectively.124  Murray’s figures on incomes show that the average net cash 
income in arable farming was £282 for 1936-7 which was considerably higher 
than those for grassland farming and mixed farming at £188 and £233, with any 
type of mixed farming involving significant arable production providing better 
incomes than those that didn’t.125  Statistics show that, of the counties examined 
here, it was those in the east with the biggest average farm sizes that saw the 
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smallest falls in their arable acreages between 1919 and 1939 but it is also 
apparent that, concurrently, these counties also saw the largest increases in 
their dairy herds.126  It would appear that not only were the areas with the larger 
farms receiving aid in the form of the Wheat Act, but that they were benefiting 
most from legislation enacted to help dairy farming.  Murray shows that the best 
incomes were to be found where arable and mixed farming took place on alluvial 
soils and where corn growing and dairying took place together.127  
  The value of the connections between the large-scale landowners and 
farmers and Government are seen nowhere more clearly than in the results of 
the Wheat Act except, perhaps, in the enacting of the legislation to finally 
exempt agricultural land fully from local taxes – local rates – in 1929.   This was 
a benefit derived in the first instance by landowners including those farmers who 
owned their own land.  The tenor of the debate in the House of Commons over 
the proposal to remove agricultural land from the charging of local rates 
suggests that, certainly, members of the Labour Party were strongly 
unconvinced of the likelihood of the benefits of derating reaching small-scale 
tenant farmers suggesting that the legislation was simply a gift of £2.5 million 
pounds every six months to landowners who were, in Ramsay MacDonald’s 
words, ‘in a tight spot’.128  This was disputed by Colonel Sir George Courthorpe, 
the Conservative MP for Rye, although his impartiality must come into question 
because, on his own admission, he was speaking as a large owner occupying 
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farmer.129  Farmers occupying and farming their own land would have 
specifically been aided because they would, formerly, have been directly 
responsible for the payment of local rates.  Sturmey estimates that the two 
classes of farmers amongst whom owner-occupation was at its highest in 1927 
were those farming over 300 acres and those on less than five so it is safe to say 
that there would have been greater benefit to the larger farmers since the land 
on which they were paying was much more extensive.130  The most striking 
example of the influence of the agricultural community and its large-scale 
landowners and farmers that was clearly in operation in Parliament must come 
from the MP, Mr. George Albert Spencer, using the example of a Lincolnshire 
farmer during the debates on the Agricultural Rates Bill on 19 April, 1929: 
I wish to support the action of the Government in the interests of the 
farmers of the country.  I have just been helping an Independent 
candidate at Boston who is the owner or part owner of 8,000 acres of 
land.  Anything that is given by this Bill will go to that man himself as 
farmer.  Last year he lost £40,000, although his land is some of the best 
to be found in the country. 
The Bill passed into law.131 
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The Part Played by Agricultural Workers in Small Farm Decline 
 
 Bourdieu and Passeron use the theory of ‘misrecognition’ to describe the 
failure of agents to recognise existing social relations as relations of unequal 
power.  Misrecognition leads not only to a failure to challenge inequality but 
effectively to the social and cultural legitimization of the existing unequal social 
relations and their reinforcement because the continuing acceptance of them 
makes it increasingly difficult to question their arbitrary existence and the nature 
of their origins.132  ‘Misrecognition’ would seem to be the precise term to 
describe the behaviour of the MP for Broxtowe, Mr. G.A. Spencer, in defending 
the privileged existence of a farmer and landowner of 8,000 acres whose capital 
fund was large enough that he could lose £40,000 in a single year.  The use of 
the term seems appropriate because Mr. Spencer was an MP for the Labour 
Party, the party committed, at least nominally,133 to nationalization of agricultural 
land.  The understanding of the Labour Party as being a socialist party at the 
time is made clear by the Conservative Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of 
Health, Sir Kingsley Wood, who referred to the, ‘Socialist remedy for agriculture 
which, as I understand it, is nationalization’, during the very same debate over 
the de-rating of agricultural land in 1929 in which Spencer defended large-scale 
landowning.134   
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 The quote from Spencer might be thought to benefit from being 
contextualised, because he goes on to say that the reason he is defending 
landowning farmers is that they provide employment for agricultural labourers; 
however, this serves simply to demonstrate how deeply Spencer was suffering 
the effects of misrecognition because Spencer has singularly failed to recognise 
that any progress towards social and economic equality achieved through 
nationalization could not be made by encouraging private capital to dominate 
any industry.  Gramsci’s theory of the ‘historic bloc’ suggests that a relationship 
exists between the ideological superstructure and the economic base of any 
social formation135 and this in turn informs a ‘hegemonic bloc’ of allied class 
forces within that social formation, a relationship that Cloke and Goodwin have 
identified as existing between farmers and landowners in the rural politics of 
England in the interwar years.136  The most important aspect of the economic 
base for the ruling rural hegemonic bloc was the derivation of profit from the 
labour power of rural working class labourers and, whilst Mr. Spencer may not 
have recognised this, farmers who employed labour certainly seem to have done 
so. 
 Rural labour relations may not appear to have much pertinence to the 
economic existence of small farmers who did not employ regular labour but this 
is not correct.  Labour relations were made central to the setting of the 
agricultural agenda in the interwar years by the hegemonic bloc of large scale 
farmers and landowners.  The social and economic positions of these groups 
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derived from profit made ultimately as a result of the paid labour of employees 
and the labour of family members.  Employing farmers and landowners benefited 
directly from labour, whilst landowners benefited from rents paid by tenants who 
either employed labour, often alongside their families where farms were small to 
medium size, or, in the case of small-scale tenant farmers, exploited family 
labour only.137     
 Differing types of cultivation required varying amounts of labour, including 
on small farms, but a generalization must suffice, here.  The categorization of 
farms of less than 50 acres in size as ‘small’ was one that was used in the limited 
attention that had been paid to the small farm sector by contemporary interwar 
agricultural economists who generally considered 50 as the largest acreage that 
could be farmed by the farmer and their family without the use of regular hired 
labour;138 Venn demonstrates this in his 1933 statement, ‘50 acres forms roughly 
the dividing line between the holdings farmed by those who use their hands and 
those who use their brains.’139   
 A representation was created in which landowners and large-scale 
farmers demonstrated that State imposed wage regulation and the demands of 
labourers, whether organised in trade unions or not, were undermining their 
ability to survive and that, if wage regulation were to remain in place, they, too, 
would need State support.  A continual rhetoric that undermined the position of 
agricultural employees was created and is illustrated, below, and one of its 
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results was the absence from the agricultural discourse of issues of genuine 
importance to the small-scale farmers for whom the actual, or direct, 
employment of regular paid labour was unimportant. 
 Howkins has demonstrated that the intensification of capitalist relations of 
production in English agriculture in the 1920s as a result of increased 
competition from imports of some products from overseas, notably wheat, 
meant that conflict on the farm was, if not inevitable, more than highly likely; 
conflict is structural, as Howkins recognises,140 because, as Marx repeatedly 
asserts, capitalists seek by necessity to increase the value of their capital, and, 
since the direct source of such increase is labour power, the intuitive way of 
maintaining profit as prices fall is to make workers more productive, that is, to 
produce the same number or more of commodities as previously whilst 
expending less capital on labour.141  Farmers were often to be found arguing 
that the opposite was occurring, however, and that labour was becoming less 
productive. 
 Farmers’ dissatisfaction with a decline in the willingness of labourers to 
accede to exploitation was articulated in their association of this decline with a 
corresponding decrease in workers’ productivity, as articulated by Mr. R.W. 
Hobbs, a farmer of 2,200 acres in Oxfordshire, in his evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Agriculture in 1919.  Hobbs, when asked by Committee member 
and NFU Vice President Mr. Herbert Padwick, ‘Do you find that your men do as 
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much work per man per day as men in the former generation, shall I say a 
generation ago?’ replied, simply, ‘No, I do not think they do.’142  That such a 
decrease in productivity is a result of a moral defect in the workers related to 
their increasing avarice is implied in the exchange between Hobbs and Padwick 
that followed immediately afterwards; Padwick asked, suggestively, of Hobbs, 
‘You do not find that, when you put them at piece work, they only want to earn 
day wages and so get through their work quickly to leave off earlier?’, the 
suggestion being that labourers deliberately worked less productively when paid 
for a full day than when offered the opportunity of the same pay for shorter 
working hours.  Hobbs replied, ‘No, we do not find that at all,’143 which is 
somewhat ambiguous, but which, when considered in conjunction with another 
statement of his - ‘I think most of us get our work done by piece-work at the 
present time’ - suggests that piece work is more desirable for the farmer 
because, presumably, more efficient and therefore that he agreed with the 
sentiment that labourers’ productivity was autonomously reduced under 
conditions of low reward.   
 These arguments about labour inefficiency are demonstrated to be 
spurious and ideologically motivated; agricultural economists A.W. Ashby and 
J.L. Davies, writing in 1929, demonstrated, amongst other things, that 
agricultural labour had become considerably more efficient, as measured by 
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indexes of physical volume of output per worker, thereby undermining farmers’ 
contrary opinions.144  In another article in the same issue, Ashby showed labour 
to be 54 percent more efficient in 1928 than in 1871.145  The assertion of 
increasing labour efficiency made by Ashby and Davies was repeated in the 
same journal by Carslaw in 1935.146  
 Alongside members of Government committees and their selected 
witnesses existed other ideological intermediaries who, through what Bourdieu 
would term an ‘orchestration of categories of perception of the social world’ into 
‘divisions of the established order’,147 defended the farmers’ interests and ratified 
their position of domination in the established order.  Such intermediaries are 
typified by John Hetherton who, as a farmer and editor of the Yorkshire based 
monthly newspaper The Farmer’s Advocate, pursued a relentlessly negative line 
towards any influence upon the politics and operations of agriculture other than 
that of farmers.  The newspaper, in a manner corresponding to that of Hobbs, 
above, attempted to convince readers that a traditional reciprocal goodwill that 
had existed in the industry was being undermined by factors upon which farmers 
and the history of the social relations of production in the industry had no 
bearing, to which the following extract attests: 
I may say that up till now no industry has worked so harmoniously as 
Agriculture - masters and men have worked on the ‘give and take’ 
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principle and there has consequently been good feeling on both sides.  
The professional agitator is destroying the brotherliness which has 
hitherto existed and the consequences will be disastrous.148 
 Alongside the ‘professional agitator’, the term being applied to trade 
unionists, Hetherton identified the AWB, which had been established under the 
Corn Production Act of 1917, as a source of unrest in agriculture.  The cloud of 
wages had long loomed large over the industry but by 1918 minimum wages 
were being set and conditions regulated through the AWB which was, 
consequently, attacked by Hetherton and The Farmers’ Advocate.  One of the 
issues subjected to sustained criticism in The Farmers’ Advocate was the AWB’s 
insistence in its publication The Wages Board Gazette upon the payment of over-
time to workers for hours spent at work over and above those agreed by 
contract:149 
The Wages Board Gazette […] tells us that working over-time is necessary 
owing to the vagaries of our weather but it does not explain that under-
time is the result of the same cause. […]  Farmers, by paying their men 
when they can’t work owing to the weather are really paying in advance 
for over-time!  The labourers will know that when they work over they are 
only making up for time previously lost.150 
 There is, thus, in this extract, evidence amongst those who claim to 
represent farmers, if not amongst farmers themselves, of a clear expectation of 
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a continued submission by labour to the will of farmers that could be expected to 
extend beyond the hours of which the workers are actually selling their labour 
power to their employers.  Farmers, as this extract attests, expected labourers to 
compensate them with their free time for the effects of a risk, the weather, 
which farmers, as entrepreneurs, could be expected to have factored into their 
calculations of the margin of profit to be made from their investments and over 
which the workers did not have, nor would expect to have, any control.  In this 
regard, agricultural labourers were, evidently, to regard their own existential 
concerns as subordinate to those of their employers which were to be expressed 
in the returns on the capital they invested in farming.  Farmers, apparently, 
desired labourers be available to work at any time at which they were required 
without any compensation, material or spiritual, for the time they were expected 
to spend waiting to work, and that they be available during poor weather in the 
expectation of beginning work when the weather improved.  The notion of ‘being 
paid in advance’ is, thus, disingenuous; labourers were expected to be under the 
control of the farmer even during hours of poor weather for which they were 
unable to perform actual physical labour, thus expending time for which they 
could expect to be paid, as well as, later, expending actual labour under the 
control of the farmer in time at work whilst only being paid once for the two 
periods under employer control.  Paying labour only once for two periods of time 
that it spent, effectively, in the workplace, would be an extension of the working 
week and would represent a cut in the price of labour151 against the arbitrary 
imposition of which the AWB had been created to protect agricultural workers. 
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 Domination also extended to the employment of a degree of psychological 
manipulation to be seen in the quoted extracts from The Farmers’ Advocate on 
the issue of overtime payments.  An appeal is made to the workers’ sense of 
self-worth in the first extract where it is made implicit in the use of the phrase, 
‘labourers will know’, that those labourers with intelligence will see that a 
symbiosis exists of their interests with those of their employers and will, thus, 
work overtime for free; such a symbiosis is, in economic reality, illusory in the 
long term and shallow in the short, since prices are determined by markets and 
employers would only continue to employ labour at a living wage as long as it 
was profitable to do so.152  Such manipulation is further evident in an article 
from September 1918 which states, ‘Farmers […] and their men have been 
accustomed to “give and take” – the good ploughman has not hesitated to sit up 
night after night with his in-foal mares without thinking of “overtime”.’153  This 
extract demonstrates how the pride of the skilled workers in their craft can be 
exploited, the implication being that a skilled and worthy worker, exemplified by 
the ploughman, who is ‘good’ and, as a condition of this goodness, stays up at 
night to look after animals, gains metaphysical reward from the successful 
execution of a skilled task.  The suggestion manifest in this extract is that 
material reward for some forms of skilled labour in certain circumstances is 
unnecessary and, possibly, even undesirable.  Material reward is unnecessary 
because the possession of the skill itself is reward enough; this is an appeal to 
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traditional social values inherent in any declining petit bourgeois,154 such as the 
skilled labourer whose work relied on principles of craftsmanship.  These 
traditional values, however, were the embodiment of a rural social hierarchy 
which was becoming increasingly redundant as it was replaced by the direct sale 
of labour consistent with the social relations of production of capitalism.155 
 There is much historical evidence to undermine the presumption on the 
part of the writer that labourers had been accustomed in agriculture during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to benefiting substantially from a 
system that might be represented by farmers and their spokesmen as one of 
‘give and take’, as quoted from the August 1918 Farmers’ Advocate, above.  This 
lop-sided interpretation of ‘give and take’ which appears to work predominantly 
in the favour of employer-farmers is once again evident in another 
representation of farmers’ expectations as to the working of overtime by 
labourers in compensation for work interrupted by bad weather, as expressed in 
The Farmers’ Advocate: ‘As farmers pay for all those wasted days they expect 
their men to make up the time thus lost by working overtime, when required, 
without pay.’156  This last extract and previous ones quoted suggest that working 
without pay as a result of weather interruptions was a commonly imposed 
practice by farmers upon labourers, at least until the creation of the AWB, as 
reference to F.E. Green’s 1920 text confirms.157  Presumably, labourers, already 
                                        
154 Bourdieu, Distinction, p.350. 
155 Howkins, A., Reshaping Rural England: a Social History 1850-1925 (London: Harper Collins, 
1991), pp.276-281.  
156 The Farmers’ Advocate, January 1919. 
157 Green, F.E., A History of the English Agricultural Labourer, 1870-1920 (London: P.S. King and 
Son Ltd., 1920), p.116. 
Chapter 6: The Unequal Effects of State Support 
330 
 
on low wages in the early twentieth century 158 and refusing to make up lost time 
with unpaid work, would have been putting their jobs in jeopardy or, at least, 
their incomes.  Even a small reduction in income would have had serious 
ramifications for agricultural workers and their families, given that over the 
period from 1879 to 1914, agricultural wages were, on average, only half those 
of many other industrial occupations.159 
   Newby estimates that a horseman would work about 70 hours per week 
and a shepherd almost unlimited hours at certain times of the year before the 
First World War.  ‘Day-men’, hired by the day and thus always unsure about 
periods of employment and, thus, income levels, were expected to be almost 
permanently at the farmer’s behest,160 especially since, as argued above, they 
were expected to be available to work whenever the weather was suitable.  The 
regularization and mechanization of agricultural work that had been increasing 
into the twentieth century at least resulted in a decrease in day work on farms 
after the First World War, as farmers sought to solve labour shortage problems 
by increasing the numbers of workers paid by the week, problems that, 
incidentally, they themselves had helped create through the low wages they paid 
and the consequent exodus of the rural population.161   
 It is clear, however, that farmers still expected to be able to demand long 
hours from their workers after the War, just as they had before the 1917 
introduction of the AWB; for example, Mr. R. Colton Fox, a substantial farmer 
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who had been asked by the Yorkshire Agricultural Clubs to represent them at the 
1919 Royal Commission on Agriculture, stated the opinion in his written evidence 
that, ‘The proposal to abolish the “customary” hours for horsemen is absolutely 
unworkable.’162  The 70 hour horsemen’s week contrasted unfavourably with 
other labourers’ working hours, but even these other labourers were expected to 
devote 60 hours per week to the farmer, inclusive of meal breaks, and, in the 
apparently customary manner, to compromise their spare time and, thus, their 
potential additional earning capacity by compensating with unpaid labour for the 
farmers’ failure to factor in the weather to his business calculations, as Colton-
Fox confirms: 
Previous to the existence of the Wages Board, our men labourers worked 
from 7a.m to 5 p.m. six days a week, resulting in a 54 hours week; 
considering the time spent going to and from their work, and also the 
many days lost through wet weather, this was not excessive.  In the 
winter of 1914 horses were four weeks idle at a stretch, and the time lost 
had to be made up.163 
 Newby illustrates how deeply felt were the antagonisms between 
agricultural labourers and employers during the interwar years with a quote from 
one labourer who refers to the period as one of ‘“hate all round”.’164  Farmers 
sought to exercise control over the social and economic situation of workers 
even where they were not employed.  The Journal of the Central and Associated 
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Chambers of Agriculture and the Agricultural Record in 1929 carried minutes of a 
debate in the organization over proposals to extend unemployment insurance to 
agricultural workers which was seen by several members as highly undesirable, 
mostly for reasons concerned with the removal of control over the workers by 
farmers and the rights of the latter to speak on behalf of the former.  Mr. Tom 
Thomson said, ‘It was desirable to avoid, as far as possible, bringing the 
agricultural labourer into the political arena’ and continued, ‘The casual 
employee was, to a large extent, insured today.  When he had finished pulling 
beets he found a job on the roads or stood on the street corner.’  Sir Henry 
Fairfax Lucy ‘strongly opposed the inclusion of agricultural workers in 
unemployment insurance, believing that it would not be in the interest of the 
men’:165   
Mr Swaffield said that he had explained to farm labourers in 
Northamptonshire what would happen if they came under the scheme, 
and he was sure that if the question was put to the vote of the 
agricultural labourers in his district not one would vote in favour of the 
scheme.166 
No details are given of the actual explanation that Swaffield gave to the farm 
labourers. 
 The issue that caused most ire amongst farmers was the payment of 
wages and, particularly, of minimum wage rates imposed by law.  The abolition 
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of the minimum wage, set by the AWB, in 1921 had been welcomed by the NFU 
in Lincoln-Holland who had ‘naturally a very strong desire that farmers should 
have freedom in making contracts with their men.’167  The agricultural 
economist, John Orr, who wrote, ‘I have an instinctive, unexamined and 
probably unreasonable prejudice against the minimum wage’, quoted one farmer 
who told him that his neighbour, on abolition, ‘put his men down to 23 shillings 
and trusted in his ability to drive them to get the work out of them.’168  The 
Parliamentary Bill to reinstate the AWB in 1924 came under prolonged attack in 
the NFU Record where it remained on the front page from May to September 
and was blamed for the unemployment it would cause because farmers, 
unwillingly, would have to ‘make things better for themselves’ by laying off 
men.169  ‘A more mischievous measure it would be impossible to conceive’ and 
‘an unworkable scheme’ were verdicts on the proposed wages board whilst it 
was considered that it was being designed to ‘harass the lives of unfortunate 
agricultural employers’.170  Walter R. Smith, the former president of NALRWU, 
demonstrates the attitude of farmers to labour when responding to Minister of 
Agriculture, Sir Arthur Boscawen, who had criticised the coercive measures of 
the AWB as part of a justification for abolishing the original AWB in 1921: 
The Right Honourable Gentleman went on to criticise quite severely the 
work of the Wages Board.  He spoke of its coercive measures.  This is not 
the fault of the Wages Board.  If coercion has had to be adopted, what is 
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the reasonable explanation?  It is that employers of labour have refused 
to carry out the Board’s decisions and that they have withheld wages from 
their work people that were legally theirs.  It is right that a man who 
breaks the law should have proceedings taken against him, more 
especially when his action is responsible for the withholding of wages 
from some of the poorest paid of workers. [...]  I have a cutting from the 
Western Daily Press of the 20th of last month in which a farmer, in 
speaking of the decision to abolish the Wages Board, states that it means 
that farmers will get cheaper labour and will be able to make their men 
work longer hours. [...]  Only as recently as Saturday I came across a 
case where a farmer had reduced the wages of his workmen by 16 
shillings a week.  How is it possible to have conciliation committees 
formed with any degree of confidence with people who pretend that they 
do not know that an Act has been passed or an order has been issued, 
and have to be summoned to make them obey it.171 
 Wage levels were referred to, often, by differing bodies representing 
factions within the rural hegemonic bloc in the later 1920s and 1930s as being 
responsible for difficulties in agriculture.  The responsibility of workers’ wages for 
‘the depression in agriculture’ was made clear by the ‘Parliamentary Secretary of 
the Minister of Agriculture’ in January 1928, the NFU Record told its readers.172  
The assignment to wages of the responsibility for agricultural difficulties 
continued at the Royal Commission on Tithe Rentcharge in 1934 where Mr. J.O. 
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Steed of the Central Chamber of Agriculture (CCA) stated that the problems of 
owner-occupying farmers’ existed because ‘wages have not yielded to prices’.  
The NFU representatives stated that wages had been ‘mounting up’ since the 
Agricultural Wages Act of 1924 whilst the statement by the CLA said that the 
‘stabilization’ of wages in 1924 and of tithe payments ‘was bound sooner or later 
to bring about the serious difficulties with which tithe-owners and tithe-payers 
are faced today’.  ‘One third of the cost of production is attributable to wages’ 
was the view of the Auctioneers’ and Estate Agents’ Institute of the United 
Kingdom.  Mr. Coleman of the Wessex Agricultural Defence Association 
considered ‘the rise in wages’ a considerable contribution to the hardship of 
farmers whilst the Association’s R.F Watkins stated, ‘The subsidizing of wages 
brought about by the Agricultural Wages Act of 1924 has aggravated the 
position’.173  Farmers still appeared to regard it as their right to voice the 
opinions of their employees in 1934 despite having diametrically opposed 
objectives to them regarding the distribution of farm revenues; C.F. Ryder 
stated, in reply to Venn’s paper to the AES, that, ‘The high wage bill is a very 
large addition to the charges of the arable farmer,’ going on to say, ‘It is not 
liked by the men themselves.’174 
 One contrasting view of the level of wages came from Mr. George 
Middleton, governor of the tithe-holders’ body, the Queen Anne’s Bounty: 
It is true the labour costs have gone up very largely. […]  On the other 
hand, the number of people employed has been less and where 
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mechanized apparatus is employed the general overhead costs are even 
as low as they used to be before the War.175 
The views of the tithe-holders had no effect on the NFU whose publication the 
NFU Record was unequivocal in 1936 in its opinion of the effects of wages 
legislation and its results: 
As far as England and Wales are concerned, employers of agricultural 
labour have since 1924 been subject to the operation of the Agricultural 
Wages Act. […]  It is fair to say that the assistance which has been 
accorded to the industry by successive Governments has been absorbed 
in maintaining these uneconomic wage rates.176 
 An extract from The Land Worker suggests that the agricultural 
economists, Ashby and Smith, were probably as unaware in 1938 that the 
workers’ wages and productivity levels were uneconomic, as farmers claimed, as 
Ashby had been, with Davies, in 1929 and Carslaw had been in 1935:177  
A study by Prof Ashby and Mr. J.H. Smith of recent wage changes on 
farms reveals the fact that the farmer’s total wage bill, in spite of 
increases in wage rates, is now smaller than it used to be, because of 
fewer workers and their greater output per man.178  
 Griffiths has maintained recently that a novel, more sympathetic public 
understanding of farmers emerged during and after the Second World War that 
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resulted from representations of farmers as socially responsible and less 
individualistic.179  Griffiths makes little reference to relations with workers and it 
is not surprising that this image of farmers seems, therefore, to be one that 
arose in isolation from the approach of large-scale farmers to their labour force 
in the interwar period.  Those farmers, whose prosperity was a function of the 
treatment of their workforce insofar as such treatment had played a part in the 
creation of agricultural subsidy, had spent the years between the two Wars 
denying any credit to that workforce and blaming it for their travails; however, 
as a group of business owners, large-scale farmers and farming landowners 
seemed to be enduring the conditions reasonably well, at least if the numbers of 
their farms disappearing from the statistics after 1931 is any measure.  Certainly, 
if the material condition of agricultural labourers had changed for the better as a 
result of high wages, the famous paper of the medical profession, The Lancet, 
was not aware of it; according to The Land Worker in 1938, The Lancet claimed 
that, ‘No need is more pressing in England today than to raise the status of the 
farm worker.’180  
 Gowers and Hatton suggest that wheat deficiency payments under the 
Wheat Act raised farmers’ incomes more than minimum wage regulation raised 
farm costs whilst the addition to farm incomes from the wheat deficiency 
payments increased, relative to wage payments, as farm size increased.181  This 
suggests that the continual campaign to maintain that the wages of agricultural 
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workers were cripplingly high had been successful insofar as it had eventually 
influenced policy in cereal farmers’ favour.  
  Agricultural labourers and their families were one of the most 
disadvantaged sections of English society during the interwar period.182  
Vociferous criticism of the payment of adequate wages and of official 
interference with the setting of wage rates has been shown to have been raised 
from sectors of an agricultural business community that ultimately derived its 
social and economic position from the product of labour on the land.  The effect 
of this was to obscure in general the increasingly acute problems of another 
section of the farming community, the small farmers and their families, but 
occasionally they would be recognised; one occasion was the response of the 
agricultural economist, D.K. Elmhirst, to a paper given by H.M. Conacher: 
I think there are quite a number of family farms in England which, under 
the impact of the world price system and of increased efficiency in the 
farming industry, are incapable of holding their own even if the 
depression lifts.  All kind of uneconomic units, including smallholdings and 
small farms, are being driven to the wall to-day. 183 
Elmhirst continued with an observation even more relevant to a study seeking to 
highlight the marginalization of small-scale farmers: 
Although we have a way of saying that in times of depression “These are 
the farms where men can easily tighten their belts” – we are really saying 
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“We don’t mind their starving or being sweated so long as they do it 
quietly and out of sight” [sic].184 
The decline in numbers of small farms in the interwar period seems to have 
occurred ‘out of sight’ because it was hidden behind the issues, such as payment 
of wages, which were of significance only to farmers on larger acreages. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Venn said in 1934 that farmers were ‘looking to the future with less 
apprehension’, going on to say that the prosperity that farmers will enjoy will 
have been ‘fostered and expedited by preferential treatment of an all-embracing 
character’.  The contention of this chapter has been that the preferential 
treatment had been somewhat less equally distributed amongst farmers than 
Venn might have assumed.185   
 Large farms have been shown to have retained their numbers much more 
successfully in England in the 1930s than small farms.  This success has been 
shown to be consistent with the enactment of legislation giving financial support 
to agriculture and it has been argued that farmers and landowners were able to 
employ their social and economic capital to influence the creation of that 
legislation in their own favour.  Ashby commented in 1929 that, during periods 
of depression, ‘farmers who are financially strong [...] start to maintain their 
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share by getting it from other people’;186 in this case, they engineered a situation 
where they maintained their share through a disproportionately large share of 
the State’s aid to the agricultural industry, effectively taking a share that might 
have gone to small farmers.  The result was that the incomes of farmers rose in 
relation to those of workers between 1933 and 1938, according to Bellerby, who 
goes on to acknowledge State support, including to milk and wheat production, 
as a considerable influence upon the differential fortunes of farmers and workers 
but makes no reference to the incomes of non-employing farmers.187  Note 
should be made of the extreme lack of attention that was paid to the 
disappearance of the considerable numbers of small farmers during the period in 
which the events depicted in this chapter were taking place.  Even the issues of 
the producer retailers, who numbered up to 50,000 in the mid-1930s,188 were 
only being addressed by the isolated voice of the journal specifically dedicated to 
them, Milk Producer Retailer.   
 A hypothetical accusation that the ignorance of the small farmer has been 
perpetuated by the emphasis of this chapter upon the issues concerning large-
scale farmers would be, firstly, incorrect, due to the reference to statistics on 
small farms and, secondly, specious, because the aim has been to bring to 
attention the effects that the dominance of the agenda by those large farm 
issues had upon small farmers at the time, in order that future work might be 
better informed.  The issue of the treatment of agricultural labour is, anyway, of 
relevance to the study of small farmers because it led to legislation that failed to 
                                        
186 Ashby, ‘Some Human and Social Factors’, pp.91-2. 
187 Bellerby, p.137. 
188 Baker, p.17. 
Chapter 6: The Unequal Effects of State Support 
341 
 
help them but which has been assumed to have been of benefit to agriculture, 
as a whole.  The interwar agricultural discourse was dominated by wage issues 
which were of little direct significance to small farmers but were made to appear 
to be of massive importance to large farmers, leading to the Wheat Act of 1932 
from which small-scale farmers benefited little.  Reference to the 1934 work of 
Harkness even suggests that the portrayal by farmers of their workers as the 
source of any financial problems that they might have been encountering and 
which influenced policy in favour of wheat subsidies in 1932 was even more 
mistaken – or disingenuous – than has been demonstrated, here; the output per 
worker had increased by 15 percent between 1924 and 1931 with a concurrent 
fall in the national agricultural wage bill in England from £54 million to £52.6 
million.189 
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Conclusion 
 
Farmers have, to some extent, been objectified in this study in the form of the 
farms that they operated but purely because the farms they operated offered the 
best available statistical representation of their existence; however, as a 
consequence, the conclusion to be drawn from this study can be best 
understood as having two interrelated parts: one economic, the other social.  
Firstly, the evidence has shown that the single economic factor of most influence 
to the chances of success or, at least, of survival of farms in the interwar period 
was the acreage of the farms in question which, realistically, was required to be 
of 50 acres or more; however, the social counterpart to this is not that large-
scale farmers prospered whilst small farms declined but that they prospered at 
the expense of small-scale farmers because their economic power afforded them 
social and political influence to be wielded in their own favour whilst small farm 
requirements were ignored.  It is the combination of the economic and the social 
factors that give the conclusion its significance.  Such a conclusion has not been 
drawn before, even though a framework of rural power relations that included 
farmers as part of a rural ‘hegemonic bloc’ has been previously delineated; this 
earlier framework did not extend to recognising an objective division based on 
the differential possession of capital – in the form of land - within the umbrella 
group of farmers themselves. 
 The social element of the conclusion can be given much more exploration 
and detailed illustration than has been afforded in this work.  The greater part of 
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this study has been an effort to provide an empirical web with which some 
evidence of the effects of the observed social historical circumstances has been 
interwoven.  The search for further observable experiences and recorded 
examples of social behaviour that exist to ratify the theory and synthesise it with 
the empirical evidence should be undertaken in future research.  Much remains 
to be said about the relationship between large-scale and small-scale farmers 
but it has been demonstrated here that the relative chances of the survival of 
farms of 50 acres and above and those below were dramatically unequal.  The 
fundamental difference was in the presence of employees on the larger farms 
which facilitated economies of scale and thus the increase of profits for large-
scale farmers that were simply impossible on small acreages; as Marx points out: 
The battle of competition is fought by the cheapening of commodities.  
The cheapness of commodities depends, all other circumstances 
remaining the same, on the productivity of labour, and this depends in 
turn on the scale of production.  Therefore, the larger capitals beat the 
smaller.1   
 Bridges’ evidence supports the argument that large-scale production on 
bigger farms and the large capital necessary to undertake it had benefits over 
small that derived from the employment of labour power.  Bridges, in 1947, 
noted Ashby’s calculations showing that output per man had increased by 80 to 
90 percent over 70 years to 1942, stating drily, ‘It is probably a fair statement to 
say that labour, power and machinery costs combined are higher on small farms 
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than on large farms of the same natural fertility.’2  Wynne showed the social 
income per 100 acres per ‘man’ to be much greater on arable farms of over 500 
acres in 1944-5 and 1947-8, at £354, than the £302 on farms of 51 to 100 acres, 
demonstrating the increasing economies of scale as farm-size increased; it goes 
unsaid that, of course, the greater part of this income would return to the farmer 
as profit on that labour after wages had been paid, with the farmer receiving, in 
this case, £1,745 per annum on a 500 acre farm.3  In contrast, incomes on small 
milk and butter farms had been very poor in 1929 at £42 per person on a 35 
acre milk farm and £33 on a similarly sized farm producing butter.4  Thus, the 
most significant factor, in general, in interwar English agriculture was the 
possession of capital in the form of land;5 its complement was, of course, capital 
in the form of money which was necessary to pay labour and to invest in more 
land and labour or labour-saving devices, money that had been, at some earlier 
point in time, accumulated from the sale of commodities6 derived from the 
labour on the land of paid workers.   
 The existence of economies of scale are, it must be said, recognised in 
mainstream economics but inequalities were not simply the result of the 
bourgeois ‘natural laws’ of political economy as understood by both the 
neoclassical economists in the interwar period as well as the Keynesians;7 
however, nor were they simply the result of the monopoly tendencies recognised 
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by Marxists.  Inequalities in agriculture were perpetuated and extended, at least 
in part, from Government policies that gave financial support to agriculture.  
Léon Walras had said in the nineteenth century, ‘Pure economics is, in essence, 
the theory of the determination of prices under a hypothetical regime of 
perfectly free competition.’8  The situation prevailing in rural England during the 
interwar years has to be recognised as in no way resembling one in which the 
laws of ‘pure economics’ were at work.  The most obvious subvention of pure 
economics was in the increasing volume of State aid given to farmers which, as 
Bellerby pointed out, was ‘capable of substantially raising the farmer’s incentive 
income, even during general depression.’9  The granting of State aid to 
agriculture, in particular in the form of the subsidies to wheat and the creation of 
the Milk Marketing Board, have been shown to have been of much greater 
benefit to large-scale farmers than to small.   
 The disparity in the structuring of State aid resulted from the existence of 
a rural hegemonic bloc whose most prominent members were landowners and 
large-scale farmers who were able to use their social capital – their positions in 
power and social networks and their understanding of this power and networks, 
conscious or otherwise – to influence policy.  Small farmers, with rare 
exceptions, did not possess the economic capital necessary to allow them the 
time and leisure10 to generate such social capital and, thus, it can be seen that 
the possession, or not, of economic capital was hugely significant in determining 
the fortunes of interwar farmers.  Small farmers possessed only the petty capital 
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of a business so small as to not be able to employ and make profit from labour 
and thus were, objectively, part of a different stratum or social ‘class’ from large-
scale farmers.  Small farmers were petit bourgeois, deriving income from their 
own labour and that of their families; large-scale farmers derived their income 
from the investment of capital and the payment of wages and, as with 
landowners who had taken to farming, constituted elements of the bourgeoisie, 
to varying extent.11  The result of this division of class interests is clear in the 
disproportionately high failure rate of small farms in the interwar years and it is 
this realization, based on the statistics and narrative supplied in this work, 
above, that can inform future study of the interwar English countryside. 
 Very little has been written about the social relations of the countryside in 
the interwar years with only Newby, Howkins and Mansfield tackling the relations 
between landowners, farmers and labourers to any extent and, even then, either 
in reference to a much wider narrative or only up to 1930.12  Griffiths has 
concentrated on the political activity of the organised labour movement, 
including where her research has related to farmers; this avoids the ways in 
which the dominant classes of the countryside came together in a new rural 
bourgeoisie after the First World War to dominate the economic life of the 
English countryside and, thus, to exercise the greatest influence in its social and 
cultural life.  Cultural life would have been of little comfort to the small-scale 
farmers and their families who were being expelled from the land as a result of 
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the influence wielded by those in possession of the requisite economic and social 
capital. 
 Small farmers do not appear to have been actively and openly 
discriminated against; they were simply not recognised within the farming 
community as having distinct political requirements resulting from their particular 
economic circumstances.  This lack of awareness extended to small farmers 
themselves but was not replicated in the wider rural or agricultural communities 
within which small farmers were romanticised in myths of race and nation, to the 
point of being artificially augmented through newly created smallholders.  The 
study of competition amongst small farmers between the Wars, such as was 
created artificially by the creation of statutory smallholdings,  is one area offering 
opportunities for deeper engagement; an economic dimension needs to be 
retained, one in which the advantages of large-scale business over small 
competitors are recognised.  The increasing of numbers of smallholders after the 
First World War acted to the detriment of small farmers since it resulted in a 
further extension of competition at a time of growing exploitation of small 
farmers’ markets by better capitalised large scale farmers.  The limitations of the 
length of this thesis mean that, although the milk market has been shown to 
have been a case in point, the same was happening to other small farmers has 
not been shown.  Market gardening and vegetable production are good 
examples of market opportunities being exploited in the 1930s by large farmers 
to the detriment of small farmers,13 as evidence from smallholders in the Vale of 
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Evesham in 1938 testifies, their responses to questioning on future prospects 
recording a dolorous outlook: ‘Not good.  Competition from farmers’, ‘Farmers 
make the small growers’ position untenable’, ‘Very poor for the small grower, 
whose day is past’, ‘Not much better in view of severe competition from 
farmers’, ‘Not good if present prices and competition continue’.14  Such 
competition may not have caused the kind of resentment amongst small farmers 
that might lead to them questioning their kinship with other farmers, however; 
Ashby stressed in 1929 that competition was taken for granted amongst farmers 
and that, ‘They believe that wealth is got rather than made (i.e. that wealth is 
got by struggling with people rather than with the forces of nature).’15 
 The study of small-scale farmers in their relations with other groups is 
problematic because evidence relating to them is very difficult to unearth, with 
the exception of official documents on Government and County Council 
smallholders; R.B. Jones of the AES wrote, in 1957, ‘Little or nothing is known 
about the operators of holdings of various sizes to given changes in economic 
conditions.’16  The actual attitudes of small farmers seem to have escaped 
recording, possibly because it was necessary for them to actually work such long 
hours on the farm in order to survive that they could never develop any social 
capital through attaining political positions, let alone wield it.  Brassley shows 
that large-scale ‘professional’ farmers have dominated the NFU whilst small-scale 
farmers did not possess the financial capital to allow them to take time off work 
                                        
14 Dawe, C.V., ‘An Economic Survey of Smallholdings in the Vale of Evesham’, in Smallholdings 
Studies: Reports of Surveys Undertaken by some Agricultural Economists, ed. by Viscount Astor 
and Rowntree, B.S. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, 1938), pp.4-19, (pp.10-11). 
15 Ashby, ‘Some Human and Social Factors’, p.91 [brackets in original]. 
16 Jones, R. B., ‘Farm Classification’, pp.201-24. 
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to engage in politics nor to utilise professional services in order to improve their 
businesses.  Similarly, as Street recognised between the Wars, they had neither 
the time nor money to acquire and benefit from agricultural education.17  
Griffiths has, creditably, found one incidence of a small-scale farmer in the 1930s 
who expressed the belief that small farmers were suffering from being led by 
those on large acreages, but this is a lone voice.18 
  Research could be directed at the possibility that small farmers simply 
identified with all other farmers, tenants or otherwise, whose consciousness was 
dominated by the normative discourses of individualism and voluntarism which 
are the complementary ‘philosophies’ of laissez-faire liberalism and free market 
economics; such discourses were apparently popular amongst farmers in the 
interwar years, as demonstrated by the rhetoric of the Mark Lane Express on the 
natural rights of farmers and workers as ‘free born Englishmen’ to strike 
individual bargains over wages.19  Burchardt has highlighted Newby’s 
identification of a single umbrella identity amongst farmers, despite the fact that 
family farmers have not benefited from the activities of the NFU and CLA over 
time, dominated as they are by large-scale farmers and landowners.20  Thus, any 
benefits gained by farmers’ representatives through the hegemonic bloc and 
policy community would be understood by small farmers to be available to all 
farmers, and the most effective individual would be the one that survived.  The 
reality might have been that the only possible remedies for economic problems 
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18 Griffiths, Labour, p.285. 
19 Mark Lane Express, 11 July 1921. 
20 Burchardt, ‘Introduction: Farming and the Countryside’, p.8. 
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amongst small farmers, given the difficulties of generating investment capital for 
intensification or expansion, were much greater protection for the prices of their 
products in the marketplace or cooperation in production and marketing.  The 
limits to agricultural support may well have been extended significantly under 
the Agriculture Act of 1947 but the 1946 Hill Farming Act,21 1959 Small Farmer 
Scheme22 and the 1965 Agriculture Act gave tacit and open encouragement 
respectively to the demise of small farms,23 as shown by subsequent falls in 
numbers.24  The hostility of farmers to incentives to cooperate in the interwar 
period reflect a facet of their identity consistent with what has been said, here, 
but would endure some research.25   
 One way of comprehending the, seemingly, self-defeating behaviour of 
the small farmer in acquiescing to leadership by the bourgeois dominant class, 
beyond the time constraints on autonomous political behaviour engendered by 
the struggle to survive, might be to contextualise it within wider interwar society.  
Petit bourgeois farmers were part of the middle class; this is a middle class 
understood in the universal, objective sense and not, as Gramsci makes clear, in 
the particularistic sense applied in Britain whereby the aristocracy and gentry are 
perceived to be an ‘upper’ class, rather than a feudal remnant, with petit-
bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie lumped together as the ‘middle class’.26  The most 
perspicacious landowners became part of the ruling bourgeoisie from the last 
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22 Self and Storing, p.84. 
23 Whitby, p.83. 
24 Grigg, ‘Farm Size’, p.185. 
25 McKibbin, R., Parties and People: England 1914-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
pp.35-6. 
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quarter of the nineteenth century through, either, selling land and reinvesting 
the liberated capital or taking to farming and forming part of the hegemonic bloc 
in the countryside with other capitalist farmers.27  The middle class had a deep 
fear of - and snobbery towards - the working class which had no direct material 
basis,28 unlike the relationship between employing farmers and their workers, 
and there is no reason to assume that this would not be shared by middle class 
farmers, especially given their immersion in a rural society that venerated 
hierarchy. 
 Perhaps, the reason for the ignorance of the existence of the small farmer 
derived from the fact that they were overshadowed numerically by the numbers 
of agricultural labourers and appeared insignificant when judged by the small 
acreage they occupied and capital they controlled.  Such ignorance of small 
business would not appear to fit the modern rhetoric which stresses its 
importance in economic development.  The ‘individualism’ and independence 
much prized by the small farmer in the interwar years29 has remained one of the 
attractions of the small business30 but the interwar experience of farmers should, 
perhaps, sound a cautionary historical note, as Ashby’s statement from 1929 
suggests: 
Most small farmers and certain members of their families have no real 
‘refusal price’ for their labour or capital, except the total family income 
                                        
27 Ibid., pp.128, 156; Perkin, p.254; Thompson, F.M.L., English Landed Society in the Nineteenth 
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28 McKibbin, pp.2, 36. 
29 Ashby, ‘Some Human and Social Factors’, p.91. 
30 Delmar, F., and Witte, F.C., ‘The Psychology of the Entrepreneur’, in Enterprise and Small 
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which will enable them to live at their accepted standards. [...]  Small 
farmers will accept reductions of temporary standards, even some 
reductions in their established standards, as long as the other advantages 
of their occupation are not threatened.31  
Ashby wrote this in 1929 and was perhaps not aware that the ‘advantages’ 
enjoyed by small farmers were under the kind of threat that their disappearance 
in large numbers demonstrates was a reality.  Even when they did not fail, life 
was an unremitting struggle; the Smallholdings Commissioner, F.E.N. Rogers had 
said in 1916 that ‘children work like slaves on smallholdings’ whilst a MAF 
advisory committee had reported that smallholders had neither the time nor 
money to visit friends or relatives and that women would have to neglect their 
roles in the domestic sphere, accepted as a given in the report, in order to assist 
in any attempt to make a smallholding profitable.32  Southern perceives the 
dangers which might arise from modern, positivistic perpetration of the values of 
‘enterprise’ that might correspond with Ashby’s understanding of small farmers 
and might, through studies other than this one, infiltrate the history of small 
businesses, such as farmers, and then have a reactionary effect on the present.  
Southern notes the existence of a ‘recent push for enterprise as a panacea for 
deprivation in the developed world’ which ‘stems directly from the positive 
notions attached to enterprise rather than any clear theoretical or empirical 
framework’ and is part of a ‘generic discourse concerning its progressive 
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32 NA/MAF/48/26; NA/MAF/48/88. 
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qualities’.33  Storey states that, ‘failure is endemic to the small firm sector’;34   
concentration of capital means that the kind of small businesses dealt with in 
this study would be under particular threat in the western economies in relatively 
recent times: ‘In the US, only 37.2 percent of new firms with one to 4 employees 
created in 1976-8 survived for 6 years.’35 
 The study of the behaviour and the expression of the attitudes of 
members of social classes to one another appears to have grown in popularity in 
the wake of the research of Bourdieu,36 as does the status of small businesses 
and entrepreneurship in the wake of the neoliberal, post-Fordist triumph in the 
1980s.37  The fate of small-scale farmers in the interwar period should act as a 
group warning to anybody who believes that small business operates in the 
economy in an equal relationship with larger businesses.  The one difference 
between the future study of the small businesses of today and that of the small 
farmers of the interwar years is that sources relating to the modern petite 
bourgeoisie will constitute an embarrassment of riches. 
 The apparent dearth of sources of immediate or direct relevance to the 
relationships between small-scale farmers and the rest of rural society has meant 
that statistics have been used to represent them.  They have shown, fairly 
conclusively, that the economic fortunes of small-scale farmers as a whole were 
                                        
33 Southern, A., ‘Introduction: Enterprise and Deprivation’ in, Enterprise, Deprivation and Social 
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in decline in the interwar period.  If the interwar period is to be represented as 
one of mixed fortunes in agriculture, then stress should be laid on the small-
scale farmers who were the victims of misfortune; if it is to be represented as 
one of success, small-scale farmers should be ignored.  The study of the 
interwar countryside, to date, demonstrates that the latter approach would be a 
continuation of the norm. 
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